Compensation Determination Factors for the Executive Personnel Groups of State Enterprises in Thailand : A Case Study of Group A State Enterprises in Thailand
Keywords:
Executive groups in state enterprises, Compensation Management, Organizational Characteristics, Political RelationshipAbstract
This research aims to find personal characteristic factors of the executive personnel groups (EPGs), by considering the characteristics of an organization, which leads to different compensation determination. The researcher also adds political relationship factor into consideration. The researcher uses the mixed-method research by in-depth interviews with 25 personnel who involve with the compensation determination process of the target group. Questionnaires were used to collect information from 347 employees in state enterprises from level 5 or assistant director level of a department onward. The result shows that 1) State enterprise A is in an industry with a low number of competitors. The form of this industry is considered to be concentrated. The environment of competitiveness for this industry consists of only a handful of big players. At the same time, State enterprise B is in a monopolized business. It is difficult for a new player to enter the market and be competitive with both state enterprises. 2) Accessibility to resources ( = -.327), determined compensation from other players in the market ( = .224), management experience ( = .224), and ability to create changes ( = .135), are the factors that determine compensation differences of the EPGs in State enterprise A. All variables have 30% of predictive efficacy (Adjusted R2 = .300). While executive board ( = -.296), determined compensation from other players in the market ( = -.292), management experience ( = -.249), and ability to create changes ( = .216), are the factors that determine compensation differences of the EPGs in State enterprise B. All variables have 28% of predictive efficacy (Adjusted R2 = .280). 3) Political relationship factors are more influential in recruitment than determined compensation for the EPGs.
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