T. M. Scanlon on Normativity: A Methodological Exploration
Keywords:
philosophical methodology, normativity, reason for action, reflective equilibrium, T. M. ScanlonAbstract
This article argues that T. M. Scanlon’s account of normativity, grounded in the concepts of reasons and reason relations, is strongly justified as it attains substantive coherence through the method of reflective equilibrium. The argument focuses on three strategies employed by Scanlon in his critical analysis of Joseph Raz’s and Jonathan Dancy’s alternative accounts of normativity, namely, (1) characterization, (2) the pursuit of narrow reflective equilibrium (N-RE), and (3) the pursuit of wide reflective equilibrium (W-RE). In addition to the robustness provided by substantive coherence, which safeguards his account against Justin Clarke-Doane’s objection regarding reliability, Scanlon is also able to address other criticisms. This is because Scanlon’s philosophical methodology incorporates (1) conceptualization and generalization through instances and (2) the pursuit of convergence among divergent accounts.
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