Political studies on Military Factions in Thailand, A.D. 1973-2019
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Abstract
This research article consisted of two objectives, namely (1) to investigate the formation of military factions, especially that within the Royal Thai Army, (2) to study the entry into the political role of military factions from 1973 to 2019. In this study, a qualitative research was used as a research design. The study was conducted based on exploring related documents, articles, books, research papers, newspapers, and publications through using the obtained data for analysis, so analyzing the descriptive data by using the concept of military factions and entering a political role when appointed to the command the military force and in senior positions in the Army. The results of the research indicated that (1) the formation of military factions in the Royal Thai Army was caused by the collapse of the centralized power of the senior military factions led by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachon and Field Marshal Prapas Charusathien in the situation of 14 October 1973. The formation of the military factions was characterized by the fellow formation of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy (CRMA), led by the CRMA in class 7 and class 5 of military factions, it was down after 1992, but the formation of the military factions still occurred and was transformed into a formation grouping of the military who grew up in the 2nd Infantry Division, Queen Sirikit's Guard or Burapha Payak and the 1st Divisions, the King's Guard or Wongthewan which grouping to build networks and influence by supporting fellow into important positions in the Army and supported military subordinates who were close to a strategic position of the Army, such as a combat controlling position which was a long-term position forces format in both groups. (2) After the events of 14 October 1973 until the year of 1992, it was the era that the military factions of Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy (CRMA), led by the CRMA in class 7 and class 5 of military factions, came to play a political role by balancing power and dominated in the Army and after 1992 until the year of 2019 was the era when Burapha Payak and Wongthewan military factions completed to the senior positions and controlling forces in the Army, especially the Commander-in-Chief and the 1st Army Area Command, the Burapha Payak military factions that could hold both positions continuously. This allowed the factions to be able to long-term position forces and to play a greater political role than the Wongthewan military factions after the coup on 19 September 2006 coup until 2019.
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