Problems Concerning the Independence of the Constitutional Court in the Context of Law and Politics

Abstract

This academic article aims to examine and analyze the issues concerning the independence of the Constitutional Court of Thailand under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2560 (2017), within the contexts of law and politics. The findings reveal that although the current Constitution explicitly guarantees the independence of the Constitutional Court, such independence continues to face significant challenges arising from the transitional political climate. The principal issues stem from the selection and appointment process of Constitutional Court judges, which allows political influence to intervene in the final stage through the Senate. In addition, inconsistencies remain regarding the uniformity of judicial tenure within the institution. Furthermore, the Court bears the burden of adjudicating highly sensitive political cases, particularly those concerning the dissolution of political parties, within a Thai political culture deeply rooted in patronage systems and authoritarian attitudes. These factors have placed the Constitutional Court at the center of political conflicts and weakened public confidence in the institution. Consequently, this article proposes an amendment to Article 204, paragraph one, of the Constitution by revising the Senate’s approval requirement from “not less than one-half” to “not less than one-fifth” of the total existing members of the Senate.