A Study on Nāgārjuna’s Mahayana Precept Thoughts in Chinese-Translated Mādhyamika-śāstra
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Abstract
This academic article examines Nāgārjuna’s Mahāyāna precept thought as reflected in the Chinese translation of the Madhyamaka-śāstra. It focuses on passages concerning dependent arising, karmic causality, non-self, and the emptiness of dharmas in order to clarify how ethical cultivation can remain meaningful within a philosophy of emptiness. Although modern scholarship has extensively examined Nāgārjuna’s ontology and epistemology, the ethical and disciplinary implications of Madhyamaka thought have received comparatively less attention
The article employs qualitative documentary and textual analysis. The primary source is Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation of the Madhyamaka-śāstra in the Taishō canon, supplemented by Garfield’s English translation of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and relevant modern scholarship in Buddhist philosophy and ethics. The analysis is organized around the Two Truths and three interrelated contemplative themes: dependent arising, karmic causes and effects, and non-self/non-dharma.
The analysis shows that Nāgārjuna’s account of emptiness does not require the rejection of moral discipline. At the level of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), precepts, karmic responsibility, and wholesome conduct retain practical and ethical force. At the level of ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), neither precepts, agents, actions, nor consequences possess independent intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Their emptiness is precisely what makes them dependently arisen and relational rather than fixed or self-subsistent.
The article therefore argues that Mahāyāna precept cultivation and emptiness are not contradictory. Ethical discipline can be understood as a conventional and skillful expression of insight into dependent arising, while the realization of emptiness prevents moral practice from hardening into reification or dogmatism. This interpretation contributes to Buddhist ethics by highlighting the practical dimension of Madhyamaka thought and to Chinese Buddhist studies by showing how the Chinese Madhyamaka-śāstra can be read as a source for reconstructing Nāgārjuna’s ethical vision.
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References
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Nāgārjuna. (n.d.). Zhong lun 中論 [Madhyamaka-śāstra] (Kumārajīva, Trans.). In Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (Vol. 30, No. 1564).
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