INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION PLANS, SUSTAINABLE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM INDUSTRIAL ESTATE AUTHORITY OF THAILAND
Keywords:
Information Asymmetry, Incentive-Based Compensation Plans, Sustainable Organizational Commitment, Managerial PerformanceAbstract
The main purpose of this study is to examine the influences of information asymmetry, incentive-based compensation plans and sustainable organizational commitment on managerial performance. It is well known that Information asymmetry happens when the firm has subordinates who have more private information or possess confidential information about their work environment and responsibility function than their top managers. The existence of a subordinate’s private information is an illustration of information asymmetry. This study posits a positive assumption that subordinates have more private information about their responsible work and share it as result to provide the firm receive the additional information and the useful information for decision making of top managers in the future. The data were collected from a survey of 270 firms. Moreover, 270 firms are classified into two groups: high and low information asymmetry groups to compare and confirm the result of regression. The results find that information asymmetry, incentive-based compensation plans, and sustainable organizational commitment have a positive effect on managerial performance. The robust test of comparison between both groups confirms that information asymmetry, incentive-based compensation plans, and sustainable organizational commitment have a positive effect on managerial performance in the group of high information asymmetry situation as well.
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