Same Again? – Individuation and its Presuppositions
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Abstract
Are there any conditions that are necessary prerequisites in order for the individuation of three-dimensional continuants to be successful? This paper concentrates on the most comprehensive current account of what is involved in singling out an object. It is suggested that the main thesis of the account put forward by David Wiggins, to wit, that all identity statements need to be supplied with covering concepts of a very specific kind, is best defended by isolating the formal conditions of possibility of the conceptual practice in question.
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