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China's Modernization Approach: A Genuine Break from the Past or a Repackaging of familiar Developmental Discourse for African States?

Abiodun A. Adiat ^{1*}   , Kayode W. Olawoyin ²  

¹ Development of International Relations, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria

² Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria

* Corresponding Author, © Authors

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Abstract

Many new states in the developing world after their independence adopted the western modernization approach which focuses on liberal democracy and capitalism as a panacea to their problem of low industrial productivity and underdevelopment. However, several decades after, the western modernization approach has not been able to bring about much development to the poor countries of the global south. Against this background, this article with the use of in-depth interviews and secondary materials examines the credibility of the Chinese modernization approach as a viable alternative to development in developing countries. Specifically, it examines the basis of the Chinese modernization approach and also investigates the extent to which the approach is a credible alternative to the western modernization approach. It also examines the significant differences in the Chinese and western modernization model. The findings of the study reveal that the Chinese developmental model offers a lot of significant innovations to African states which makes it to be a credible alternative developmental model to the western modernization model. This is because it demonstrates the importance of state led developmental approach for a developing country in need of development. In spite of this significance, the Chinese model is not a fit for all system, hence it recommends that African states learns from the Chinese experience and evolve a system that fits their needs based on lessons learnt from the model.

Introduction

Development theories or models are multi variate in nature because of the plethora of paradigms about the path way to development for a developing nation. Some of the most important paradigms within development studies include modernization theory, dependency theory, neoclassical theory, structuralism among several others. These theories provided hypothetical explanations about the causes of underdevelopment and the prescribed options or path way for development for states in dire need of development. However, Development studies from the late 1950s and early 1960s witness the dominance

of the western modernization approach as the pathway to development for the countries in the global south. The approach is described as a theory that uses a systematic process to move underdeveloped or developing countries to a more sophisticated level of development (Reyes, 2001). It is basically an American and Euro-centric normative model of development while its focus is on cultural change directed at institutional structures in non-industrialized countries (Bubaker, 2015). Basically, the theory explains disparity in developmental status of states by pinpointing different values, systems and ideas believed in by states (Martinussen, 1997).

The success of this model in the global north has been attributed to the adoption of this approach which is based on democracy, capitalism and largely industrialization. As a consequence of this, many new states in the developing world switched to the practice of liberal democracy and capitalism as a panacea to their problem of low industrial productivity and acute state of under-development. However, several decades after, the western modernization approach has not been able to bring about much development to the poor countries of the global south. Even post industrial models such as the neo liberal paradigm has offered little hope for development in the global south. Developing countries in the global south continue to demonstrate several negative indices of under development why living standards continue to deteriorate. Against this background, this article with the use of in-depth interviews and secondary materials examines the credibility of the Chinese modernization approach as a viable alternative to development in developing states of Africa. Specifically, the objectives of the study are to: (a) assess the basis of the Chinese modernization approach and also investigates the extent to which the approach is a credible alternative to the western modernization approach; (b) examine the significant differences in the Chinese and western modernization model. These objectives of the study are significant because of their potential to provide an insight into the Chinese modernization approach as an alternative developmental strategy for developing states.

Methodology

This study is qualitative and it generates data from both primary and secondary sources. For the primary data, in-depth interview method was adopted and it was conducted with 25 respondents that are purposively selected for the study. The interviewees include 5 respondents selected from Chinese embassy in Nigeria, 5

respondents from Nigeria Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The respondents were selected because of their role as policy makers and advisors on these issues. It also include 15 respondents from three Nigerian Universities who have done an extensive research work in this area. The data for the study will also be generated from secondary materials such as books, articles and online publications. Data generated for the study were analyzed through the use of thematic content analysis.

Theoretical Framework

The theory of Structuralism is adopted as the appropriate framework for this study. Structuralism is a development theory that focused on structural aspects that stagnate economic growth of developing countries. Basically, it has to do with the transformation of a country's economy from the reliance on an agrarian system to a more industrialize system. The basis of the theory is that economic growth in developing states requires state intervention to sustain the operation of the market system. The origin of the theory can be traced to the 1950s and 1960s in Latin America which explains about the necessity of state intervention in the region's quest for economic growth and development. The theory is mostly associated with Latin American scholars. According to the proponents of the theory, there is a need for major structural changes in governance and economy of less developed countries which are to be spearheaded by the government. The logic of this model is that new industries initially do not possess the economies of scale that is required to compete with their competitors from developed economies. As a result, they need to be protected until they are able to gather strength to compete in the global capitalist market. The theory developed as a response to the inability of modernization theory and liberal approach to solve Latin America's endemic problem of vulnerability to external forces, poverty and social exclusion (Kay, 1998).

This model challenges the hypothetical prepositions of the modernization and liberal theory that markets is a self regulating system that returns to stable equilibrium position rather than as a substantive expression of national or international power status of the contracting parties (Di Fillippo, 2009). The implication of this is that the state in the developing countries have important role to play in the market in order to achieve sustainable economic growth. This theory is relevant to the study because of its appropriateness in explaining the subject matter of the study. Specifically, it helps to understand the importance of the role played by the Chinese government in enabling relative political stability which is pivotal for its economic growth and development. Furthermore, it also helps to understand the factors responsible for the Chinese modernization approach with the capability to make predictions about its probability of becoming a credible alternative to the western modernization approach.

Chinese Modernization Approach: Basis and Principles

The concept of modernity in the western context is a byproduct of historical and cultural forces that resulted in the era of enlightenment, forces of European histories and culture that is different from that of China (Golden, 2006). This European modernity was introduced into China's history through the forces of European imperialism (*Ibid*). However, it will be a herculean task to understand Chinese approach to modernization without comprehending this part of history. This is because; China's dissatisfaction with the western imposed modernization model is a percussion to its invention of a home grown model which is refers to as the Chinese modernization. The Chinese model of modernization is a combination of free market system with an authoritarian form of governance. According to Zhao (2010), China's modernization approach

is based on two factors. The first is that China basically adopted some elements of liberal economic policy by giving greater access to foreign direct investments as well as domestic investments. The resulting effect is that the system enhances labour flexibility, low tax and regulatory burden as well as the creation of an outstanding infrastructure that supports credible investment. This was through the integration of private sector and state spending. The second component of the model is the enabling of the ruling party to sustain its firm grip on government, army, internal security apparatus, courts and free flow of information (Callick, 2007). As a consequence, China has established a positive linkage between political stability and economic growth as well as a relatively perfect balance between a capitalist system and an authoritarian system in its effort to sustain its modernization efforts with its persistent economic growth (Zhao, 2010). As argued by Jiang (2023), China's modernization strategy is anchored on the imperial mode, whose path dependence is the foundational operational mechanism of the Chinese society. This means that China did not abandon its imperial systems in its quest for modernization. Furthermore, Dari and Oyuna (2014) noted that the Chinese modernization approach is characterized by a complex, dynamic and non uniform process. This is similar to the unstructured multi-linear model that characterized the developmental strategy adopted by the Soviet Union in its socialist national economy in its early stage. They identified three stages of Chinese process of modernization which include: Early, Revolutionary and Reformation stages. Each of these stages according to these scholars has its own goals, challenges and constraints. At the first stage, the desire is to win over national independence. This is due to the fact that China had been colonized by British imperialists while the western way of life has also been imposed throughout the period of imperialism.

This stage is essential because of the centrality of culture to modernity. This implies that modernization requires embracing and fortifying a country's culture. Hence the desire for political independence will enable the Chinese authority to be in control of their destiny. The major challenge of this stage is about to how bring an end to the influence of the erstwhile imperialists and sustain their independence. At the second stage, which occurs after independence, the main goal under this stage is to seek innovations about new political systems, achieve national economic recovery as well as mass projects on industrialization. The goal of this stage is to essentially transform the Chinese society through modernization of its political, social and economic systems. The third stage of the Chinese modernization process is characterized by a concern for realistic developmental concept by giving consideration to national peculiarities such as revival of national spirit of the Chinese people. This process of modernization embarked upon by the Chinese authorities has revolutionized the Chinese traditional societies in three different ways. The first is that the traditional society which was conservative in nature was replaced by a new desire for futuristic goals with the determination to achieve them. This means that the Chinese society has become more open to the progressiveness in the international system which is made possible by globalization. Specifically it made closeness to be replaced with openness by its allowance of foreign direct investments and foreigners into the Chinese society. The second is about the greater emphasis on collectivity which resulted in the assimilation and synchronization of various interests in the society. The third is that modern science has instigated the spirit of analytics and criticism in the Chinese society. The Chinese modernization process is characterized by four major principles that were initiated by Den Xiaoping in 1979 during the initial phase of the reform

while debates were not allowed on these principles within the people's republic of China (Shambaugh, 2000). These cardinal principles as enunciated by him include:

- The principle of upholding the communist path
- The principle of upholding the people's democratic dictatorship
- The principle of upholding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- The principle of upholding Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism

Upholding the Communist Path

Theoretically, communism as a political and economic ideology is an egalitarian and peaceful principle that advocated for a society whereby people attain the highest social, political and economic progress (Salaam and Usman, 2015). The system is characterized by absence of antagonism and class differences while private property ownership is abolished. This ideal political and economic creed that is attributed mainly to Karl Marx serves as the major principle of Chinese modernization in a revised form. As a cardinal principle of the Chinese modernization approach, it emphasizes on collectivism in the exercise of political power as well as the management of economic resources. This implies that government and the market are directed towards ensuring the good of all which is a basic principle of communism as a political and economic ideology. This makes China to have the most State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the world than any other state (Pieke and Hoffman, 2022). This is in contrast to individualism under the western modernization approach where political and economic power is exercised by a privileged few. Hence, the communist path is held sacrosanct in the Chinese modernization approach while the system does not allow any criticism of the system.

Upholding the people's democratic dictatorship

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a cardinal principle of Marxism which emphasizes the importance of the vesting political power in the people for the sake of political stability. This principle is a derivative from the first one which emphasizes on political and economic collectivism. Specifically, political power under the principle as practiced in China is vested in the people and they are seen as the supreme authority in the Chinese state. This is against the exercise of political power by a privilege few under the western modernization system.

The principle of upholding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

One party system is an integral feature of socialist democracy which symbolizes a symbol of political stability which is needed for sustainable economic growth. The logic behind this is that political pluralism under multi party system usually brings about political instability. Hence, an entrenchment of one party system has the potential to bring about high level of unity and the much needed political stability in the system. It is on the basis that this principle guarantees that upholding of the Chinese Communist Party as the dominant political party in China.

The principle of upholding Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism

Marxist Leninism is a political ideology that is describe as the largest faction of the global communist movement after the after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917-1923 and it was a dominant political and economic ideology among socialist countries in the 20th century (Lansford, 2007). The ideology believes in a two stage process of communist revolution is required to replace capitalism. Hence, it further expatiates that the state should control the, means of production in other to pave way for an eventual communist society that will be classless and stateless (Cooke,

1998 and Morgan, 2015). While China continues to uphold the collectivist principle promoted by this ideology, it has indeed favour a market economy under the vanguard of the Chinese Communist party which is responsible for the management of the country's economy. The Chinese modernization strategy since the holding of power by the Communist Party of China has made distribution and management of public resources for the achievement of the common prosperity of all ethnic group and regions in the country (Ren and Shen, 2023). This collectivist approach to economic management differentiates China significantly from the western modernization model that focus on profit motive of the minority group. It has also help to consolidate the power of the CCP as decision making system is also based on consultation with stakeholders that represent relatively all interests. In this regard, China can thus be described as a modern socialist state that has successfully integrated itself into the global economy. For instance, before 1978, China had a closed economy with a government tight fist on the control of its economy. These four principles are indications of the fact that in theory, China is a communist state that subscribe to the tenets of communism in a revised way and this has enabled it to preserve its ideological stability and legitimacy of the CCP as response to the global democratic movement. Subsequently, the principles are given further legitimacy by their inculcation into the constitution of the People's Republic of China in 1982(Song, 2015).

Results and Discussion

Chinese Modernization: A Credible Alternative or an extension of the Old Rhetoric

Most observers and scholars on Chinese modernization approach are optimistic about the credibility of the model as a substantive alternative to development that can be emulated by developing countries. However, this section examines the credibility of the claim that the Chinese

modernization is indeed significant and can serve as a good alternative to western modernization approach in a modified form. This is against the background of the failures of several developmental paradigms such as the neo liberal model, western modernization and other Keynesian models. Specifically, the model has been contended to be a better replacement for the western modernization approach as well as other models that have failed to mirror the model of developments in developed countries in the developing countries. The Chinese approach according to one observer who is also a respondent for this study is described as:

A very complex and slow process which endured over time. This means that it is not a developmental approach that develops overnight, but represents a clear departure from the western model (Interview, 16.09.2023).

This according to Chen and Naughton (2016) is a developmental effort that evolve over a period of 37 years from 1978-2015 and the system continue to evolve with different levels of adaptation at both political and economic level. This period is breakdown into different eras which include 1978-1985, 1979-1989, 1993- 1999, 19992-2010 and 2013-2015. Each of these periods had designated political and economic objectives that the government set out to achieve. The periods are in a non linear form because of different sets of political and economic objectives that the state was trying to pursue at the same time. It is the actualization of the different set of political and economic agenda that were set out by the Chinese government that resulted in what is been refer to as the Chinese modernization approach. The developmental model of the Chinese by its nature is characterized by trans formativeness, institutional innovation; guiding role of values and the awareness of the material connect between man and nature as well as global transparency (Liu and Xiong, 2023). Furthermore,

Naughton (2007) argued about the gradual evolvement of the Chinese modernization approach as he noted that:

Chinese approach of development, in the beginning, was followed because reformers literally did not know where they are going: they were reformers "without a blueprint" and merely seeking ways to ameliorate the obvious serious problems of the planned economy. The approach to transition was starkly different in Eastern Europe and Boris Yeltsin's Russia (and Latin America). In those countries, the predominant objective of committed reformers was to move as rapidly as feasible to a modern market economy, reformers did not believe that their governments could correct distortions in their economy (Naughton 2007, p. 86).

The implication of this is that the success of the Chinese modernization approach was as a result of high level of commitment and endurance on the part on the people and government of China. According to Yang (2022), the CPC adopted a party centric path to modernizing the country while its adoption of democratic centralism in its power structure clearly differentiates it from the western representative democracy. This is supported by another respondent as he noted that:

Chinese modernization approach is an inspiration for global development and a suitable challenge to the western modernization model which has dominated developmental discourse for decades (Interview, 12.09. 2023).

This implies that it is an alternative developmental model that can encourage other developing countries to pursue their own path to development and not necessarily by coping China or the western nations but by evolving their own home grown solution. This will enable them to pursue a kind of development that is dynamic, sustainable and truly progressive. With this home grown approach, China has emerged has the world largest economy using the

purchasing power parity as the bench mark while based on official exchange rate; it is world second largest economy (Hou, 2014 and Interview, 15.8.2023). The most essential component of China's political economy is the presence of a virile invasive government and the dominance of the political over the economic and the social system (Chen and Naughton, 2016). The strong involvement of the government in the economy is providing the relative stability that is needed for the sustenance of the country's economic growth. According to Zhang and Zhao (2023), the China's peculiar modernization strategy has propelled it into the ranks of modernized countries within an amazing period of 40 years. The implication of this strategy for a developing nation is that government withdrawal from the market has dire consequences for economic growth. Hence, government is expected to be involved in the market to ameliorate shocks in the system. These shocks are usually caused by unforeseen economic circumstances which market forces may not be able to respond to and which the fragile economy may also not be able to cope with. Structuralism which is the framework for this study provided a further analytical support for this by its advocacy for state intervention as a panacea for development in developing countries. As captured by Amsden (2009):

The establishment of control mechanisms to change the status of the countries of the

"rest" is a key variable for understanding the uniqueness in the process of economic development. The international implications of the Chinese model of development in the Global South of the states that today can be considered as emerging economic powers. Hence, the mechanism of reciprocal control of the 'rest' thereby transformed the inefficiency and venality associated with government intervention in a collective good, as well as the 'invisible hand' of the control mechanism led by the North Atlantic market turned chaos and selfishness forms of market in a general welfare" (Amsden, 2009, p.39).

This Chinese modernization approach in contrast to the western modernization approach is termed or designated as the Beijing consensus. The Beijing consensus was an invention of John Cooper Rano in his work "Notes on New Physics of Chinese power which was published in 2004. The work summarizes China's unique approach to development with significant emphasis on the special role of the state in the management of the economy. He used the nomenclature as a neology in development studies to contrast the Washington consensus which he described as a more conventional approach. The summary of the Washington consensus as enunciated by Williamson (1990) is highlighted on table 1

Table 1
The Washington Consensus

S/No	Point	Later Revised or Qualified
1	Fiscal Discipline	
2	Reordering of public expenditure	
3	Liberalized interest rate	*
4	Competitive exchange rate	*
5	Trade liberalization	
6	Liberalization of inward FDI	*
7	Privatization	*

S/No	Point	Later Revised or Qualified
8	Deregulation to ease barriers for firms entry and exit,	*
9	Strong protection of property rights	*
10	Tax reform that combines broad tax base with moderate marginal rates	*

Source: (Williamson, 1990)

The points listed in Table I represents the set of issues that Williamson (1990) proposed everyone in Washington should be contented with and they also represent what is needed as significant policy reforms in Latin America. It is on this basis that he tagged these set of points as Washington consensus. The points with tags are those that has been revised and found acceptable as substantive needed economic policies in the west as recommended by him. The Washington consensus as encapsulated by Williamson 1990 is a globalised adaptation of the modernization theory, which advocated that developing countries should emulate Western institutions in order for them to attain the level of development in the West in the modern world (World Foresight Forum, 2011). The effects of the Washington on consensus have been noted in several studies as

an instrument of imperialism. According to Omonihu and Okonkwo (2018) in their study on the effect of Washington consensus on Africa's development with Nigeria as an example, they argued that the consensus is a strategy for perpetuating underdevelopment in Africa. Furthermore, Hickel, (2020) and Momoh, (2023) also argued that neo-liberal institutions such as International Monetary Fund and World Bank have used their stringent conditionalities to perpetuate developmental crisis in sub Saharan Africa. This validates the theoretical framework for the study as it shows how the consensus have been used as an instrument of imperialism to stagnate development in the developing countries of Africa. On other hand, table II on the next page is an illustration of the set of points that are tagged as Beijing consensus.

Table 2
Beijing Consensus

S/No	Points
1	Innovation-Based Development
2	Economic success measured not by per capita GDP growth but by its sustainability and level of equality
3	Self-determination for China and for other countries vis-à-vis the United States: Opposition to the Washington Consensus Globalization on their own terms Chinese influence by example, not weaponry Develop asymmetric capabilities to balance against the United States

Source: (Ramo, 2004)

The set of items on table II represents the alternative developmental model to Washington consensus as developed by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004. This different aspects of China's approach to development is what is collectively referred to as the Beijing consensus. The most important feature of these set of points is their dynamic and innovative nature. Another important factor is that development under this model is not measured by economic growth but by the extent of sustainability of the system and the level of equality. Specifically, the model does not advocate a fit for all prescription, but developmental reality interpreted based on peculiar needs of a state. It is on the sharp basis of its departure from the Washington consensus that earns it commendable recognition from scholars as a model capable of replacing the western modernization model. For instance, it has been argued that the political and economic success that has been achieved by China in over four decades has made it the largest biggest potential ideological competitor to liberal democratic capitalism since the end of communism (Ash, 2008). In spite of the notable significance of the Chinese modernization approach, it has been criticized on the basis that it is not a worthwhile competitor to the western modernization approach while Ramo's coinage of Beijing consensus has been described as a misguided and inaccurate account of China's actual reform experience (Kennedy, 2010). However, this criticism has not diminished the importance of the Chinese model as an alternative developmental approach. This is because it offers many useful innovations that can be utilized for by a developing nation.

Chinese and western modernization model:

Significant Variances

The Chinese and Western modernization models is based on the economic creed of free markets system which is otherwise referred to as capitalism. However, despite the similarity in their economic ideology, the two systems differ in the aspect of the political framework provided for the sustenance of their economic systems. In this regard, the focus of this section will be on an elaborate discussion about the significant differences between the western modernization approach and the Chinese model of development. The Chinese model as earlier discussed is a blend of a free market system with an authoritarian system. Apart from this, political and economic power under the Chinese system is exercised on a collective basis while the CCP exercises this power on behalf of the people. The western modernization model on the other hand is based on the practice of liberal democracy and free market economic system. An obvious sharp contrast between the two models is the idea of political plurality in one instance and political censorship on the other hand. The CCP as the ruling party in China is vested with the authority to take political and economic decisions for the good governance of the people's republic of China. In spite of the differences between the western and Chinese model of development, the area of convergence between the two models is that they both operate a free market system that allows for both foreign and local investment from individuals and groups. However, their differences are highlighted on table III on the next page.

Table 3
Differences between the Western and Chinese Model of Modernization

S/No	Western Model	Chinese Model
1	Liberal Capitalism	State Capitalism
2	Liberal Democracy	Socialist Democracy
3	Individualism	Collectivism
4	Win/Lose approach to economic activities	Win/Win Approach to economic activities
5	Imperial approach to industrialization	Non imperial approach to industrialization

Source: (Field Work, 2023)

At the economic level, both western and Chinese model espoused different variants of capitalism. For the west, the focus is on liberal capitalism which is a free market system that advocated for limited government intervention in the market. Under the system, the market is expected to be regulated mainly by the forces of demand and supply while the government is expected to play limited role of providing law and order for the system. The Chinese model on the other hand advocated for a free market oriented system with strong government intervention. The extent of the government intervention is a major differentiating factor about the kind of capitalism that is practiced by the duo. The second factor that differentiates the two is the political framework that is provided for the regulation of the system. Under the western modernization model, the operating political system is the liberal democracy which allows for political competition among various political parties. The Chinese model on the other hand favors a socialist form of democracy which allows the existence of a single party as the legitimate party for the system. The socialist democracy is essentially a one party or political framework that allows only one political party to run the affairs of the state (Monyani, 2018). The argument for this is that a one party system if well structured engenders political stability which is needed for the development of the state (Ibid).

The third factor is the issue of individualism versus collectivism as the basis for the organization of the society and most especially at the political and economic level. The western modernization model subscribed to the ideology of liberalism which emphasize on the primacy of an individual in political and economic relations. The implication of this is that the individual is seen as the basic unit of the society and as such relations in the society should be on individual basis. According to Awofeso and Udokang(2015), liberalism is a philosophical idea that stresses the freedom and rights of every individual and also believes in freedom within the social context and individual realm both politically and economically. One of the central themes of the liberal ideology is the concept of individualism. This refer to the believe in the supreme importance of the individual over any social group or collective body (Heywood, 2003). This idea of individualism serves as the basis for the allocation of political and economic resources in the west. As a consequence of this, inequality increases in the society as those who have continue to pullulate while the have-nots continue to wallow in abject poverty. According to Marx, individualism gives rise to the acquisition of private property which in turn results in primitive accumulation of wealth at the expense of the mass of the people. The Chinese model on the other hand subscribes to the ideology of Marxism/Leninism. This is a **collectivist ideology**

that emphasizes the primacy of the group in political and economic relations. As a political ideology, it advocated for the control of means of production as well as the suppression of political opposition in order to promote collectivism which will eventually result in a classless society (Adrain, 1994; Cookie, 1998; Busky, 2002; and Morgan, 2015). This ideology is the basis of the four principles that governs the Chinese modernization process. As a collectivist ideology, the individual is seen as subordinate to a social group or any other social organization (Nolen, 2023). In spite of its adoption of free market system, the collectivist principle has been used constantly to regulate the economic activities of the people's republic of China.

The fourth differentiating factor is their approach to trade relations and other forms of economic activities. The western modernization system because of its emphasis on the profit for the capitalist class can be described as a zero sum game where one party loses and the other party wins. Under the Chinese modernization, the government performs the role of a leveler, which makes wealth to be pervasive in the society. According to a respondent:

The role of the Chinese government as a leveler in the Chinese political system has contributed immensely to increased standard of living in China and also helps to eradicate abject poverty which was prevalent many years ago (Interview, 16.08.2023).

Furthermore, it has helped China in more than two decades to move from the periphery to the center of the global economic system thereby shifting the geographical core of capitalist accumulation process (Vadell, et al, 2014).

The fifth factor has to do with their approach to industrialization which forms the core of modernization under the two models. Under the western modernization model, imperial ambition plays a critical role in their process of industrialization (Interview, 16.09.2023). Specifically,

the west engaged in slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. This affords them the opportunity to have access to cheap labor and raw materials which is highly essential for the growth of their industries. According to Rodney (2005), Western Europe in its imperial relations with Africa ascertains the transfer of wealth from Africa to Europe. This transfer of wealth occurs throughout Africa's imperial relationship with Europe from the slavery period to the post-colonial era. The Chinese modernization on the other hand in its over four decades has been based on friendship between China and other developing countries and developed countries on the basis of equality of states. For instance, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been described as a tool of economic diplomacy which intends to deliver trillions of dollars for infrastructure financing for Asia, Europe and Africa (Hurley et al, 2018). As a global developmental strategy, it was adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 to invest in infrastructural development in more than 150 countries and international organizations (World Bank, 2019). As at August 2023, about 155 countries were listed to have signed up for the BRI (Christopher, 2022). While the initiative has been criticized or interpreted as a plan for a sinocentric international trade network (Cohan, 2017), it has not been viewed as an instrument of imperialism and most especially by the countries that have signed up to it. Significantly, the initiative has made several states and their people to have favorable opinion about China as an economic model as well as an attractive partner for their developmental needs (Brautigam, 2020). This shows that China in its approach to industrialization and modernization has basically utilized a non imperial approach compared to the western imperial method. The data on table three demonstrates the difference between the Washington consensus on table 1 and the Beijing consensus on table two. The essence is to give more clarity to the two models of development.

Conclusion

The study examined the basis of the Chinese modernization approach and also investigates the extent to which it can be described as a credible developmental alternative. It also identifies and discusses the basic differences between the Chinese modernization and western modernization model. The Chinese approach to development is basically a mix of free market system with democratic dictatorship. The system by its nature is dynamic and complex while the government responds to changes both usual and unusual shocks in the system. In the Chinese example, the system has been very useful as it has made China to move from the status of developing nation in the 1970s to the second largest economy. However, political culture of the Chinese plays a very important role in its blending of a free market system with dictatorial governance. Historically, China has been ruled by series of dynasties and even when its monarchical system was abolished in 1949, it was replaced with democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the Chinese communist party. Another important factor is the belief of most Chinese in the ideology of Confucianism which is described as a theory of governance and a way of life (De Barry, 1989). This peculiar political culture of the Chinese as well as their political experience makes the excessive state intervention in the economy to be sustainable. However, the evolving political system in China can be described as a stakeholder democracy. This is because of its constitutional prescription that the state shall be governed by a people's democratic dictatorship that is led by a working class while the state institutions are expected to adhere to the principles of democratic centralism (NPC, 2019). Hence the Chinese workers or middle class represents the major stakeholders in the Chinese political system. It is on this basis that the PRC describe China's democratic system as a socialist consultative democracy (Qinglin, 2013) as well as

a whole process people's democracy (Drinhausen, 2023).

In spite of the peculiarity of this model to China, it offers a lot of significant innovations to African states which makes it to be a credible alternative developmental model to the western modernization model. The first is that it demonstrates how a free market system can be organized to promote equality rather than inequality and promote common good as opposed to what is presently obtainable under the western modernization approach. Secondly, it demonstrates the significance of state intervention in the management of the economy of a developing state because of its fragility and vulnerability to the market forces in the international capitalist system. Hence, this state intervention helps to respond to the different kind of shocks in the system. Thirdly, the Chinese model of development shows the high level of resilience and dynamism that is required by a developing country in its quest for modernization. In spite of this significance, the Chinese model is not a fit for all systems while its greatest take away is that developing countries should strive to adopt and adapt a model of development that best fit their political and economic situation. In this regard, a hybridization of the two models may be essential. This is because developmental approach is multifaceted and an examination of an alternative developmental paradigm like the Chinese model is essential for a relative equal global development.

Recommendation

In line with the findings of the study, some recommendations are suggested for further research and policy choices by the government. For the government of African states, there are lessons they should learn from China about the role of state in the development of developing states. While the study does not recommend a complete adoption of the Chinese model because

of its peculiarity to the Chinese system, it recommend that based on the Chinese system, African states should evolve their own developmental model that fits their economic needs. Furthermore, there is also the need for policy makers to redirect economic policies of chauvinist capitalism by making government policies to serve public interest and not the interest of the minority. Future research should have as its focal point, the evolving of developmental paradigm that can provide an insight on a development paradigm for Africa with little or no reliance on external development partners. While the Chinese model already provides an insight, there is the need for the development of a paradigm that focus on the needs of Africa.

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The Milk Tea Alliance as Internationalizing Protest

Ariel Blenkitni ^{1*}  , Jordan Alexander Forehand ² 

¹ Institute of Political Science at the National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan

² St. Dominic's Catholic School, Kaohsiung, Taiwan

* Corresponding Author, © Authors

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Abstract

The Milk Tea Alliance movement acted as a tacit alliance linking pro-democracy advocates uniting citizens across Asia. The loose collective is a reaction to authoritarianism, whether internal, as in the case of Myanmar's civil war, or regional, as with the relationship between China and its neighbors. This loose ideological association uses social media to promote their message and collaborate with other democratic activists, transcending international borders. This analysis seeks to uncover whether the movement internationalized domestic protest movements' solidarism to promote democratic values through mobilizing attention, amplifying popular cross-border opposition. Combing through Facebook's corpus to temporally track participation behavior, this research questions whether the internationalization of domestic democratization movements represents instrumentalized exploitation of the popularity of trending hashtags, or rather represents a more integrative form of nonreciprocal solidaristic participation, potentially symbolizing the inculcation of universalist democratic values in an international protest movement that could outlive domestic opposition. The findings suggest that the majority of international participatory behavior occurred irrespective of the domestic state political situations of participants, and was therefore largely nonreciprocal. Thus, the Milk-Tea Alliance apparently represents a case of effective transnational solidarity.

Introduction

In 2020, Science posed a question as to "whether citizen movements alone—absent external support—are sufficient to check newly emboldened autocrats (Hyde)." The natural corollary of this question is how those movements seek out and institutionalize this external support. An ideal test case for this is the recent period of democratic unraveling in Asia that has led to a regional push against authoritarianism. Perhaps because of the ineffectiveness of these domestic movements, they have gradually merged their symbols to become a cross-national and collective struggle,

appearing to consolidate resources to provide institutionalized popular external support in the form of a shared movement. Beginning in Thailand during their first wave of protests in 2020 against the military junta, a tacit alliance between Thai protesters and supporters from Hong Kong and Taiwan emerged, in what would be called the "Milk Tea Alliance." This movement would later stretch to encompass political events in India and Myanmar, eventually expanding to include mutual mobilization across the entire region, and would eventually include solidaristic participation from across the world.

Democracy-minded activists in these countries provided mutual support for one another, and this new form of mobilization largely took place in the digital space. This support took the form of sharing advocacy and drawing attention to turmoil in affected states through hashtags, news, and memes. While there were of course elements of shared focus, the ultimate question that must be posited in the wake of this apparently transnational action was whether these novel forms of digital mobilization and resource sharing constitute what has been called instrumentalized action (Pilny & Shumate, 2012) in the form of hashtag sharing just to garner attention for parochial domestic issues, or rather solidarity unconditional of reciprocal transnational participation representing common values (Bob, 2018; Robin-D'Cruz, 2019) such as international democracy and human rights.

The initial formation of this loose coalition is attributed to Thai actor, Vachirawit Chiva-aree, coming under attack from Chinese netizens after his girlfriend, "Nevvy," of the eponymous hashtag, posted an Instagram photo in which she tacitly implied that Taiwan and China are two different countries. This led to a vitriolic backlash amongst Chinese online activists, who began lambasting the Thai government, followed by a counterreaction in Thailand. Thai netizens, for their part, quickly rallied against the attacks with digital mobilization, which were initially primarily confined to Instagram and Weibo. This led to millions of posts, and billions of impressions, along with a swift backlash from the greater public who opposed what they saw as indirect Chinese censorship outside the borders of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Due to a degree of cultural proximity, as well as a shared heritage of victims of authoritarianism, online users from Hong Kong and Taiwan quickly joined ranks with the Thai people in demonstrating opposition to what they perceived

as the PRC throwing its weight around. The three countries, through their cooperation, quickly formed a tacit alliance to oppose what they viewed as Chinese aggression. This opposition quickly came to encompass more than just anti-PRC speech, and rather began to grow into a broader movement characterized by anti-authoritarianism, and pan-Asian democratic idealism.

Within a month, a group of users from India joined the movement just preceding the China-India border skirmishes which began in early 2020. This was followed by participation beginning in Taiwan, perhaps related to a push for non-UN member Taiwan to be admitted to the UN-based World Health Assembly against the wishes of the PRC. After this, the slow trickle of the hashtag #MilkTeaAlliance began to be observed on various social media websites. Support from the Philippines soon emerged, and even places far removed from the Southeast and East Asian region, including the UK and Germany, became prolific in their echoing of hashtags related on social media.

One of the last countries in the region to join the movement, and eventually becoming the biggest contributors in the form of posting and engagement, was Myanmar. Myanmar serves as a test case for the theory of instrumentalization of the movement, as their participation and co-optation of the hashtag only occurred after the coup in their own country in 2021. This timing is, perhaps, suggestive that their participation was more opportunistic than the apparently solidaristic participation of citizens in other states who joined earlier, or had no direct stakes in the outcome of the movement. While this potential self interestedness does not dilute the impact and additional reach that Myanmar's joining of the Milk Tea Alliance provided for the proliferation of the overall pro-democratic advocacy, it raises a large question over whether such national

responses represent a form of sustainable solidarism if only linked to parochial domestic self-interest and not bridging values. Thus, this research aims to determine whether the movement represented true solidaristic behavior characteristic of a shared transnational movement concerned with the outcomes of one another, represented by participation irrespective of domestic political upheaval, or rather existed as a collection of contemporaneous individual domestic movements that simply exploited the shared label as an opportunity to gain international support for their respective causes. The importance of this question can not be easily overstated, as the transnational nature of movements has the potential to ensure ideological survival beyond the borders of the state where they originate, with such movements threatening to outlive regimes themselves.

Theory and Background

In the last several decades with the advent of the internet and rapid global communication networks, social movement typologies have broadened and changed their modes of mobilization and action (Schmitz et al., 2020). This has expanded to include the concept of the “transnational social movement,” with these movements and their ideas by definition cross national boundaries with “appeals to international norms or alliances [which] can bring international pressure to bear on states, thereby altering the balance of power in national political contests (Smith, 2013).” Their conceptual basis resembles the archetypal terrorist organization: with a safe haven outside international borders and the pressure of the citizenry of multiple states on a domestic government scrutinizing the grievances, movements could more resistant to domestic suppression if they have transnational backing (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Definitionally, even if a movement simply receives tacit backing from

abroad could qualify it as transnational, but these parameters exclusive of directionality can not distinguish between instrumentalized support confined to a limited context or value-based support that has no expectation of reciprocation and can therefore be considered nonreciprocal (Bob, 2018).

This is particularly true if the aims pursued by supporters in different states are primarily related to local conflicts, rather than based on shared normative values. The Arab Spring represents an example of this alternative instrumentalized model, an ostensibly transnational movement with parallel goals of deposing local autarchs, albeit one whose participant state citizens hardly interacted, and thus acted largely autonomously and with little transnational cooperation. For many of the participants, movement aims though were not focused on regional action in terms of applying international pressure on autocratic regimes as a whole, or even on democratization, but instead on domestic actors in the respective states capitalizing off of the opportunity to seize power. The momentum of crumbling autarchies in neighboring states, as well as emerging norms against killing protestors in favor of abdication enabled political mobilization. However, what was labeled by some as a transnational social movement because it had some shared ideals (Sadiki, 2016), had its labels questioned by others because “what counts in a social movement is the existence of vectors of mobilization along existing or newly formed networks” but it is not necessarily clear that this occurred in any substantial way during the Arab Spring (Smith, 2013; Lafi, 2017). In the recent case of the Milk Tea Alliance its vectors of mobilization certainly constituted novel shared networks, as opposed to simply marketing their parallel individual aims and sharing a common hashtag. However, some have suggested that the Milk-tea Alliance movement was not monolithic in its push for liberalization,

claiming that it was not purely regarding the fight between democratization and entrenching authoritarianism, but that it instead included elements of domestic grievances against China (Dedman & Lai, 2021; Schaffar & Praphakorn, 2021). This research can not parse every element within the movement, but instead attempts to measure whether those mobilization vectors appeared exploitative and instrumentalized, or rather nonreciprocal and solidaristic.

If movements are not truly transnational and cooperative, with shared ideological grounding, mobilization, and resource pooling, then the pressure they bring to bear on regimes ends at their borders. If the opposite is true and they are acting collectively and solidaristically with shared focus, then a truly transnational movement reflects deeper societal uniformity and there is greater potential for burden-sharing in pressuring autocratic regimes, which can potentially even outlive a specific movement within the borders of a country. The participation trends of the Milk Tea Alliance movement will henceforth be examined to gauge the degree of international solidarism and temporal homogeneity.

The last several years have seen an explosion of literature positing similar requisitions regarding the underlying ideological underpinnings of digital mobilization. This included the use of interviews (Chan, 2023; Phalapong, 2022), and broadly summarizing the changes in the mobilization landscape brought about by so called “transnational networks” on social media (Ponglamjiak, 2021, Schaffar & Praphakorn, 2021; Huang and Svetanant, 2022). The present research aims to utilize the largest and most prolific social media service in the region and across the world to quantify the national differences in activism during this movement on a temporal scale to clearly measure the timing and degree of participation of the involved countries. From this, a better degree of determination can be made regarding whether

the Milk Tea Alliance simply involved instrumentalized hashtag sharing to increase likes, or whether it involved nonreciprocal cross-border solidarity based on shared values.

Modern protest movements in the East Asian milieu are not uniformly common throughout the region, and are often tied to domestic constraints and culture in each respective state. Even in the post-colonial and post-revolutionary eras in Asia, due to the persistence of autocratic behavior, contentious mass movements proliferated during opportune periods of state weakness in elite regimes, including the Taiwanese 228 Incident in 1947 and the Formosa Incident in 1979, the ROK Gwangju Uprising in 1980, the Philippines’ People Power Revolution in 1986, and the riots that led to the fall of Suharto in 1998. In the last two decades though, this has expanded to online mobilization which is cheaper, quicker and more penetrating than traditional methods, and has led to a new wave of movements (De & Thakur, 2016). This has manifested in largescale and potent outbursts such as the multiparty Bersih Movement for cleaner election in Malaysia (Radue, 2012), the extremely largescale Umbrella Movement for democratization in Hong Kong (Blenkitni, 2023), the massive 2012 Delhi Rape Protests (Nigam, 2014), and the Sunflower Movement which stood against the Taiwanese ROC government forming closer relations with the PRC, specifically through a trade pact (Szuchien, 2017). Over time, these movements have become increasingly reliant on digital mobilization efforts to not only share information about live demonstrations, but effectively advocate outside the physical space of their respective polities.

The Milk Tea Alliance began in 2020 as triggered by the innocuous posting of two Thai celebrities, Vachirawit “Bright” Cheva-aree and his girlfriend “Nnevvy,” which took on political dimensions as they challenged the PRC sovereign worldview by referring to both Hong Kong and

Taiwan as entities separate from China. The reactive response of the PRC was a vitriolic anti-Thai response, targeting Thai institutions and focusing on their new monarch, a large taboo as *Lèse-majesté* is still a crime in Thailand (Schaffar & Praphakorn, 2021). Much of this took place on Western-controlled social media, which is still inaccessible to most in China, suggesting that some interactions may have been sanctioned or conducted by the Chinese state. The twist that took place was that many Thai netizens were at the time disillusioned with their government and took the insults in stride. They were also joined by Hong Kongers and Taiwanese confederates thankful that Thai netizens had defended their statements that had been seen as pro-Taiwanese and pro-Hong Kong, even against aggressive Chinese pushback.

In October 2020, Morrison Lee Meng-chu (李孟居), a Taiwanese activist who disappeared while visiting China, made his first appearance since he had vanished in China in 2019, making a televised forced confession. The PRC claimed he engaged in activities that endangered national security, mirroring the high profile detention of Lee Ming-che two years prior, and sparking the Taiwanese government to warn against traveling across the strait to the PRC. This humiliating coercion led netizens to post on social media in protest of what they viewed as a wrongful and politicized arrest and exploitation by Beijing, demanding Lee's immediate release.

Another incident in the same month between Taiwanese and PRC officials involved Fiji, with the Taiwanese government saying that Chinese embassy officials had crashed a Taiwanese Foreign Ministry event. On October 8th 2020, Taiwanese officials visiting Fiji were holding a celebration for the ROC National Day when Chinese officials showed up. An argument and scuffle allegedly broke out sending one Taiwanese

staffer to the hospital with a head injury, and also injuring one Chinese official (BBC, 2020). This likewise sent many Taiwanese online to protest against what they thought was PRC imperialist behavior, just as Chinese foreign ministers appeared on television and rebuked Taiwanese officials for holding the aforementioned ROC national day celebrations at all.

At times during the relatively short period of operation, the movement has had a natural ebb and flow in terms of engagement, growing towards the first zenith at the end of 2020, and then evaporating quickly. In February 2021, despite relative domestic peace in Taiwan and across the strait, the coup in Myanmar that occurred on the first of February of 2021 coincided with a rapid spike in social media activity related to the Milk Tea Alliance, with participation well distributed across Asia. Across the region, while countries like Taiwan and the Philippines faced pressure from external sources and in particular the PRC, states like Thailand and Myanmar have faced internal violence as state security services target their own citizens, leading to particularly high levels of dissent, and consequently Milk Tea Alliance participation. Thai protesters were met with physically violent reprisals from the local police (Sombatpoonsiri, 2021), while citizens of Myanmar have been openly subject to extrajudicial killings and street violence by the junta government (Prasse-Freeman, 2023). Many in Myanmar are currently engaged in what amounts to a civil war against the military government. At the beginning of 2021 with the launch of the coup in Myanmar that ousted then State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, the online presence of, and engagement with, the movement once again was invigorated, propelled upwards by nearly all major states within the alliance, whose transnational solidarism increased the number of interactions multiple fold.

Myanmar's military coup officially occurred on 1 February 2021, which quickly spurred netizens in the country to begin participating in the Milk Tea Alliance. On Facebook and Instagram, the country doubled the next closest country in terms of raw engagement. As the military junta in Myanmar has grown more violent in its actions, the calls for solidarity and assistance from citizens from Myanmar have only grown more vocal in calling for international action, spurring the search for solidarity from activist circles including those engaged in the Milk Tea Alliance.

The Milk Tea Alliance and hashtag may have originated in Thailand, but was adopted by netizens in polities across the region. Some were likely genuinely interested in universal values, but perhaps others who had their own grievances and may have attempted to instrumentally use the hashtag to increase the salience of their own messages regarding their own conflicts, rather than expressing value-based solidarity. The larger question of the Milk Tea Alliance, as a whole, remains whether this movement fits the paradigm of a true solidaristic transnational movement based on a shared set of norms, or rather whether it was opportunistically utilized by neighboring states only when they sought to increase the visibility of their own internal struggles. The distinction may be methodologically difficult to parse, but can now be examined with temporal and geographic tracking of social media posts across the movement to examine how individual state-level national usages of the hashtag transcended the domestic political troubles in each host country to allow for forms of transnational mobilization that were more solidaristic than opportunistic.

Methodology

To examine movement trends to measure the degree of nonreciprocal solidarism versus instrumental exploitation of the hashtag, a corpus

was formed encompassing the majority of the movement's high profile text, defined by Crowdtangle as attracting over 100 interactions or more. This was then examined across states and across time to examine whether movement participation in countries reflected their own need for promotion due to domestic disturbances, or rather followed external developments. This is crucial for determining whether this solidarism is stable across time and borders, especially in polities like Hong Kong or Myanmar in which the state apparatus aims to suppress dissenting discourse.

Facebook, controlled by Meta, is the primary global social media network, but this is especially true in Asia where free access to the platform is often offered to those even without formal data service connections (Roth, 2022). Using Meta's Crowdtangle data processing system, which has a strong track record in tracking social movements (Darius & Urquhart, 2021); (Frischlich, 2022); (Kim & Lee, 2022) and so-called "hashtag activism" (Alperstein, 2022), this research utilized a corpus including all public Facebook social media posts with the phrase "milkteaalliance" recorded by Facebook Crowdtangle during the time frame of this analysis, with data from 1 May 2016 to 31 August 2022, a corpus totalling 336,622 posts. This phrase was included without spaces to make use of the hashtag functionality. Posts were sorted by state using the country of the majority of administrators (labelled admins in data) for the posting page or person, for which under Facebook, both Hong Kong and Taiwan are coded as distinct entities from the PRC. Python was utilized to both process the corpus of posts and perform trend analysis. The total interactions, including likes and other Facebook reactions for each post, were calculated to gauge the degree of public engagement with the posts in their respective countries. Because of significant language and cultural differences between the participant

states, other than the proportion of posts written in English and thus more geared towards international audiences, it can be assumed that the majority of posts made by accounts in a specific country are aimed at informing and mobilizing domestic audiences. Therefore, the engagement rates on posts made by accounts in a specific country are seen to be a reflection on the participation intensity as well as a metric of overall engagement in that respective country. As such, these metrics were used to track increases in both activity and engagement after major political events in the region, and included hashtag diffusion across countries.


One final methodological limitation is that because of fear of reprisals, inevitably a cohort of activists have either fled abroad, or shifted their social media locations to avoid detection by local authorities. Thus, the locations provided to Meta by those admins may not accurately reflect where

some of the included interactions are sourced. This means that there may be a degree data bias away from Milk Tea core countries and towards extraregional states. This may be especially true for certain polities like Hong Kong with strong ties to outside powers such as the UK, however, it does not seem to be the case for states such as Myanmar, which is relatively isolated.

Theoretically, if participation in the movement is only opportunistically instrumental, and not tied to solidarism, then individual state level participation signified by engagement and use of the hashtag and associated messaging should be tied to major moments of domestic unrest, and less tethered to events abroad. If there is bridging transnational normative solidarism however, participation trends should not reflect domestic turmoil, but rather should be more reflective of events abroad.

Figure 1

Interactions on the Facebook platform over the course of the movement plotted logarithmically



Note: Each point represents the interaction/day total for posts emanating from accounts tied to each of the five participant countries listed above, for each day with total daily country interaction sums over 100. The large notches in the interaction scale on the Y-axis increase logarithmically. Country codes: TW: Taiwan, HK: Hong Kong, IN: India, TH: Thailand, MM: Myanmar. For an interactive high resolution form of both figures, see the appendix for the URL.

Data

National level data shows that while the overall primary sources of engagement were contained in posts disseminated by accounts tied to the core countries of the Milk Tea Alliance, including Myanmar, Thailand, Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also included non-participant states.

These outside countries include countries ranked by Freedom House as more democratic including the Philippines, as well as flawed democracies like Malaysia and Singapore. The effects of the movement also apparently spread to users outside of Asia, in particular large democratic states like the US, Canada, Australia, and the UK.

Figure 2
Heatmap of total sums by country over the entire course of the movement



Note: The size and color represent the total interactions by country, and each country is sorted by continent in a nested format. For an interactive high resolution form of both figures, see the appendix for the URL.

Being that the movement emanated from Thailand originally, interactions from Thailand dominate in early data from 2020, with the state's users being the most numerically prolific in reacting to posts regarding the Milk Tea Alliance. This is true despite this hashtag's definition alluding to international solidarity, and not specifically to any domestic turmoil. This rapidly shifted by Spring 2020 when Hong Kong linked accounts encountered nearly as many interactions as in Thailand, a country whose population is nearly ten times its size. This period coincided with the waning months of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong Protest Movement as the physical security situation there changed rapidly. While the instances of, and interactions with, the hashtag on Hong Kong social media were similar

in content to Thailand, possibly reflecting a cooperative spirit and opportunities for cooperation and collaboration, the duration of such their posting has ultimately proved shorter lived. Taiwan during this period of early to mid 2020 exhibited tens of thousands of post interactions, with the highest levels of engagement in October 2020 and February 2021. Taiwan maintained consistently high levels of participation throughout the period of analysis, despite no imminent direct threat, or domestic turmoil. Taiwanese netizens were one of the initial and primary participant polities, and yet stood to gain less from publicizing Milk Tea Alliance related conflicts than many other states, making this case unique.

In the fall of 2020, all of the countries that contemporaneously comprised the Milk Tea Alliance, aside from India, grew in their support for the alliance on social media. This support only continued to grow until late October. In the fall of 2020 the interactions for all countries dropped precipitously in a lull, before skyrocketing in early 2021, coinciding with the coup d'état of the military junta in Myanmar. At the same time interactions in Myanmar hit their zenith, so did the interactions from Thailand, while interactions from India also hit their highest throughout the entire period of measurement, while Hong Kong also saw a minor resurgence during this period in early 2021.

Looking at this period of 2021 as a whole, at the beginning of the year, when the coup in Myanmar took place, we can observe what appears to demonstrate the growth of nonreciprocal transnational participation. This form of solidaristic camaraderie can be seen in multiple periods throughout the existence of the alliance, the first instance of this coming in the initial Thai protests that saw support from Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as India. As time progressed, all of these dropped off to a degree, with the exceptions of Thailand, Hong Kong, and India, which continued to grow over the summer. However, almost all of the Milk Tea Alliance states saw an increase in interactions moving into the fall of 2021.

Figure 2 indicates that since the beginning, a degree of solidaristic participation has certainly existed between the primary core countries, and persisted for years after the creation of the hashtag. Despite the fact that Hong Kong's protests died down at the end of 2020, their interaction volumes have been amongst the highest for any polity on these platforms and did not slow until late 2021. India's participation also predated the beginning of the China-India border skirmishes, with its highest participation numbers

during the time of the coup in Myanmar, although the degree of their participation was still more limited than Southeast Asian states. This suggests that despite its smaller share, that India also exhibited nonreciprocal solidaristic behavior.

Figure 1, Thailand, from which the Milk Tea Alliance was birthed, has largely maintained the top spot in terms of engagement. Around the fourth wave of the Thai protests, at the end of 2021, interactions began to drop off. This is precisely the point when Myanmar superseded all other members of the Milk Tea Alliance in terms of interactions, with their participation trends reaching a new peak.

After this period of intense interaction, interactions leveled off. Since 2022 levels of interaction have mostly remained steady, though most of the interactions have come from Myanmar and Thailand, followed by India and then Taiwan.

In terms of overall interactions, visualized in Figure 2, Myanmar-based account's posts clearly hold the bulk of the interactions, totalling well over four million. With all Asian accounts comprising a total of nearly eight million interactions total, Myanmar maintains a stark global plurality in terms of participation. This figure is even more impressive when taking into account that Myanmar's full scale involvement in the Milk Tea Alliance was largely delayed until early 2021. The next highest country in terms of its post interactions is Thailand, which was the original catalyst for the alliance, totalling a total interaction count of 1.29 million. Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan each totalled more than 100,000 interactions on their posts. Other Asian countries recording at least 50,000 interactions included India, Cambodia, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, Laos, Indonesia, China, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.

Myanmar's temporal interaction trend, as displayed in Figure 1, raises the largest questions over movement instrumentalization. Prior to

their coup, interactions from Myanmar were so low that they didn't even register in the data, with relevant Milk Tea Alliance posts all attracting less than 100 reactions each. However, once the domestic threat of authoritarianism and violence reared its head, the country became one of the most consistently and heavily involved in the alliance, surpassing all other participant populations with their post reaction rates. The only exception to this was over the summer months of 2022, when they dropped below Thailand in terms of interactions.

Analysis

The Milk Tea Alliance clearly succeeded in its aims to establish a so-called "Transnational Advocacy Network" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) to garner international support and mobilize attention for embattled citizens acting under the restraints of repressive regimes. In responding to authoritarian retrenchment in Thailand against the government installed after the 2014 coup, responding to the military coup in Myanmar, or challenging authoritarian creep or influence campaigns from the PRC within Taiwan, Hong Kong, or India, the movement established an informal confederation of democracy-oriented dissenters raising the profile of turmoil in their respective polities. They used the hashtag and its momentum to express solidarity support for one another and for democracy, and to share news, updates, and grievances from the front lines of those disputes. From those in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Myanmar, laws restricting the ability to express dissent against those regimes meant that by maintaining a safe third space online with the cooperation of international allies, pressure brought to bear would not let up as easily.

That being said, without speculating on the multidimensional goals of the individuals involved in the movement perhaps numbering in the hundreds of thousands, there is still a question as

to whether the trends of participation demonstrated instrumental hashtag sharing protocols designed to multiply attention, or whether there was a phenomenon of solidaristic value-based nonreciprocal transnational participation. This analysis has highlighted several key participation features strongly suggestive of a solidaristic internationalized movement. This includes what appears to be clearly nonreciprocal behavior, including participation from users in many key states such as Taiwan, India, Hong Kong, and Thailand, whose temporal participation trends were largely dissociated from domestic political events.

Taiwan represents one of the best cases for nonreciprocal participation, with large profile content sharing related to Thailand, not Taiwan, and higher participation during external political events than domestic ones. The best demonstration of non-instrumental use is a measured spike in engagement on Taiwanese posts in early August 2021 in what temporally seems to be related to events outside of Taiwan, namely the Fourth wave of the 2020-2021 Thai protests. At that time, there was a ramp up in street action and police responses at the end of July and early August of 2021. Interactions with "milkteaalliance" posts increased during this period, as did solidarity signals on posts from accounts in Taiwan, specifically including posts bearing the hashtag "#WhatsHappeningInThailand," which ultimately demonstrated relatively high engagement. Notably, despite the subsequent spike in PLA inclusions into Taiwan's ADIZ, which hit all time highs in the following period, interactions after this period dropped significantly in Taiwan. This seems to suggest that for certain actors, including participants in Taiwan, attention seeking from external activists may not have been the primary motivation for participation in the movement.

India showed high participation both before and long after the border skirmishes with China, and again mostly tied to external events, strongly

suggestive of their ideological engagement with the movement and not instrumental exploitation. Indian participation long outlived the India-PRC border clashes in 2020, with high interaction numbers persisting well into 2022 until close to the end of the period of analysis for the data set of this research.

Hong Kong had large scale participation even long after the 2019 protests, but dying down in 2020. The longevity of Hong Kongers' use of the hashtag overall was very likely stunted by the passing of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, originally passed 30 June 2020, which has seen arrests for speaking out against the state, including online, with active enforcement beginning almost immediately after the law went into effect (Fung, 2022). Ultimately fewer spikes in the aftermath of the national security law related to major shifts in leadership or policy appeared than could be observed in other countries. For example, after the new Chief Executive, John Lee Ka-chiu took over for Carrie Lam, very little activity was observed despite the extremely low popularity of both and clear outrage over the process (Lo, 2024). The lack of universal suffrage in the selection process, and relatively low level of support for the Chief Executive on foreign-controlled social media such as Instagram and Facebook, suggest that while Hong Kongers may have been displeased by the process, that their dropoff in participation was due to fear of state retribution. The new Chief Executive's largest following remains instead on Weibo, a PRC-based social media company, and there have been accusations that the ruling communist party in China, who oversees the nomination and election process ensuring his win, instead boosted the public profile of this pro-China Hong Kong politician (Wong, 2022).

Finally, Thailand, the original source of the movement and its solidaristic transnational hashtag sharing demonstrate that Thai support

for Taiwan would not go unreciprocated. However, this support would long outlast the protests which died down in 2021 with Thai participation, like Indian, continuing strongly until late in 2022 near the end of the period of analysis and the data set for this research.

Even Myanmar has maintained high participation, although with decreasing responses over time. The 2022 drop offs in participation in Myanmar were possibly due to internet crackdowns, likely reflecting the junta government choking off access to Facebook, which in Myanmar is almost synonymous with internet access, to stymie protest mobilization (Whitten-Woodring, 2022). The Myanmar junta apparatus has also made accessing the internet through a virtual private network (VPN) punishable by up to three years in prison (The Irrawaddy, 2022), further decreasing the likelihood that citizens would take the risk to interact with Milk Tea Alliance posts.

Countries outside the region of Eastern and Southern Asia have overall seen more muted coverage on social media than within the region. Still, there is a notable phenomenon of high profile outside interactions, particularly in countries with democratic governments, many of which have received significant engagement. These engagements were more often tied to large groups that produce content through "internationally-facing news outlets (Blenkitni & Forehand, 2022)," some directed at the nations of the Milk Tea Alliance, for example BBC Thai or Voice of America. Outside of Asia, North America holds the title for the next highest level of interactions, with the US leading the total count followed by Canada. Still, the combined total of the two G7 states is still lower than Singapore alone, demonstrating the importance of regional dynamics. Australia and the UK follow, both leading Europe, with Germany, France, Norway, and Switzerland following behind. It should be considered that a small degree of this may also simply be linked to

account relocation from core Milk Tea Alliance countries in which state opposition has been repressed.

While extraregional support is relatively small compared to major participant states, it remains symbolically significant in demonstrating international solidarity. It is evidence that both the movement and usage of its hashtags have gained attention and support in the popular consciousness of many democratic nations in the international community. Outside of Asia, this international support also comes almost entirely from English speaking countries. While this may be a relic of the colonial history of both Myanmar and Hong Kong remaining connected to the UK, this phenomena remains notable because many of the posts that contained text were in languages other than English, suggesting deeper cultural or diasporic links. This may speak to the cross-cutting power of the use of memes inside of the Milk Tea Alliance, as discussed in Schaffar and Praphakorn in 2020.

One final notable feature is the cross-national discourse format of sharing images. Within Asia there exists a plethora of different languages, and within the Milk Tea Alliance, there are numerous examples including Thai, Cantonese, Burmese, Mandarin, Taiwanese, Japanese, and countless others. The multilingual nature of the movement thus necessitates the use of a lingua franca. Users may have chosen to default to English, but an alternative choice may have been the formation of language-free graphics in the form of memes, whose meaning can often be inferred without words through the formation of common understandings. Memes certainly seem to be a key component that assisted international understanding, though new technologies such as translation functions impeded in social media may have also played a role. However, pictures help to evoke a shared understanding as they transcend language and are often derived

from content that is enjoyed around the world. They also employ commonly understood ideas that are not required to be put into words to be understood. The increased relevance of this new tool harkens back to the common symbol building that was created from this movement, and suggests deeper value sharing.

This form of shared-value solidarity seems to have not been built upon a desire to see only one's own country thrive, but instead to build a regional, and perhaps universalist movement for democracy. Nations that seem to have little to gain from the promotion of content, news or activism of others in alliance commonly acted in apparent support of others within the group. Activists in polities such as Taiwan or Hong Kong gain little substantively if local despots are overthrown in distant regional powers, such as Myanmar, other than the normative shifts that take place. However, we can routinely see that people around the world supported them in their struggle, especially those in countries within the Milk Tea Alliance.

Conclusion

The trends examined in the social movement called the Milk Tea Alliance should indicate two primary findings. The first is the sheer geographic spread of the movement outside of its initial region indicating value-based participation outside of regional and local concerns. The second is that the temporal participation through sharing and use of these hashtags unrelated to domestic events both have taken place in a pattern that can only be described as nonreciprocal, and transnational. The patterns of participation of populations in the majority of the participant polities that themselves had grievances, including Thailand, Taiwan, India, and Hong Kong, are strongly suggestive of nonreciprocal behavior, as their spikes in activity occurred irrespective of domestic turmoil, or any potential short-term interest in

signal amplification. Taiwanese netizens, although fearful of the encroachment of the PRC, but whose people are not directly subject to authoritarianism, was one of the largest participants, with even temporal spread in engagement unrelated to domestic concerns. Netizens in India and Thailand both actively participated long after their domestic political conflicts cooled down. Netizens in Singapore and Malaysia, states with flawed democratic institutions but without active political conflicts, who don't stand to directly gain from democratic consolidation in Thailand or regime change in Myanmar, were still prolific in their participation. Lastly, the US, Canada, and Australia, democracies far removed from the region, were the source of some of the posts with the largest number of interactions, further illustrating the importance of the spread outside of the region. The only exception was Myanmar's participation following their own coup, which may be indicative of instrumental bandwagoning, calling into question the degree of nonreciprocal solidaristic support in that polity. However, the degree of long-term political, social, and cultural isolation in Myanmar over decades of sanctions regimes may explain initial hesitance to participate pre-coup. For that country, a case-study is recommended to understand the relationship between Milk Tea Alliance participation and mobilization against the junta. The preponderance of the data still demonstrates that even citizens in polities with little stake in the outcome of faraway neighbors still actively engaged with the movement and its hashtag, and in nearby states this participation occurred even temporally distant from mobilization following domestic events.

One large question largely unaddressed by the current research regards the content and intent of the corpus of participation in the Milk Tea Alliance. This research remains challenging as the sheer number of languages and volume of posts make this a formidable task to parse, espe-

cially when including the full range of participant states is considered. Such an analysis could further refine the ideological congruence and extent of value sharing between participants in different states. It also has the potential to attempt to numerically quantify the proportion of participation in each respective state dedicated to domestic versus international issues in order to further provide evidence for the degree of solidaristic transnational value sharing and nonreciprocal behavior. Gradual advances in machine learning based natural language processing will only improve the prospects for this critical analysis.

The broader question still remains as to whether such forms of digital mobilization in police states where citizens are unable to exercise physical protest are sufficient to pressure states to liberalize (Kim & Kroeger, 2019). Follow up research could measure the specific factors influencing the efficacy of such transnational advocacy movements relying on digital mobilization. Lastly, it is critical to also understand the dropoff of movement strength over time, especially for movements whose networks are primarily online and based on solidaristic value sharing and not on diasporic or culturally, ethically, or politically connected communities abroad. This is particularly true for cases when domestic opposition is suppressed and there is a reliance on foreign solidaristic support to echo and amplify grievances and calls for action.

Notwithstanding the inevitable need for refinement and continued advances for theory testing, this research provides abundant evidence with multiple state cases that such digital movements can be representative of a high degree of non-instrumentalized solidarity between netizens of different states. This occurred without the incentive for reciprocity as they shared resources and applied international normative pressure against these regimes with their collective willpower. As such there is optimism that such a movement,

when internationalized, can extend not only the reach and public attention, but also the effective lifespan of a social movement, so that even when it has been purged from within the borders of a country, the idea can persist.

Appendix

Interactive Data Figures:

Figure 1: <https://freechinapost.com/data/Figure1.html>

Figure 2: <https://freechinapost.com/data/Figure2.html>

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Factors that Affected Policy Making of the European Union 2009-2019

Macarthur Kitibutr ¹✉

¹ Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Thailand, © Author

Abstract

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The reform of the European Union (EU) in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty can be considered as the evolution of the EU, eventually becoming a Politico-Economic Union. It made the EU reach the point that it has become a quasi-federation and a group of nations that have a status of power on par with the world's superpowers. This reform can be regarded as a power reflection of the European People's Party Group (EPPG), which became the leader of the EU in 2004. The EPPG concentrates on consolidating the center of political power and uses laissez-faire economics. To obtain information, this study uses a research method in the analysis and evaluation of empirical phenomena related to the EPPG, political ideology as a factor, and the EU's geopolitics. The research design focused on 2009–2014 and 2015–2019 periods. With the aforementioned methods, it was found that the EPPG guideline makes the EU more state-being and tangible, because it has a political mechanism and bureaucracy that is clearly and significantly separated from member states, for example, the court, central bank, and diplomatic corps, as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, in which EPPG is the main supporter. However, this also causes inefficiencies in handling economic recessions, resulting in mass protests across the EU. In conclusion, although there remain some differences, the European Union maintains political stability and unity in creating common policies together.

Introduction

After the reunification of Germany, the European Union (EU) reached a significant turning point when the Schengen Agreement of 1985 came into effect in 1995, allowing citizens of the EU to move, and visit each other freely. The abolishment of border controls aligns with the fact that the political group within the European Parliament, which functions as a de facto political party, adheres to a Center-Left ideology, currently known as the Progressive Alliance of Socialists

and Democrats (S&D), which rose to power and controlled the mechanisms of the EU during the 1980s.

Concurrently, as explained and published in the summary of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty by the Publications Office of the European Union (2024), officially known as the Treaty on European Union, it had served as a significant milestone. The Maastricht Treaty marks the first official use of the term "European Union" in Article 1 of the Treaty.

It elevated the EU to a stronger politico-economic union with deeper integration compared to the 1970s and the 1980s. It officially changed its name from the European Community to the EU and established a three-pillar system, namely The European Communities¹, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Justice and Home Affairs, which jointly managed the EU in a parallel manner. This treaty is significant as it was the first to use the term "Maastricht Treaty" and endorsed the Schengen Agreement, which had been signed earlier.

For Article 1, paragraph 21 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, it can be summarized that to have a role in the international forum, the EU must be driven by the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms that are universal and indivisible, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and unity, respect for the United Nations Charter and international law.

In terms of the economy, the Maastricht Treaty is an important treaty that emphasized and reformed the EU's economic system. Specifically, the use of a single currency is a good solution for reducing the economic gap among EU member states. Thus, everyone has the opportunity to contribute to and benefit economically equally.

From 1979 to the early 2000s, the EU had the S&D group as an important core in driving, shaping, creating, and enforcing policies that form the foundation of the current EU. As Woshinsky (2008, 143–146) noted, the center-left ideological approach that the S&D group uses as its main guideline focuses on creating equal opportunities in various aspects.

This is reflected in Europe under the leadership of the S&D group as the core of the EU, along with the Center-Right political party group, the European People's Party Group (EPPG), and

the centrist political party group, which is currently known as the Renew Europe group (Renew). These three groups jointly define, create, and implement various policies for the development of the European Community into the present EU. The Renew group alternately took the lead in the EU along with the S&D group, with the EPPG group as a key ally.

Before the EPPG group assumed leadership of the EU in the mid-2000s, the S&D group jointly defined, created, and enforced key policies, such as the Schengen Agreement, which was signed in 1985 and came into effect in 1995. Another significant policy was the adoption of a single currency, such as the Euro, under the provisions and plans of the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, which was confirmed by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. These efforts aimed to reduce economic disparities and promote equal economic opportunities through shared borders and a common currency. This was influenced by the center-left ideological stance, specifically the ideology of social democracy. This was the EU before the EPPG, a center-right ideological group, took over governance in 2004.

Research Question

How much and in what way do Left-Right Political Ideologies and International Relations Theoretical Approaches affect policymaking and the conduct of international relations in the EU, both at the level of member/non-member states and the union?

Research Methodology and Design

This qualitative study focuses on the analysis and evaluation of empirically observed phenomena resulting from the formulation and implementation of policies by EU executives, specifically from the EPPG. The analysis uses a historical background, purposes, objectives, principles, ultimatum goals,

¹ As the comprisal of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC), and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

and various methods, particularly those related to political ideologies, concerning the formulation, creation, and implementation of EU policies during the eras of 2009 to 2014 and 2015 to 2019.

The rationale behind choosing these two eras is that it is the era in which the EU became the legal entity, according to the implementation and enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, as it is the first time that the EPPG took full control of the EU's governance, with other political groups being sidelined and also the EU, which was in the status of great power. These eras witnessed important events, such as the Eurozone Crisis and the Brexit event, which affected both the European and global levels.

To emphasize, the setting of the period of analysis and division into two eras corresponds to the Research Question, because it can indicate the development of the EU's politics clearly, because it is the right-lean political group to be the core of the EU's administration, as their power has already consolidated fully, and it was the same time that the right-wing sentiment was about to emerge, comparing when this political group (the EPPG) was the minority group at the time that the left-lean political group still had power and was the core of the EU during the 1970s to the middle of the 1990s.

Literature Review and Theoretical Approaches

There exist studies on factors such as political ideologies that influence the EU's policy-making. This study uses two main theories to analyze various issues: Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Defensive Realism.

The concept of Liberal Intergovernmentalism was developed by Andrew Moravcsik, who aimed to explain the internal politics of the EU, which was considered a *sui generis* political entity. This concept is regarded as an approach within liberalism theory but has been heavily influenced by realism theory.

Moravcsik (1998) explained the concept of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and this can be summarized that the state is the main actor in political interactions and must exist in a state of anarchy. The EU is an international political institution that helps coordinate nation-states in Europe with several common goals through various forms of negotiation. However, every state understands and realizes that political institutions act as representatives, coordinating the strategic preferences of certain social groups under conditions that require managing issues of economic, social, and cultural interdependence. This leads member states of political institutions to adopt sovereignty as a policy to establish joint commitments. Although states face anarchy, they often make decisions based on the international environment and other circumstances by creating international political institutions based on the expectation of adhering to the same framework and rules.

This concept is based on Liberalism theory, and concurrently, all of the executives of the EU come from centrist political groups, whether they are center-right, center-left, or just centrism groups, whose main ideological foundation is liberalism, combined with conservatism, Christian democracy, and social democracy.

This led the member states of the EU to gather for economic and political benefits, leading to the establishment of the EU to function both as an international organization and a semi-representative of all member states' governments. This makes the EU develop a bureaucratic structure to help represent and enhance the power, influence, wealth, and interests of member states; however, it does not have authority or sovereignty over the governments of member states. As many of its members are not large and influenced by liberalism, it made those member states decide to unite and create the EU as a survival apparatus in an anarchic environment,

strengthening and developing internal mechanisms within the EU to the point of having a quasi-nation-state status, because of its own court of justice, central bank, currency (the Euro currency), the court of auditors, bureaucracy, parliament, leaders, and executives separated from national-level equivalent institutions of member states; therefore, they have worked closely together.

The EU, with its many components, diverse beliefs, ethnicities, and political groups of all ideologies, instead of facing significant problems, has no apparent conflicts. This is because each politician and the political group chooses to use various mechanisms within the EU as a means of managing, administering, and controlling the behavior of member states at both the group and individual levels, keeping them within the framework and order and limiting the scope of conflicts to align with the enhancement of power, influence, wealth, and interests, which are components of the security of the entire EU.

The liberal approach to intergovernmental cooperation has aligned with another theory, that is, realism. Waltz (1979) proposed Defensive Realism, which has five key principles:

1. The international system is anarchic.
2. States inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the ability to hurt and possibly destroy each other.
3. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states.
4. The basic motive driving states is survival.
5. States think strategically about how to survive in the international system.

After Waltz's Defensive Realism, Mearsheimer (2001) developed the concept of "Offensive Realism," which focuses on the maximization of power to prepare for proactive measures and offensive in foreign policy, while Defensive Realism focuses more on the maximization of security in a defensive manner. The countries in Europe, whether they are members of the EU or not, have faced two

world wars, threats from terrorism, economic problems, and the impact of the United Kingdom's exit from the EU (Brexit).

In Europe, the people, political groups, and the EU as a whole have clear political ideologies and concepts of Pan-Europeanism/ Euroscepticism. They were well aware that to survive, it is necessary to strive for cooperation in resolving conflicts and seeking mutual benefits among EU member states to drive the goals of strengthening collective security and peace.

Most of the EU's states are also members of a military alliance led by the United States, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or even the EU's security agencies, such as the European Defense Union, under the regulation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Therefore, even with political polarization, it remains at a controllable level, not affecting security, the conduct of relations among member states, external affairs, or the overall policies of the EU.

The details indicate that Left-Right political ideology and spectrum are a characteristic, criterion, and factor that influences the policymaking of various countries in Europe, a concept that has been in use since the 19th century. At present, the political world has changed significantly, leading to criticisms, comments, or opinions from many academics questioning whether the left-right political spectrum can still be applied to the 21st-century political world and in which parts of the world it remains relevant. Various studies have critically examined left-right political ideology and its relevance to policymaking.

For example, the article of Fraccaroli and Cheysson (2019) who were part of the editorial team for the educational web blog of the London School of Economics (LSE), raised the question, given the numerous factors and variables that have emerged in recent times, it can be explained that, in the case of the EU, far-right parties have adopted certain ideas and elements from the left

in their party's approach, and in some cases, those parties have declared themselves as "the Third Way/Position," meaning they are neither left nor right, but a third alternative instead.

Fukuyama (1992), in his book "The End of History and the Last Man," stated that the end of history is "...the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." This implies that the left-right division can no longer evolve. However, upon closer consideration, the arguments in the article of the LSE and Fukuyama's book do not align with the current reality or the actual situation. In other words, many political ideologies are fluid and not permanent but rather represented as political turns. If the EU can resolve dissatisfaction or find a compromise, the political conflict will naturally decrease in intensity.

Another point is that Fukuyama's statement which was stated more than 30 years ago has been proven wrong. In addition to the excessively Eurocentric perspective, it seems that both new and old political ideologies have evolved and become more complex. Most importantly, nowadays, not every country utilizes or is a liberal democrat in the Western system. Conversely, as noted in the article by Schedler (2002), out of 200 countries worldwide, approximately 115 countries, or 57.5% of the world, are not liberal democracies. This may align with various definitions by academics such as in the article of Collier and Levitsky (1997), and a book by Levitsky with Way (2010), such as Democracy with Adjectives and Hybrid Regimes, meaning that most countries are not liberal democracies in the western sense. Therefore, Fukuyama's predictions were not accurate according to observable reality, and the division of left-right ideologies continues to develop.

Nimni (1991) compared and presented both the agreements and disagreements of two oppos-

ing ideologies: Marxism (left) and Nationalism (right)—in his work, particularly regarding the concept and importance between national and international contexts. Nimni cited views from important thinkers such as Karl Marx and Otto Bauer. He concluded that Marx viewed the nation as a matter of historical materialism, a product of the oppression of capitalists and the bourgeoisie. If the modern proletariat wants to be free, they must create their state beyond the concept of a nation dominated by capitalists. For Bauer, it is necessary to use the principles and rationale of Immanuel Kant's idealism, along with economics, to create a modern state that transcends the concept of a nation-state.

This study analyzes and explains the outcomes of how political ideologies have influenced and affected the policymaking of the EPPG, the main policymaker and leader of the EU since 2004, by evaluating and analyzing the implementation of policies and events based on various academic literature to understand their impact on the political situation, geopolitics, international relations, and security of the EU.

Results and Discussion

1. 2009–2014 era

Since the 2009 EU reform with the Lisbon Treaty, the EPPG is the true power of the EU. They have continuously won elections in several EU member countries as well as in the European Parliament. It has been able to appoint its staff to various important offices in the EU, such as the President of the European Commission, with José Barroso serving from 2004 to 2014 and Jean-Claude Juncker serving from 2014 to 2019. Although the Lisbon Treaty is considered the pseudo-constitution of the entire EU, it has undergone several revisions, changes, and developments from many previous treaties, such as the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the Treaty of Nice (2003), and even

earlier treaties, such as the Treaty of Brussels (1967), the Treaty of Rome (1958), and the Treaty of Paris (1952).

The Lisbon Treaty (2009) used some content from the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004, which was an attempt by the EPPG to unify the provisions and create a new unified direction for the EU's policies.

However, although most member states agreed to and ratified this treaty, the rules of the EU required unanimous consent from all member states. Therefore, opposition from France and the Netherlands rendered this treaty unenforceable, and it was removed from consideration, becoming merely a draft document with no legal effect. Franck (2005) explained that the main reasons for these concerns were the possible loss of national sovereignty, the rejection of new member states, and the liberalization of services. When the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004 ceased to exist and was no longer legally binding, it was transformed, revised, and amended into the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which has been legally affecting until today.

Despite having similar content, the key points in each version, whether the constitution or various treaties of the EU have different focuses or important issues. There is an emphasis on "Citizen of the European Union" according to Article 8 of The Maastricht Treaty of 1993, and it grants citizens of all nationalities of EU member states, has the status of being a citizen of the EU as well (Publications Office of the European Union, 2024b).

These are the main significant achievements of the EPPG, which has made the group become a leader in defining and implementing various policies of the EU. This is because it is the most concrete policy and the only one under the administration of the EPPG. In comparison to the period when the S&D was in power, the definition and implementation of various EU policies from

the 1980s to the late 1990s were driven, designed, and implemented by S&D. The two most concrete and impactful policies on the EU were the Open Border Policy among EU member states under the Schengen Agreement, and the Economic and Monetary Union under the Maastricht Treaty.

Leadership and power within the executive branch can be considered the main mechanisms driving the entire EU. It marked the first time that the President of the European Council had become a permanent position following the reforms of the EU in 2009, as referenced in Article 9 B of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (Publications Office of the European Union, 2024a).

Therefore, despite the major reforms within the EU, when the key policy enforcers were Reinfeldt, the Swedish Prime Minister as the rotating President of the European Council, Count Van Rompuy, the permanent President of the European Council, and Barroso, the President of the European Commission, all of them were from the EPPG, the EPPG has since then completely controlled the administration of the EU.

After the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in 2009, Fredrik Reinfeldt, the Prime Minister of Sweden, who held the position of President of the European Council (Rotational) at that time, had to resign from the presidency to make way for the European Council to elect the first-ever permanent president. Reinfeldt was the last person to hold the rotational presidency.

The European Council appointed Count Herman Van Rompuy, the former Prime Minister of Belgium, as the first permanent President of the European Council, with the support of José Barroso, the President of the European Commission. Owing to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, José Barroso was able to serve another term, totaling 10 years in office, and became the second person who could do this since 1979; succeeded Jacques Delors, who served as President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995,

and was one of the key persons in designing, drafting, and implementing the Schengen and Euro policies from the S&D.

From 2009 to 2014, the EU reached its greatest expansion since 1979, with the addition of Croatia as the latest member state in 2013. This brought the total number of EU member states to 28, marking the most extensive expansion of the EU before the United Kingdom's withdrawal shortly afterward. According to the European Commission (2022), after becoming an EU member, Croatia took another 10 years to join the Schengen Agreement and adopt the Euro as its currency, replacing its original currency, which has been governed by the Renew, S&D, and EPPG groups collectively as the country's government leaders. These political groups are at the core of the EU, influencing the design and implementation of various policies and ensuring cohesive operations within the EU.


One important event occurred during this era. That is, the European sovereign debt crisis as a consequence of the economic crisis in the United

States in 2007. The crisis in Europe occurred from 2009 to 2014, severely affecting five member countries of the EU : Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain—which suffered from public debt problems.

According to data from the European Central Bank (ECB, 2024), before the economic crisis, the exchange rate of the Euro currency was 1 Euro per 1.60 US Dollars. This was an upward tendency following the major expansion of the EU in 2004, marking the point at which the Euro was at its strongest.

When the economic crisis occurred, the Euro depreciated by approximately 22 to 25 percent, with an average exchange rate of 1 euro to 1.25 US dollars. According to the Occasional Paper of the ECB, this resulted in a decrease in the value of export goods and simultaneous import issues across the EU (Mauro et al., 2010). Since then, the Euro has not regained its strength at the level of 1 Euro to 1.60 US Dollars.

Figure 1
The Euro exchange rate against US Dollar



Member states with strong economic foundations and extensive business networks can survive economic crises. However, this is not the case for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. According to an article by the Asian Development Bank Institute, scholars such as Collignon (2012) have noted that Germany, as a primary core of the EU, particularly during Angela Merkel's Chancellery, has tried to compromise to create unity between the benefactor and recipient countries of economic aid. However, not all countries accepted these compromises, leading to what Collignon referred to as "Political inefficiency," which increases the cost of economic aid and poses risks to economic credibility.

When delving into the details, it becomes apparent that one of the main reasons for the issues in political communication between the benefactor and recipient member states within the EU is the difference in the political ideologies of both union - and national-level leaders of the EU member states.

In other words, union-level leaders such as Count Van Rompuy, President of the European Council; José Barroso, President of the European Commission; former Prime Ministers of Belgium and Portugal; and national leaders such as Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany; Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France; and Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg all belong to the EPPG group.

This has led the EU to adopt a right-leaning economic perspective in line with the core ideologies of the political group (Conservatism of the EPPG). Although they faced similar economic problems, most of the leaders of the governments of Portugal, Ireland, and Spain at that time belonged to the same political group as the key decision-makers in the EU's policy-making (EPPG), resulting in similar approaches to problem-solving.

In Italy, according to a report by the Voice of America, with political stability issues along-

side the economy, Silvio Berlusconi, the Prime Minister of Italy, had to resign from his position, and Italy had to change its Prime Minister three times in five years. However, because Berlusconi was one of the national leaders of the EU affiliated with the EPPG, Italy received assistance and support from EU core leaders (Ridgwell, 2011). Italy is one of the world's leading industrial nations and is a member of the Group of Seven (G7), along with France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Japan, with the EU as a non-enumerated member.

However, in the case of Greece, as Collignon explained, during the period of the economic crisis, Greece was under the leadership of Prime Minister George Andreas Papandreou, who rose to become the leader of the national-level political party that was affiliated with the S&D group in Greece (The Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK], 2012).

The main reason for the already high internal conflicts in Greece's political and economic situation was the economic crisis that exacerbated these problems. Prime Minister Papandreou was not a member and often conflicted with the policies of the EPPG, which held power in the EU. For this reason, Greece did not receive sufficient support and assistance. Consequently, Papandreou had to resign from his position.

This also led to riots and protests across Greece from 2010 to 2012 because of the Greek government's need to cut budgets, suspend social welfare, and raise taxes in exchange for debt relief from the European Commission and other related political entities of the EU, collectively called as, "The Greek Austerity." These riots have resulted in several deaths and injuries among the populace. Politically, Greece had to change its prime minister five times in four years. Although the main political groups, including the European People's Party, Socialist group, and Liberal group, attempted to connect the control of the Greek government to the European Council and

European Commission directly through both formal and informal contacts, none of the three groups could directly control the Greek government. The position of the Greek Prime Minister was changed to the leader of the opposition party and the core member of the Confederal Group of the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL group) of the European Parliament, like Alexis Tsipras, from 2015 to 2019. This reflects the issues arising from disagreements in political ideology (Horner, 2017). However, the four main political groups also attempted to find ways to compromise.

The reform of the EU, resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, granted the EU legal personality status and consolidated political power, aligning with the center-right ideology of the EPPG. However, it also created some unexpected issues that significantly impacted the period from 2015 to 2019, particularly by emphasizing or clarifying withdrawal from membership. The EU, which the United Kingdom used as a point to proceed with its exit from the EU.

2. 2015–2019 era

In terms of leaders and those in power in the executive branch, the EPPG continues to hold leadership and control over all mechanisms of the EU, with Donald Tusk, the Prime Minister of Poland and the national-level leader of the EPPG, becoming the President of the European Council, and Jean-Claude Juncker, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, serving as the President of the European Commission. Juncker is considered highly experienced in the EU's executive, since he held the position of President of the European Council (on a rotating basis) twice while still serving as Prime Minister of Luxembourg, specifically in the second half of 1997 and the first half of 2005.

During this era, several significant events occurred such as economic troubles in the EU, the

need to handle the wave of Euroscepticism, and major security issues for Europe since the end of the Cold War. One of these events was Russian control of the Crimean Peninsula, which had been under Ukrainian control since 1991, becoming part of Russia as it was during the Soviet era. According to reports by The Guardian in March 2014, it was a response from Russia after the pro-Russian Ukrainian government was overthrown by the pro-West Ukrainian group one month before the major protests in Kiev and the declaration to expel Russian troops from the Crimean Peninsula (Walker and Sauer, 2024).

Although political groups in the EU and the European Parliament have different ideologies, the United Kingdom wants to leave the EU. However, in terms of security, military affairs, and geopolitics, both the United Kingdom and the EU cooperate and share consistent views. This was demonstrated in a joint statement from the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) led by Baroness Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Vice President of the European Commission from the United Kingdom, affiliated with the S&D group (2014).

In this statement, the EU called on Russia and Ukraine to gradually negotiate a resolution to the conflict and urged Russia not to annex Crimea as an associate member of the Group of Eight (G8). The EU jointly issued The Hague Declaration to suspend Russia's membership in the G8, which has been in place since 1997, reverting the G8 back into the G7. This can be considered a consensus among the group (Do, 2014).

The United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit) was considered the most significant issue for the EU from 2015 to 2019. The United Kingdom opted for the Schengen Agreement and did not use the Euro. Owing to its geopolitical status as an island separate

from the European continent, when the Eurozone Crisis occurred, and it was necessary to provide financial assistance to other member countries facing economic problems, the UK government decided to hold a referendum in 2016; and subsequently, 17,410,742 of British citizens, or 51.89% ("EU Referendum Results," 2024), agreed to the government's decision to leave the EU by invoking Article 50. This event brought about changes at all levels in the United Kingdom, the EU, and the world.

Although both groups share conservative ideologies, the term "conservative" in the United Kingdom and the EU refers to different matters. The Conservative Party in the United Kingdom is not a member of the EPPG. Brexit caused dissatisfaction among the EU's high-level policymakers. For instance, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, has warned the United Kingdom, that Brexit could destroy the political civilization of the Western world in addition to the EU itself (Dickson, 2017). Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, expressed dissatisfaction with the decision of the United Kingdom, and he agreed that if English were to be removed from the official languages of the EU, English would gradually disappear and lose its significance in the EU (Rankin, 2017).

Later, Juncker's opinion was strongly opposed because, in addition to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Malta also use English as an official language (Moreno-Tenero et al., 2018). Therefore, it is impossible to remove English from the official language of the EU. This proves that Tusk and Juncker failed to persuade the United Kingdom to change its mind and not leave the EU despite their efforts to negotiate to maintain its stability and unity of the EU. This aligns with the theory noted by Beckstein and Cheneval, as some conservative principles that the EPPG has adhered to since its establishment in 1953, often prefer to maintain the status quo for as long as

possible (2016), the efforts were unsuccessful because the United Kingdom successfully proceeded with Brexit.

Baron David Cameron, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, decided to resign to take responsibility for being unable to prevent withdrawal and persuade the British public not to agree to the United Kingdom withdrawing from the EU, after which political turmoil ensued in the UK, with four prime ministers changing hands over a span of six years. Euroskepticism, as another factor influencing the formulation, design, and implementation of EU policies, alongside political ideologies, has reached its peak during this period.

Although the United Kingdom has left the EU, the economic recovery resulting from the Eurozone Crisis requires generating significant revenue for the EU to repay substantial debts, as well as managing the growing Euroskepticism and controlling political ideological differences.

From the aforementioned issues, although the EPPG, which has been managing and setting policies for the EU since 2004, had to use a significant number of resources to address these problems, the fact that the EU has developed itself to become more tangible and recognized as a legal entity in international law is a result of the Lisbon Treaty.

Overall, although it has not yet been able to concretely and effectively solve various problems, including the economic living conditions of the people, it can be said that the EU still holds influence on the global stage, possesses political power, and maintains a high level of stability in terms of security under the administration of the EPPG.

Conclusion

The ideology of the political group of the European Parliament, which holds executive power in the EU at any given time, is one of the key factors influencing the formulation and

implementation of EU policies. Since 2004, most of the EU's executives have come from the EPPG, which primarily adheres to conservatism. This ideology focuses on maintaining the existing environment and increasing tools and mechanisms, in other words status quo, to further develop political institutions; however, it does not promote equal opportunities in politics, economics, and society. Furthermore, this ideology does not encourage governments to regulate or intervene in economic mechanisms.

For this reason, the design and implementation of policies are influenced by this ideology, the most significant of which is the 2009 EU reform, supported and emphasized by the EPPG. This led to the design and enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, which primarily involved the revision of the Maastricht Treaty and the power enhancement of EU institutions, transforming them into a legal personality capable of diplomatic negotiation and conducting "foreign" relations with nation-states outside the EU.

As the EU has been under the leadership of the EPPG political group for more than 20 years since 2004, it has resulted in the political nature of the entire EU not undergoing any significant changes for a long time. Moreover, the focus on developing the structure of the EU, which has not set, developed, or implemented new policies directly regarding its citizens, has led to dissatisfaction among people. This, in turn, has resulted in protests and riots throughout the EU when compared to the Schengen Agreement policy and the Euro currency policy, which were promoted and implemented by the S&D, which was in charge of the policymaking and governance of the EU from the 1980s to the early 2000s.

Moreover, the Eurozone Crisis and Brexit have continuously impacted the EU, affecting the resolution of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Israel-Palestine conflict in the post-2019 period. Although this situation

seemed to allow the EU to have a unified stance, it does not mean that the citizens of its member states are satisfied with the current economic conditions and rising cost of living. This remains a problem that the EU, under the leadership of center-right conservative groups, such as the EPPG, will have to handle in the future.

Theoretically, analyzing the factors that affected the policymaking of the EU from 2009 to 2019 reveals two major factors: Political Ideology and Euroscepticism. As the EU's main core idea is Liberalism, while Moravcsik's Liberal intergovernmentalism theory also has a significant influence from realism, it can be explained that the political ideology has shaped and emphasized what Moravcsik's theory has outlined: all member states of the EU create this union as the apparatus for increasing their role in world politics, which clearly reflects influence from Liberalism, as it gives importance to integration, it also has a strong influence from realism, that all member states of the EU still play a significant role in administrating the Union, in addition to the fact that the EU also has its own bureaucrat, system, and many mechanisms that can also be considered as a pseudo nation-state.

Furthermore, this can also relate to another theory, that is Defensive Realism, instead of developing and concentrating on offensive capability. Under the leadership of the EPPG, the EU is focused on the defense of its territory, and tries to use other means to maintain its status in world politics; those alternatives for offensive capability are a stronger union (like the Lisbon Treaty) and the power of the economy (the Euro Currency).

In conclusion, political ideology is the main factor influencing the formulation and implementation of the EU's policies at all levels. Since 2004, the European People's Party has adhered to a conservative ideology, which has led to the EU facing challenges in dealing with economic crises,

the cost of living, and energy expenses, resulting in protests and riots by the public. Overall, the EU is considered a strong and significant player and one of the great powers in international politics. This reflects the EU's choice to compromise on conflicts and differing political ideologies to maintain the unity of member states, overall security stability, and the shared interests of the entire members, according to the EU's official motto "In Varietate Concordia" or English, "United in Diversity."

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Social Capital of Local Community Businesses in Border Towns and Their Contribution to Supporting Tourism in Betong District, Yala, Thailand

Manus Suttikan¹  

¹ Faculty of Management Science, Yala Rajabhat University, Yala, Thailand, © Author

Abstract

The development of local community businesses in border areas, particularly in Betong District, Yala Province, Thailand, is crucial for supporting tourism, a key source of income for the community. Social capital, consisting of human capital, cultural capital, and network capital, is a critical factor in enhancing the potential of local businesses. Human capital in Betong enables entrepreneurs to develop products and services that meet the needs of tourists. The area's rich cultural diversity, a blend of Thai, Chinese, and Malay influences, serves as a unique attraction for visitors. Network capital, which includes relationships between entrepreneurs, the community, and government agencies, fosters collaboration in sustainably developing local businesses. The research methodology involves studying relevant documents and research, as well as conducting field surveys in Betong District, Yala Province, to gather information about local community businesses with the potential to support tourism. The focus is on businesses related to local products. Data is collected from local business operators through in-depth interviews to obtain relevant information. The analysis, using SWOT and TOWS Matrix tools, revealed that local community businesses in Betong District have strengths in natural resources, local culture, and robust social capital. However, they face challenges, such as a shortage of trainers for developing local products and incomplete infrastructure in certain areas. The findings are used to develop strategic plans for adapting and improving community businesses to fully meet the demands of the tourism market. While Betong District faces challenges in business development and infrastructure, the effective utilization of social capital can enhance competitiveness and promote sustainable tourism development in the area.

Introduction:

Betong District, located at the southern of Thailand, is surrounded by high mountains that give the area a cool climate year-round. Its unique geographical characteristics have made Betong an enchanting and attractive tourist destination. The district is home to numerous

distinctive and beautiful attractions, such as the world's largest post box, Thailand's first mountain-surrounding car tunnel, the highest-altitude sports stadium in the country, the first and largest Chinese language school in Betong, the largest bronze Buddha statue in Thailand, and the only winter flower garden in southern Thailand.

Beyond these natural and man-made attractions, Betong also stands out for its unique way of life, culture, traditions, and cuisine. These are shaped by the harmonious coexistence of diverse ethnicities and religions, each contributing its unique cultural identity. This blend has created a rich multicultural environment, making Betong one of the most culturally diverse areas in the country. Moreover, it is one of the most economically significant tourist destinations in southern Thailand, generating considerable revenue for the nation (Kaewngam and Wongwilaikasem, 2019). In 2020 the Aiyerweng Skywalk offering breathtaking views of the sea of mist, opened for the first time to both Thai and international tourists. It quickly gained popularity, particularly during festivals such as Hari Raya, Chinese New Year, and public holidays in Thailand and Malaysia, attracting a large number of visitors. However, there were periods during the COVID-19 pandemic when tourist numbers dropped significantly due to restrictions, although these periods were brief. Feedback from tourists visiting the area revealed a common sentiment: the lack of signature souvenirs representing Betong. This feedback prompted researchers to investigate the reasons behind this shortfall and work collaboratively with local authorities to address the issue. Strategies were developed to improve local community businesses through strategic planning and targeted projects, aiming to create a comprehensive tourism ecosystem in Betong. Efforts focused on identifying standout local businesses, especially those related to souvenir production, to fill the gaps in the tourism cycle. Strengthening these businesses has helped unify the community, increase income, and provide sustainable livelihoods. This initiative also capitalizes on Betong's diverse tourist attractions, such as the Aiyerweng Skywalk, hot springs, flower gardens, and tunnels, enhancing the area's overall tourism appeal. By fostering community-based businesses and integrating them into the

broader tourism framework, Betong is better positioned to accommodate growing tourist demand while preserving its unique identity and contributing to the local economy.

Tourism in border areas serves as a crucial mechanism for driving economic growth, particularly in Betong District, Yala Province. This unique destination stands out for its distinctive geography, culture, and local way of life. With a cool climate year-round and stunning natural attractions, Betong captivates both Thai and international tourists alike. However, to accommodate the growth of tourism, local community businesses in the area must develop and adapt to meet market demands effectively.

Social capital is a critical factor that contributes to the resilience of local community businesses. It not only enhances their competitive potential but also serves as a tool for preserving cultural identity and ensuring sustainable tourism in the region. By utilizing social capital effectively and appropriately, community businesses can adapt and grow steadily in the highly competitive tourism market. This article examines ten local community businesses in depth: 1. Betong Shogun Orange Business, known for their exceptional taste, Betong Shogun oranges are a highlight for tourists. Visitors are often eager to experience the famed flavor of these oranges, making them a signature product of the area. 2. Watercress Farming, Watercress is a unique agricultural product of Betong, thriving in the region's specific conditions where it is challenging to grow elsewhere. It is versatile in cooking, with the most popular dish being stir-fried watercress, which has gained wide acclaim. 3. Handicrafts Business, Handicrafts products are an essential cultural heritage worth supporting. Items include elegant bags, thermos holders, durian baskets, tissue boxes, and more. However, the industry faces challenges due to a lack of skilled trainers in advanced techniques, such as pattern design, dyeing, fabric lining, and

zipper installation, which could significantly enhance product quality and value. 4. Grass Jelly Business, Betong's grass jelly is a popular local delicacy sought by tourists. By improving packaging, it could become a valuable souvenir representing the region's culinary heritage. 5. Betong Chicken Business, Betong chicken is highly regarded for its quality, as seen from the high demand by restaurant owners in Hat Yai and Bangkok. This product's unique taste makes it a prized ingredient in upscale restaurants. 6. Krua Tuan Restaurant, This Muslim-owned restaurant offers a wide array of Betong-style dishes, standing out with its unique signature flavors that cannot be found elsewhere, adding to the culinary appeal of the region. 7. Kopi Business, Betong's traditional coffee or kopi, is a favorite among coffee lovers. By enhancing packaging and adding multilingual labeling, this product could cater to international tourists and become a premium souvenir. 8. Rim Than Resort Business, this resort-style homestay showcases Betong's pristine natural beauty. However, some areas require government support in improving basic infrastructure to fully capitalize on its potential. 9. Garcinia Business, Garcinia a fruit abundant in Betong year-round, offers significant potential. With proper processing, it could be transformed into diverse products, making it an excellent souvenir option. 10. Nile Tilapia Business, Betong's unique tilapia farming technique involves raising fish in large ponds with continuously flowing mountain water. This method ensures the fish are free from muddy odors, making them ideal for various dishes. A standout menu item is "khlooi pla nin" (crispy tilapia rolls), a signature dish that tourists frequently buy as a gift to take home. This study delves deeply into various dimensions of these

businesses, examining their challenges and opportunities. By integrating social capital effectively, these enterprises can strengthen their economic standing, foster sustainable livelihoods, and enhance the overall tourism ecosystem of Betong.


Therefore, the study of the social capital of local community businesses in border towns and their contribution to supporting tourism in Betong District, Yala, Thailand, serves as an alternative avenue for devising strategies to create opportunities for local border communities to accommodate future tourism. This approach aims to provide deeper insights into the practical adaptation of local community businesses while preserving and leveraging the unique features of the area. It aligns with the development plan of the Model City for Stability, Prosperity, and Sustainability and fills gaps in the tourism ecosystem of Betong District, making it more comprehensive. This is achieved through the contributions of local border community entrepreneurs in Betong District. This research article focuses on analyzing the role of social capital in local community businesses in Betong District. It seeks to understand how these resources can be utilized to develop sustainable tourism in the area and effectively accommodate tourists.

Research Objective

To study the social capital of border community businesses in Betong that influences the adaptation process of local community businesses to support tourism in Betong District, Yala Province, Thailand.

Research Framework

Figure1
Research Framework



Literature Review

The Concept of Social Capital

Social capital has been highly emphasized since Thailand faced the economic crisis in 1997. It has been continuously applied in the dimension of development, both in academic circles and among practitioners. Empirical evidence demonstrates its transformation into strategies and policies for sustainable development, using social capital as a key tool. This involves encouraging communities to identify their social capital and utilize it in community management. The types of social capital within each community depending on the contextual conditions of the area.

From a review of the literature, it was found that studies on social capital in Thailand generally share a common framework for analysis and classification of social capital, albeit with considerable variation in details. This means that the frameworks are often defined based on definitions that emphasize the distinctiveness or identity of the area under study. However, social capital is integrated into various research themes. Totum and Dokduang (2022) proposed a framework of five types of social capital in studying the development of social capital as learning centers and promoting secondary city tourism. These include human capital, institutional capital, intellectual capital, cultural capital, and natural and environmental resources capital. Meanwhile, Phetsatit

(2019) offered an interesting classification of social capital related to driving community businesses into four types: human capital, physical capital, indigenous knowledge capital, and kinship network capital. These were based on the target area of the study. In addition, the study by Phiwhphun and Kobamrung (2023) summarized four main social capital frameworks for analyzing causal relationships influencing the development of local economic capital to enhance the competitiveness of community enterprise entrepreneurs in the Northern Region of Thailand. These frameworks include physical capital, financial asset capital, cultural wisdom capital, and human resource capital, with direct influences on competitiveness in terms of low-cost structures, differentiation, innovation, market potential, and quality.

This study will examine social capital by integrating it with community businesses and tourism. The researcher will adopt the frameworks from the aforementioned studies to define the social capital framework for this research into four key dimensions: 1. Causal human resource capital directly influencing competitiveness in areas such as low-cost structures, differentiation, innovation, market potential, and quality. 2. Physical capital. 3. Cultural wisdom capital. 4. Natural and environmental resource capital.

The Concept of Adaptation in Local Community Businesses

Adaptation for survival involves adjusting to ensure that businesses can continue to operate or enhance the capacity of local businesses to become resilient and capable of competing with large-scale corporations. This is achieved through various methods and strategies to foster consumer satisfaction and trust, enabling businesses to maintain control and determine their operational direction. It also allows businesses to understand the true needs of consumers, keeping them aware of rapid changes in the modern era. Entrepreneurs must consistently stay updated with technology, news, and current events (Thavonsiri et al., 2015). Laihang (2013) stated that creating differentiation to impress consumers is a key factor for marketing success. This approach can convey a sense of uniqueness in various ways, making products stand out by offering diverse options tailored to specific needs. Additionally, maintaining manageable marketing sizes allows businesses to better understand customer behavior, truly comprehend their customers, and anticipate future demands. This understanding enables businesses to achieve consistent sales, fostering repeat purchases and ultimately cultivating customer loyalty toward both the product and the entrepreneur.

Phonphonatham (2008, p.93) stated that consumer purchasing behavior has changed significantly. Therefore, small businesses must adapt in various ways to meet the needs of modern consumers, who prioritize convenience and alignment with current preferences. These adaptations include the following:

1. Business Owner Attributes. Small business owners must elevate themselves from being mere sellers to becoming business managers, with the following key attributes: 1.1 Knowledge about their business. 1.2 Learning additional principles of business management. 1.3 Enhancing diverse

skills. 1.4 Having a good personality. 1.5 Decision-making ability and a proactive mindset.

2. Location. Small businesses often face financial constraints when choosing prime locations in communities or city centers with high customer traffic. Therefore, several factors should be considered: 2.1 The cost of the location relative to the potential revenue generation, ensuring a worthwhile investment. 2.2 Building brand awareness through effective communication strategies.

3. Sales Management. Traditional sales methods involve passively waiting for customers to visit, but modern sales strategies focus on driving and achieving sales targets through the following approaches: 3.1 Studying customer needs. 3.2 Setting sales goals. 3.3 Managing sales effectively. 3.4 Utilizing technology to enhance sales management.

4. Pricing. Small businesses often face disadvantages in pricing due to higher product costs from lower purchase volumes. To avoid direct price competition, small businesses can consider: 4.1 Selecting products to sell strategically. 4.2 Observing customers' purchasing power.

5. Other Factors: 5.1 Purchase timing. 5.2 Essential products. 5.3 Target groups.

Strategic Adaptation: The Four Key Strategies

1. Service Quality. High-quality service is crucial for differentiating a business and outperforming competitors. Delivering consistent, exceptional service that exceeds customer expectations builds loyalty. Customer expectations are shaped by past experiences, word-of-mouth recommendations, and advertising. If the service received meets or exceeds expectations, customers are likely to return; otherwise, they lose interest.

2. Creating Differentiation. Differentiation involves making products and services unique and superior in the eyes of customers. This uniqueness can stem from product design, convenience, quality, service, branding, innovation, technology, or production processes. Even if the

product is more expensive, customers may be willing to pay for the perceived value and quality.

3. Niche Market Focus. Focusing on smaller target markets allows businesses to deeply understand customer behavior and predict future needs. Success in niche markets can lead to repeat purchases and customer loyalty, enabling businesses to sustain long-term sales and maintain a competitive edge.

4. Building Customer Relationships. This involves continuous marketing activities directed at customers, whether end-users or intermediaries in the distribution channel. The aim is to foster understanding, positive perceptions, and affinity toward the business and its products or services. Emphasis is placed on two-way communication to develop mutually beneficial, long-term relationships between the business and its customers.

In summary, the adaptation of local border-town community businesses requires diverse skills and capabilities. Business owners must pay close attention to and thoroughly study their operations to cater to the growing number of tourists, both domestic and international, visiting the Betong area. Key areas of focus include: Quality of Products and Services, Creating Differentiation, Targeting Niche Markets, Building Special Relationships, Monitoring Local Events, Embracing New Technology, Employee Training, Honesty and Integrity.

Concept of Border Town and Special Economic Zone Development

The development of special economic zones (SEZs) in the past was primarily a policy aimed at promoting investment and macroeconomic development, leveraging four key advantages of the area:

1. Geographic advantage: Strategic locations with abundant natural resources ready for production.

2. Low import-export costs: SEZs were typically established in border areas or near international shipping ports to minimize transportation expenses.

3. Abundant low-cost labor: The availability of inexpensive labor in large numbers.

4. Government incentives for investment: These included tax exemptions or reductions, relaxed regulations, and facilitated investment processes within SEZs to attract investors by offering lower operational costs compared to other areas (Noumtanom, 2017). Currently, the government places greater emphasis on the service, technology, tourism, and innovation sectors. Consequently, the concept of SEZs has evolved to accommodate new investment formats. These include developing SEZs with an environment conducive to service and innovation sectors, advanced education systems, and skilled workforce training in innovation. Additionally, SEZs aim to create modern cities and environments for the new generation, providing facilities such as advanced communication systems, transportation networks, startup incubation services, financial services, and investment support. This approach is more complex and diverse compared to the heavy industry-focused SEZs of over 30 years ago (Farole, 2011). Moreover, it is crucial to develop the cities and external environments surrounding SEZs to enhance their potential and mutual benefit. Without this, SEZs may not achieve success or sustainability (Jong Woo Kang, 2017).

Key Success Factors in Border Town and SEZ Development

The establishment of SEZs requires several critical factors for success. According to Douglas Zihua Zeng (2015), the following elements are essential:

1. Strong Commitment and Support of the Government: A robust policy mechanism must be in place, including: Establishing organizations responsible for driving policies at both national

and local levels. Assigning specific tasks and responsibilities to specialized units. Enacting laws, orders, or regulations essential for implementing state authority measures (e.g., tax incentives, land ownership management, urban planning, customs procedures, and exemptions or relaxations of state controls). Signing cooperation agreements with neighboring countries on SEZs. Developing clear long-term, medium-term, and annual budget allocation plans for policy implementation.

2. **Clear Objectives and Benchmarks:** Setting specific goals such as boosting economic growth rates, export value, employment figures, and revenue generated by SEZ management organizations.

3. **Location Advantage:** Selecting strategically advantageous locations and appropriately sized SEZ areas, ensuring the size is neither too small nor too large.

4. **Investment Incentives and Institutional Autonomy:** Ensuring good governance in investment promotion to prevent issues such as rent-seeking behavior in area management.

5. **Infrastructure Development:** Implementing plans or projects to build or improve infrastructure that can support existing or emerging economic bases in the area.

6. **Supportive Measures:** Introducing measures that promote investment, employment, and business operations, ensuring ease of decision-making, efficiency, and minimal costs for entrepreneurs.

7. **Technology Transfer Mechanisms and Capacity Building:** Establishing mechanisms for local or national businesses to integrate the SEZ economy with local and national economies effectively. This requires collaboration between entrepreneurs inside and outside the SEZ.

8. **Management of Cities and Surrounding Environments:** Managing urban areas and environments within and around SEZs to facilitate business operations and enhance the quality of life for urban residents sustainably.

The development of border towns and SEZs involves multiple critical factors. The government must play a leading role in establishing and overseeing systems by setting clear objectives and goals, involving local administrative organizations and private sectors in the development process, and introducing supportive measures. Additionally, creating systemic linkages with the national economy is essential for achieving comprehensive and sustainable development.

Research Methods

The research article titled "Social Capital of Local Community Businesses in Border Towns and Their Contribution to Supporting Tourism in Betong District, Yala, Thailand" employs a qualitative research approach to obtain in-depth insights into social capital and the development of local community businesses. The research process includes the following steps:

1. **Document and Literature Review.** This step involves studying research, literature, and documents related to social capital, local community business development, and tourism, particularly in border areas and culturally diverse regions. The aim is to establish a comprehensive conceptual framework for analyzing social capital and the adaptation of local community businesses in Betong District.

2. **Field Survey.** A field survey is conducted in Betong District, Yala Province, to collect data on local community businesses with the potential to support tourism. The focus is on businesses related to local products, such as homestays, traditional restaurants, agricultural products, and souvenirs. This is to understand the local context and the existing social capital within the community.

3. **Data Collection from Local Entrepreneurs.** In-depth interviews were conducted with local business operators in Betong District, covering a total of 10 businesses: 1. Betong Shogun Orange Business

2. Watercress Farming 3. Handicrafts Business 4. Grass Jelly Business 5. Betong Chicken Business 6. Krua Tuan Restaurant 7. Kopi Business 8. Rim Than Resort Business 9. Garcinia Business 10. Nile Tilapia Business. A total of 14 participants were interviewed, using a combination of individual in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The aim was to gather information on causal human resource capital, physical capital, cultural wisdom capital, and natural and environmental resource capital within these businesses, as well as the challenges and opportunities for developing these businesses to support tourism. The interviews utilized semi-structured questionnaires to ensure comprehensive and qualitative data collection.

4. Data Analysis Using SWOT Analysis and TOWS Matrix. Collected data is analyzed using SWOT Analysis to assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of community businesses in the area. The results are then applied to the TOWS Matrix to develop strategies for adapting and enhancing social capital for supporting tourism.

5. Strategic Recommendations. Based on the analysis, the research findings will lead to strategic recommendations for the development of local community businesses. The focus is on effectively utilizing social capital to promote sustainable tourism and business development in the border area of Betong District.

This research aims to enhance the understanding of the role of social capital in developing local community businesses in Betong District. It also provides a framework that can be applied to other areas with similar characteristics to promote tourism and community development.

Results

The study of theories and related literature, it was found that there are four key types of capital: 1. Causal Human Resource Capital 2. Physical Capital 3. Cultural Wisdom Capital 4. Natural and Environmental Resource Capital. These were analyzed in the context of 10 local community businesses in Betong. The details can be summarized in the following table.

Table 1

Summary of the Social Capital of 10 Local Community Businesses in the Border Area of Betong District, Yala Province.

Local Community Businesses	Social Capital of Businesses
1. Betong Shogun Orange Business	<p><u>Causal Human Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Marketing: High market demand for this type of orange. - Production: A challenging fruit to cultivate but has strengths in production processes, cultivation methods, and care techniques that leverage Betong's suitable geography and climate. <p><u>Physical Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Geography: The geographic conditions are more favorable compared to other areas. <p><u>Cultural Wisdom Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stories: Features unique and interesting stories or historical backgrounds. - Identity: Known for its high-quality and distinctive oranges with unmatched characteristics in terms of yield and taste.
2. Watercress Farming	<p><u>Causal Human Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Marketing: A key economic crop of Betong District with high market demand. Productionres of the area help reduce production costs. <p><u>Physical Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Geography: Cultivation requires specific conditions and can only thrive in suitable environments like Betong. - Location: Situated at Piyamit Tunnel, a historical and tourist site in Betong District. <p><u>Natural and Environmental Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nutrition: A crop rich in nutrients and health benefits, particularly aiding in gut health.

Local Community Businesses	Social Capital of Businesses
3. Handicrafts Business	<p><u>Causal Human Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creative and Innovative Thinking: Inspired by study tours and an interest in handicrafts, leading to the idea of establishing a handicraft weaving group. - Product Design: The products are durable and offer great value for use.
4. Grass Jelly Business	<p><u>Causal Human Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Marketing: Highly sought after by tourists; consuming grass jelly is a must-do for visitors to Betong. - Technology: Utilizes technological equipment to aid in production. - Product: Complex to produce, with intricate processes that require time and meticulous attention to quality at every stage. <p><u>Physical Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tourism: Included in tour group programs organized by travel companies and promoted through word-of-mouth. - Social Media: Online platforms have increased its visibility, with well-known reviewers and YouTubers visiting the shop, filming, and advertising the grass jelly. <p><u>Cultural Wisdom Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stories: The grass jelly has a rich history and legends passed down through generations, already renowned in Betong District. - Identity: Features a unique identity that makes it incomparable to grass jelly from other regions. <p><u>Natural and Environmental Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Raw Materials: Made from high-quality grass jelly plants imported from abroad.
5. Betong Chicken Business	<p><u>Causal Human Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Marketing: Betong chicken has high market demand both domestically and internationally. - Production: Raising Betong chickens incurs higher costs than other breeds and requires intensive care, leading to significant production expenses. <p><u>Cultural Wisdom Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stories: Rich historical background with notable and interesting narratives, supported by diverse sources of information. - Identity: Recognized for its unique body shape and distinctive physical characteristics. - Taste: Offers a distinctive taste and high-quality meat and skin, characterized by a tender, sweet, firm, and aromatic flavor, unlike other chicken breeds.
6. Krua Tuan Restaurant	<p><u>Physical Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Value and Perception: Creates a high-quality impression for customers. - Social Media: Online platforms have increased its recognition, with well-known reviewers and YouTubers visiting the restaurant, filming, and promoting it. <p><u>Cultural Wisdom Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stories: Features narratives passed down through generations. - Identity: The food and its flavors possess a unique and distinctive character.
7. Kopi Business	<p><u>Causal Human Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Marketing: High demand from both the domestic market and tourists, including Thai and Malaysian visitors. <p><u>Cultural Wisdom Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identity: Possesses a unique character with an aromatic, rich, and flavorful taste, as it is traditionally hand-pounded and roasted with firewood, preserving and maintaining the traditional production methods.
8. Rim Than Resort Business	<p><u>Physical Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Location: Situated near tourist attractions in a peaceful, natural environment, making it ideal for relaxation and tourist activities.
9. Garcinia Business	<p><u>Causal Human Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Production: The production process involves multiple steps and requires time, with careful attention to quality at every stage. <p><u>Cultural Wisdom Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Taste: Has a unique, delicious flavor and is processed into various products from Garcinia Cambogia.

Local Community Businesses	Social Capital of Businesses
10. Nile Tilapia Business.	<p><u>Causal Human Resource Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Production: Fish farming requires significant effort and meticulous care at every stage, from selecting fingerlings, managing ponds, feeding, monitoring fish weight, and controlling the farming duration to ensure the highest quality fish. - Marketing: Flowing Stream Tilapia* is a highly sought-after dish among tourists visiting Betong. <p><u>Physical Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Geography: The area benefits from natural water sources, including a dam and mountain streams, with a continuous water circulation system and a climate more suitable for fish farming than other regions. - Location: Situated near major tourist attractions, including the Winter Flower Garden and Piyamit Tunnel, making it a popular dining stop for visitors. <p><u>Cultural Wisdom Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Taste: The fish has a distinctive quality and flavor—tender, naturally sweet, and free from any muddy odor—ensuring freshness as it is sourced directly from the pond for cooking.

Based on the collected data, the research team analyzed and assessed the effectiveness of utilizing social capital to support tourism in Betong District, Yala Province. The findings indicate that three key types of capital are essential for achieving effective outcomes: Human Capital, Cultural Capital, Network Capital. The details of each type of capital can be summarized as follows:

1. Human Capital. The research reveals that human capital in Betong is a vital factor influencing the ability to develop local businesses. Entrepreneurs in the area possess skills and experience in producing unique local products such as Shogun oranges, watercress, and Betong chicken, as well as providing services that meet the needs of tourists effectively. However, the lack of training and opportunities for specialized skill development remains a limitation that requires support from the government and relevant agencies.

2. Cultural Capital. Betong's diverse cultural heritage serves as a distinctive strength that

promotes cultural tourism. The blending of Thai, Chinese, and Malay cultures has created unique traditions, cuisines, and ways of life that attract tourists. This cultural capital can be further leveraged to develop tourist attractions and create distinctive local products. Nevertheless, the lack of continuous conservation and promotion of cultural capital could diminish the area's appeal over time.

3. Network Capital. Building networks and fostering collaboration among communities, local entrepreneurs, government agencies, and external organizations is a key factor in strengthening community businesses in Betong. Collaborative efforts to develop infrastructure, such as the Skywalk and the Aiyerweng, as well as tourist facilities, have significantly enhanced the area's capacity to accommodate tourists and promote local business growth. However, establishing robust and sustainable networks remains an area that requires further development.

Table 2

Distribution of Social Capital in 10 Local Community Businesses in Betong District, Yala Province, Thailand.

	Human Capital.	Cultural Capital.	Network Capital.
Betong Shogun Orange Business	1	1	1
Watercress Farming	1		1
Handicrafts Business	1		
Grass Jelly Business	1	1	1

	Human Capital.	Cultural Capital.	Network Capital.
Betong Chicken Business	1	1	
Krua Tuan Restaurant		1	1
Kopi Business	1	1	
Rim Than Resort Business			1
Garcinia Business	1	1	
Nile Tilapia Business	1	1	1

From Table 2, it is observed that all 10 community businesses possess some form of social capital, including human capital, cultural capital, and network capital, though most do not encompass all three types of capital. The findings reveal the following: 1. Businesses with all three types of social capital: There are Three businesses, that are Betong Shogun Orange Business, Grass Jelly Business and Nile Tilapia Business. 2. Businesses with two types of social capital: There are Five businesses, that are Watercress Farm, Betong Chicken Business, Krea Tuan Restaurant, Kopi Business, and Garcinia Business. 3. Businesses with one type of social capital: There are Two businesses, that are Handicrafts Business and Rim Than Resort Business.

To ensure that all businesses have the full potential and capability to support tourism in Betong District, Yala Province, at 100% in the future the government should provide support and enhance social capital in each business, ensuring they possess all three key types of capital. Additionally, each business should strive to develop itself comprehensively to attain these three types of social capital. This can be achieved through training and self-improvement via various channels. Today social media offers convenient and flexible access to knowledge through the internet. Furthermore, government financial institutions provide numerous low-interest funding options to support the operations of community enterprises.

4. SWOT Analysis and TOWS Matrix

The SWOT Analysis revealed that local community businesses in Betong District have strengths in natural resources, local culture, and strong social capital. However, they still face challenges such as a lack of trainers for local

product development and incomplete infrastructure (weaknesses). An opportunity for Betong is that it receives government support as part of the "Stable, Prosperous, and Sustainable Triangle Model City Project", endorsed by the Cabinet Resolution. This support includes budget allocations and other assistance aimed at developing Betong into a prominent tourist destination in Thailand. However, following the COVID-19 pandemic, Thailand's economy has not fully recovered. Additionally, Malaysia's currency depreciation has affected tourism growth in the area, which has not expanded as projected (threats). The analysis suggests that leveraging social capital, along with developing human capital and strengthening collaborative networks, will enhance the area's capacity to support tourism and ensure the sustainability of community businesses. This leads to a 5-year strategic plan, synthesized through the TOWS Matrix, which consists of two key strategies:

Strategy 1: Promote, support, and develop border town local business products and marketing. This strategy aims to increase the value of agricultural products through the following methods: Encouraging coffee cultivation in the area, promoting the processing of agricultural products, supporting brand design, enhancing packaging development, expanding export markets, establishing a local product distribution center and promoting online marketing. These efforts are to be supported by government agencies such as the Yala Provincial Commerce Office, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), Betong District, Yala Provincial Community Development Office, and Yala Provincial Agriculture Office.


Strategy 2: Promote and develop diverse and interconnected tourism. This strategy focuses on expanding the tourism and service sectors through the following actions: Improving transportation routes to tourist attractions and related businesses, upgrading tourist sites, activities, products, and services, establishing learning centers for community businesses with potential to support tourism in Betong, promoting the use of modern technology in local businesses, enhancing management capabilities for community tourism, community enterprises, and local leaders. This strategy will be supported by government entities including the SBPAC, Betong District Office, Betong Municipality, the Forestry Department,

the Yala Provincial Tourism and Sports Office, and Yala Rajabhat University.

Social capital in its various forms plays a critical role in developing border town community businesses in Betong District to effectively and sustainably accommodate tourism. The development of human capital, cultural capital, and collaborative networks between communities and government agencies are essential factors in promoting community businesses. Strategic analysis indicates that systematically utilizing social capital for local business development will enable Betong to become a high-potential and sustainable tourism destination in the long term.

Figure2

The Adaptation Process of Local Community Businesses to Support Tourism in Betong District, Yala Province, Thailand.



Discussion

The findings of the study "Social Capital of Local Community Businesses in Border Towns and Their Contribution to Supporting Tourism in Betong District, Yala, Thailand" align with international research on the utilization of social capital for the development of local community businesses and cultural tourism in several key aspects:

1. Human Capital and Capacity Development of Community Businesses. The research by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (2009) emphasized the role of human capital in enhancing collaborative potential and fostering innovation in local businesses. Developing the skills, knowledge, and abilities of individuals within the community is a crucial factor in increasing the capacity of local community businesses to support the growth of tourism in the area. Our findings indicate that human capital in Betong, particularly specialized skills and knowledge in service provision and local product development, plays a significant role in enhancing the competitiveness of local community businesses. This aligns with the research by Abane et al. (2024), which highlights the importance of the structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions of social capital in fostering group cohesion and social relationships. These factors are vital for supporting the growth of new businesses in Ghana. Moreover, social capital can promote group solidarity and establish beneficial social relationships, thereby enhancing business growth. Similarly, the study by Zheng and Chou (2024), titled "Rebuilding the Resilience of Mountainous Rural Communities by Enhancing Community Capital through Industrial Transformation: A Case Study from Rural Fujian, China" found that human capital plays a critical role in facilitating industrial transformation in rural areas and improving community resilience. Their research also demonstrated that bonding social

capital within communities effectively supports development and helps build resilience. These studies collectively underscore the importance of human capital development and skill enhancement in local communities to improve competitiveness and foster innovation in community businesses. This is particularly relevant for the tourism sector and local product development, which are essential for supporting economic growth in the area.

2. Cultural Capital and the Development of Cultural Tourism. The findings align with the research of Richards and Wilson (2006), which highlighted the development of cultural tourism in areas with diverse cultural heritage. Their research emphasized that regions with cultural diversity can leverage it as a unique selling point to effectively attract tourists. Similarly, our study found that Betong's cultural diversity comprising Thai, Chinese, and Malay influences serves as a distinctive feature that adds value to tourism and creates engaging experiences for visitors. Furthermore, Smith and Richards (2013) emphasized the importance of preserving and promoting local culture in the development of cultural tourism. This resonates with our findings, which suggest that conserving local culture in Betong can be a strategic approach to attract tourists and ensure sustainability in tourism. Additionally, Bashi (2015) discussed cultural heritage as a key economic asset for tourism, capable of attracting international visitors. Heritage sites not only reflect a nation's history to younger generations but also serve as an honorable representation of Albania across Europe and beyond. These studies collectively enhance the understanding of the role of cultural capital and local cultural heritage conservation in developing cultural tourism in diverse areas like Betong. By leveraging cultural diversity as a strategy to attract tourists and create memorable experiences, local communities can strengthen their identity while promoting sustainable cultural tourism in the long term.

3. Network Capital and Building Community

Collaboration. The importance of network capital in fostering collaboration between communities and the public sector, as highlighted in our research, aligns with the work of Adler and Kwon (2020). Their study emphasized the development of network capital and cooperation within local communities as a means to enhance business development potential. Collaboration among entrepreneurs, government agencies, and communities plays a crucial role in building robust networks that can support the sustainable growth of local businesses. Burt (2021) also noted that strong and sustainable relationships within networks enhance competitive potential and increase access to critical resources for businesses. This insight is reflected in our findings, particularly within the context of Betong's community businesses, which require cooperation from all sectors to promote tourism and develop infrastructure. Moreover, Vongvisitsin, Huang, and King (2024) filled knowledge gaps in community-based tourism development in urban settings by integrating fieldwork insights with social capital frameworks. Their research highlighted how interactions among various forms of social capital could lead to diverse outcomes, offering a theoretical perspective for studying social capital and community-based tourism. They underscored the importance of diversity and inclusivity in fostering collaboration. These studies reinforce the vital role of network capital in fostering partnerships and supporting the sustainable growth of local businesses. Collaboration among local entrepreneurs, government agencies, and other stakeholders such as local organizations emerge as a key strategy to enhance the competitiveness of local community businesses and support the development of critical infrastructure to attract tourists.

Limitation and Future Research

Limitations of this Research

1. Focus on a Specific Area. The study focuses exclusively on Betong District, Yala Province, which may limit the generalizability of its findings to other border areas due to differences in culture, economy, and infrastructure.

2. Limitations in Data Quality. Data collection on social capital may face accuracy challenges, as it heavily relies on the interpretations and perspectives of informants, which could lead to errors or biases.

3. Changes in Social and Political Contexts. The rapidly changing social and political circumstances in border areas may affect the long-term applicability of the research findings.

4. Access to Resources and Government Support. The sustainable development of community businesses in border areas heavily depends on the availability of resources and support from various levels of government, which may be uncertain.

Suggestions for Future Research

1. Study in Other Border Areas. Future studies should expand to other border areas with different geographic and cultural characteristics to compare and identify approaches for developing local community businesses suitable for each context.

2. In-Depth Analysis of Each Type of Social Capital. Future research should conduct a deeper analysis of each type of social capital, such as human capital, cultural capital, and network capital, to better understand their roles and interconnections within different contexts.

3. Impact Analysis of Tourism on Local Communities. Additional research is needed to explore the economic, social, and cultural impacts of tourism on local communities to identify development strategies that genuinely promote sustainability.

4. Study on the Role of Technology. Further studies should investigate how technology can support community businesses in border areas, particularly the use of digital media and online platforms to promote tourism and expand markets.

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Behind Bars: Unpacking the Nexus Between Nigeria's Federal Structure, Criminal Justice System, and Alarming Rise of Awaiting Trial Syndrome in Correctional Facilities – Challenges, and Pathways to Reform

Abubakar S. Yushau Alfakoro ^{1*}   , **Ayodele Kolawole** ²   , **Amin Amin** ¹  

¹Department of Public Administration Kwara State Polytechnic, Nigeria

²Registrar Newland Polytechnic Zango, Nigeria

* Corresponding Author, © Authors

Abstract

Federalism features three tiers of government alongside the traditional arms of government concurrently. The former constitutes the federal, state and local government which portrays a classical feature of federalism while the latter constitutes the executive, judiciary and legislature. However, the pattern of interplay and overlapping nature of responsibilities of the components units as created avenue for glitches and frictions for smooth operations of the criminal justice structure in practice. The objective of the paper is to appraise the effects of Nigeria's federal structure on general management of criminal justice administrations, with concomitant effects of increasing awaiting trials across correctional centers in Nigeria. This study primarily relied on interview of key stakeholders within the justice delivery system and secondary from panel data of relevant international organizations, journals, articles, government publication and the internet. The population for this study was purposively selected across the police, judges, clerks, and correctional officers. The study discovered that Nigeria's obtuse operation of the federal system of government constitutes delays in justice dispensation, power tussle, jurisdiction tussle and huge cost of operations. The study however, recommended creation of state police, speedy judicial and investigation process, clear jurisdiction of authority, review of the law framework among others as the remedy to the effects of the problems posed by the Nigeria federal structure on the justice system linking to the increase awaiting-trial syndrome among other recommendations.

Introduction

The inclination behind citizens submitting their affairs to a body called government is principally doctrine towards the protections of life's and properties, and to ensure effectiveness in justice

dispensation. This position is in cognizance with the social contract theory of the state as postulated by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1651). Thus, Government through its administration which constitutes its structures and agencies has been on the track to provide for

a peaceful environment that could help it carryout its functions and achieve its obligations. In realizing these governmental goals, several bodies that could foster the attainments of these aims and objectives in terms of realization of the state function were established for proper state functioning. It's in pursuit of this, that government had established groundwork for the criminal justice system that serves as the brain-box and provides the footing upon which social order rests within the state.

Hence, criminal justice system is essential for attaining effective and efficient administration of affairs as it encompasses bodies of institutions responsible for detaining suspect, making rulings and punishing offenders. Governmental apparatus in the ambit of the justice process are nothing different form the police, court/judicial system and the correctional officers.

Nigeria operates a three tiers structure. Though, Federalism entails a process whereby the states as a sub-part constitute or makes up the federal structure. Notwithstanding, they are constitutionally grounded and as an order of arrangement. This sub-part may be three or two however, are recognized and has a legal backing by the state constitution establishing the state. For example, Nigeria runs a federal structure which is the federal; the state and local government and all these levels are constitutional recognized. Operating federalism made it possible for the statutory separation of commands among the central, state and local governments in Nigeria. This structure allows for decentralization of power in other to promote efficiency and effectiveness in governance. Conversely, this arrangement was to cope with the issues of its population size, geographical size, diverse ethnicity and religious plurality. Federalism as a system therefore preaches unity in diversity. These conditions made it possible for the creation of state sharia, customary court and state house of assembly

were by each state can deal with matters affecting individual state and that suits individual states. Even though there has been constant clash of supremacy and power tussle between each component parts in terms of power jurisdiction despite the principle of unity and diversity.

Over time, the conflict between federal – state structures has been a cog in the realization of governmental goals. Lack of cooperation and coordination has hampered the effectiveness and efficiency of this system. For instance, they component of justice system, the police and prison services are of the exclusive list while the judicial and the legislative arms are of both federal and state structures. This structure shows the level of intergovernmental relations and interdependence within the system. However, the existing nature of the intergovernmental relationship has not been working effectively due to the constant overlapping of functions, tussling for supremacy, and diversity of interests among the component units of the criminal system. For instance, the Police as a federal agency can make transfer of an officer in charge of a crime investigation without consulting the court which leads to delays or interrupt justice process due to lack of coordination among the component. In another instance a police officer is not obliged to serve has a prosecutor in other cases or court of law. Also there are some cases that are beyond the jurisdiction of some courts of law and also correctional officers does not always know the actual details of who her to be brought to court, the time and the date of such case vice-versa. These irregularities among others are part of the problem posed by the federal structure. Moreover, the reduction of awaiting trial inmates depends on harmonization and collaboration of these machineries of criminal justice process (Eze et al., 2021). The country had been undergoing inter structural rivalry on issues of constitutional jurisdiction, income sourcing, wealth mechanism, resource distribution principle,

these all aggravated inter-institutional conflict among the structures (Ukwayi & Okpa, 2017; Ojo, 2020).

It is bothersome from the commitment, plethora of institutions and resources that has been apportioned to this sector in order to ensure ease and quick administration of criminal justice system, those efforts has only been seen but success still remains a mirage. The consequences in the failure of this system as resulted or to say contributed to incapability of the justice system. This has further exuberated the large number of awaiting trials inmates. In the data base of the World Prison Trial/Remand imprisonment List data reports shows that over 3.2 million people held in awaiting-trial confinement around the world (WPTRIL, 2023). Categorically, data provided it that about 76 % of Nigeria's prison populations are on awaiting trial (WPB, 2023). There has being large number of awaiting trial inmates across Nigeria prisons with majority spending more than one year in detentions. For example, in an interview report by the former comptroller of Nigeria correctional service Lagos state Mr. Adewale Adesbi he attested that there are prisoners on 12 years awaiting trials at the kirikiri maximum prisons Ideally, this contradicts against the Nigeria 1999 law book as stipulated in Section 35 sub section (5) , which clears it out that "a person must be taken to court within 24 hours from the date of arrest, where there is a court of competent jurisdiction within the radius of 40 km or within 2 days or such period considered by the court to be reasonable." Nonetheless, this provision by the constitution as been negated among these is other several factors militating against the ease and speedy justice delivery process in the country.

It's in cognizant of the above; the paper intended to carry out research on the effect of Nigeria's federal structure on justice administration with the overgrowing rate of awaiting trial inmates across correctional facilities.

Conceptual Review

The Concept of Federalism

In modern political discourse, the concept of federalism was asserted by scholars to be traced and accredited to the work of K. C Wheare's. However, the genesis of the notion Federalism was asserted to be lay claim from the word "Foedus", which connotes "treaty", "covenant". "League" or "compact". This countenance was in line with the ideas of Ogudiya and abdullahi (2012) as cited in Alfakoro (2020), that avers that the concept of federalism was a derivation of the Latin word "Foedus" which portrays league or treaty. In the declarations of Kenneth, he grasps federalism as an approach of government that is established through a constitutional framework that allows for the laws making powers and state functions to be disentangle between the recognized tiers of government usually the federal and regional were each has its competence and jurisdiction and are independent and coordinate. Defining federalism in a more clear view, it entails a system of government or an established political arrangement that consist of people of different traditional, historical, and political background with diverse ethnic groups, multiple religious faith but are united under one political arrangement to come together has one so as to cooperate together in areas of commonality and part away in areas of their diversity. This view above made people term federalism as a system of "unity in diversity". According to Aderonke (2015), she posited federalism has a political settings that permits for the principle of mutuality, progress and development through joint sacrifice were by sub-component denotes some of their powers and right of the government at the center while holding some for their diversities by collective ownership of material and national wealth. To Friedrich (1963:585) federalism is "a union of group united by one or more common objectives but retaining their distinctive group being for other purpose". In the words of Takan

(2011), federalism connotes a governmental process were by the sub components parts contribute to national power and are allocated functions in a define manners in respective of their ethnicity or clans. Federalism therefore, connotes an organized political arrangement which is guided by a federal constitution, with specification on how commands, resources and tasks are distributed and managed. This definition goes in line with the federal structure in Nigeria were by there is a legal separation of tasks between the tiers of government with each having is area of jurisdiction and areas were the jointly perform task I.e. exclusive, concurrent and residual list. Lastly, Federalism to Yusuf (2013) is the process in which political sovereignty is shared in-between the center and other parts forming they federation or federal government. From all the above submissions, it was asserted that federalism means voluntary unionism of different member state with an established constitutional framework which forms the basis of authority and power distributions specifying areas of unity and diversity between member states.

The Concept of Criminal Justice System

Justice system is an essential element or to say component of any state that has a functional government and uphold a good practice of democratic system other than authoritarian system of ruler -ship or autocratic system. The imperativeness of these machineries of the justice system is expedient for the smooth administration of government as it provides for the basic framework of the does and don'ts, and the penalties for contravening the constituted laws and authorities. The components of the criminal justice process are the police which are refer to as the gatekeeper, the court/judiciary which performs the god function of judging and the correctional service which punish the offenders and housekeeping of suspects. The agencies that chair the justice system are the police,

courts, and the correctional service (Igbo, 2007). There are certain features that have been attributed to the criminal justice system these features includes impartiality, honesty, egalitarianism efficacy and competence (Alemika, 2014).

In discussing about the justice process, Ikohm, M. U (2011) sees CJS as the collections of misconduct modifiable bodies, it embodies conglomerations of government bodies which are responsible for enforcing duties that set documented in order preserve amity, and edict, passing of judgment and correction, retribution and rehabilitation of inmates after convictions. In a similar assertion by Schubert (2018), he conceptualize criminal justice system as interconnectivity between the components of CJS agencies and the established strategies designed to monitor crime, curb crime and prescribe penalties that are commensurate with such crimes. In a another opinion, criminal justice system is viewed as an agency established to question the guilt-ridden or incorruptibility of a suspect, and delivering the required judgment by the jurisdictional court and the ration of retribution proposed with the committed misconduct in query (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2005).

In the view of Daly (2011, p.3), the criminal justice system is:

a water shade collection of codependent bodies, each having bureaucratic interests and each having specific functions that are subject to legal regulations, where agency workers have great discretion in making decisions when responding to harms defined as criminal by the state and where value conflicts exist within and across agencies and in the general population about the meaning of justice.

Going further, Ayorinde (2014) put it that, criminal system is the collections of governmental agencies or institutions through which suspects are scrutinized until such accusations are not traced or matching retributions are received before he/

she could be discharged from such cases. In another related view, the functionality of justice system is performed through the process of examining, striking, trying, arbitrating, and grueling individuals that breakdown the recognized edicts (Ajah & Okpa, 2019). To Alemika (2014), police are by law ordained to arresting, detecting, and investigating crimes and serves as the gatekeeper in the justice system. The judiciary/court according to Lohya (2017) is the final optimism for an ordinary man. Going further, in the word of Osasona (2015) avers that the court system is predominantly the second most necessitated component in the hierarchy of the criminal justice system which consists of the police, court, and the correctional service. Lastly, Bamgbose (2010) affirmed that custodial centers are the last stage of the justice delivery process was attested and awaiting trial inmates are save keep. The correctional centers are completion stage in the justice process in justice dispensation (Nwolise, 2010).

The Concept Awaiting Trial

The conception of “awaiting trial” inmates is among the other cluster of concept in the management sciences and social sciences that as no specific definition or as multiple usage. The concept is mostly used in replace of concept like un-sentenced inmates, un-trial inmates, and un-convicted inmates etc. However, the term awaiting trial inmates denotes a terminology used to refer or align with individual who has case in the court of law but justice is yet to be delivered, prove is yet to be hold on, trial is still in process, or investigation is still going own, but are nonetheless kept in custody or under watch for ease interrogation or court proceedings for the purpose of judgment delivering in other to prove the accused guilty or not guilty.

The concept remand or detention in the opinion of Schonteich (2011) is the practice of deprivation of individual vital rights owing to the

period when the individual will be established guilt-ridden, not or time of appealing. Awaiting trial similarly denotes individual limited to some fundamental rights importantly rights of movement due to is affiliation to a certain crime as defined by the court of the land (Walmsley, 2017).

In the word of a senior British probation officer, he put forth that:

In a situation where an individual is remanded in custody for over 24 hours, the gradually lose their accommodation, and job, open to different health hazards and the shame of being imprisoned. Going further, he pointsout that awaiting trial inmates usually find it hard to get access to legal representation, and the suicide rate is usually high among remanded prisoners due to frustrations.

Notwithstanding, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), offers regulation for individual aligned to criminal offense nevertheless have not been proven or sentenced. Article 9.3 of the ICCPR provides that:

It shall not be the general rule that persons on awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and should occasion arise, for the execution of the judgment.

Methodology

This research paper espoused the cross-sectional survey design. The qualitative data sourcing method was used to generate data for the study through a comprehensive review of literatures on the subject matter. This study primarily relied on interview of key stakeholders within the justice delivery system while the secondary data are of relevant international organizations, journals, articles, government publication and the internet. The population for this study was purposively selected across the police, judges, clerks, and correctional officers. For the purpose of data analysis the qualitative data are analyse in thematic or narrative form.

Discussions of Findings

The idea behind adopting a federal system of government was to foster cooperation among the different federating units and reduce interest conflict among a diverse group. The relationship between the federal-state administrative structures and the persistent rise in its inter-institutional conflict has called to question why the system is no longer ensuring effective, efficient, speedy delivery of public service that suit the population, geographical nature, diverse needs, and peculiarities of Nigeria. The research paper tries to find why the federal-state inter-institutional conflict has been increasing overtime notwithstanding its motive for adoption to foster cooperation, peace, and effectiveness in service delivery.

Buttressing this, a court clerk acclaimed that;

the reason behind the federal-state inter-institutional conflict was a problem of the constitution. He asserted that the constitution was created for both the federal and state agencies and also delineated each particular jurisdiction has power nonetheless, gives the federal veto power to decide on the issue where there is a clash of jurisdiction among the central and other component structures. The respondent referred to the January 4, 2022 issue between the Lagos state government and Nigeria police force on the issue of vacating Magodo estate.. The problem is that the constitution clearly spelt that governors are the chief security officer of their individual states and have power above others on state security matters.

However, this issue above was over rule by the federal government. Echoing the above claim, Fayemi and Olonisakin, (2008) posit that in a legal standing, the army, police, and correctional officers are accountable to the central government as scheduled in the constitution under the exclusive matters. In illustration, all the commissioners of police serving in the respective states of the federation are answerable to the Inspector General of police assign by the President. In reference to

Section 215 of the Nigeria law book he spelt out that before the commissioner of police comply with the state governor on security matters, he could “request that the matter be referred to the president or such minister of the government of the federation as may be authorized in that behalf by the president for his directions”. The ill-fated fact is that the state police commands are under the framework of the Inspector General. Thus, if the country needs to ameliorate the present issues of the central-state relations, there is the need to amend the constitutional section in other to coincide with today’s situations.

Another respondent asserted that a clash of interest most occur in the federal-state relationship as every tier claims to promote individual interest and also the federal government is a conglomeration of the federating units. That is why Harun (2016) started that disputes amongst diverse levels of government in a federal system are inevitable. In a similar view, Hogg Peter, as cited in Adem (2013), claimed that the presence of stages of government and official separation of authority mandates the possibility of class clashes amid diverse echelons of the government. However, all these challenges are expected to be addressed by the constitution so therefore the constitution is the reason for the high rate of federal-state inter-institutional conflict. This made the former Deputy Senate President, a barrister and the head of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Review, stated that the country demands citizens targeted constitution (Ekweremadu, 2012).

A divisional police officer also avers that;

“the reason behind the federal-state structures and inter-institutional crisis was due to lack of spirit of nationalism. He went further that each ethnic group is just under forceful marriage in Nigeria. That the effect of the forceful marriage is the agitation for Biafra, Boko haram, bandit, and kidnapping in the country”.....

In a similar response;

"a court official stated that federalism was aimed at national integration and national development but this has been a mere dream as there was no movement for this since the creation of the country".....

This scenario has been forecasted by the early nationalist. In the word of:

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, recounted the need for federalism as follows:

I am thrilled that the federal arrangement necessitated the current situations, the solitary main basis in which Nigeria can stay unified. We must know our difference and commonality in which the diverse ethnic societies live... hence... we must do all in our power to see that this federal system is held together and continuous (Quoted in Elaigwu, 2000, pp.41- 42).

However, they current Nigerian situation does not depict the dreams, aspirations, and yearning of our nationalists. Nigeria's state as it appeared currently portrays an image of a typical weak state in respects of its structural arrangement and principal control power (Onuoha, 2011). Notwithstanding, Ikelegbe ((2004), acclaimed that the embracement of federalism in Nigeria since its inception voids collective agreements owing to foreign intrusion, and also Nigerian state is been acclaimed to be an incoherent state arising from a fragmented people leading to disorganized bodies.

It was also pointed out by another respondent that federal practices in Nigeria are not full flagged. The respondent argued that there is an imbalance in the allocation of jobs among federating states down to ethnic and religious sentiment in the allocation of employment benefits. This contradicts the principle of federal character as the reason behind its establishment is to ensure equitability in employment and other opportunities across the thirty-six states putting into attention political, indigenous, and ethnic balances. The federal character principles as provided in the

constitution clearly stated: "compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Third Schedule, C).

Rationale behind federal principle was envisioned "to promote national unity, and also to command loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Section 14(3) in the government or any of its agencies. The legal framework clearly necessitates equality among states in sharing of jobs and holding of government offices. The work discovered understanding federal principle by many Nigerians was far away from promoting harmonious working relationship and national unity but the ideas by the citizens were taken as requirement for peaceful co-existence, in which inhabitants of a state of the federation are shared into ethnics and religious sects.

Similarly, it has been portrayed by another respondent that the reason behind federal-state structures and inter-institutional conflict was the genesis of institutional deficiency and he also linked these issues to corruption, ethnic jingoism, and power tussle between them. In a related view Obiyan (2010) claims that conflicting Intra and intergovernmental affairs and processes is the causative factors of structural irregularities while to others assertions, problems such as fraud, tribal and religious differences, regional politics and martial resurgences alongside other variables as consolidated inefficiency and non-inclusiveness in the country.

Stating another respondent, he believes that the reason behind federal-state administrative structure and inter-institutional conflict lies in the problem of fiscal federalism. In a similar response another respondent, said financial autonomy is the reason behind the federal government's veto

The country had encountered clashes and clamor among its tiers on matters of revenue generation, power control, and models of revenue sharing which intensify the struggle for supremacy among governmental structures and bodies in the country (Ukwayi & Okpa, 2017; Ojo, 2014).

In a newspaper report, it was reported that, fiscal autonomy is the major cog to the country hope towards true federalism in the recent political era. Going further, he posed that; the country has been deepening into debt financing resulting in structural inefficiency and collapse (Guardian, Nov., 28th, 2015:49; Nigeria Tribune, 8th 2015: PP.6, 10 and 14). In a related view, Ikelegbe, (2004) and Obiyan (2010), avers that the major hindrance rumpling the nation affairs is the lack of financial independence of states to carry out their constitutional functions in terms regular disbursement of state salaries.

Babatunde Fashola, former Governor of Lagos State, noted that states governors should device mechanism of funding state owned expenditure rather than depending solely on federal government by venturing into diverse form of business and should to be agricultural reoriented so ... (Punch, Dec. 2014, p.18).

At present, diverse states are indebted to many financial outsourcing outlets. The negative effects of this outcome are that many states have found it tedious to carry out their constitutional assigned functions. (Guardian. Nov., 28th, 2015:49; Vanguard, Oct., 20th, 2011, p.35).

One of the respondents responded that the issue behind federal-state agencies was a problem of resource control. He goes further to start that each state is demanding control over its respective natural endowment despite the derivation formula and percentage allocated to them.

A frequently happenstance challenges in collective governance is tussle for power balances within components parts. For example, the unfairness of position, capability, resources, and

organization among sub-parts hinders other stakeholder's privileges to participate in collective process on same levels with other stakeholders, which gives rooms for manipulation by actors with strong economic wherewithals. In the words of Dunmoye (2002), four interconnected dynamics could pledge or disintegrate a federation. They include: - the matter of equal political representation, specifically at the central level; the problem of fair job opportunities to different tribes and religions; siting of industries or infrastructures and the allotment of resources or what is known in Nigeria as resource distribution.

Conclusion

The federal structure system adopted in Nigeria was modeled to suit its diverse ethnic, religious, geographical and population size of the country. One of the features is the presence of federal, state and local government accomplished by traditional executive, legislative and judicial system present in major styles of government. However, the presence of the legislature and the judicial at the other levels of government as complicated the justice delivery process among the component of the criminal system. The effect has been long queues in the justice delivery process resulting syndrome of awaiting trial across correctional homes in Nigeria. The issues were attributed to constant overlapping of functions, duplication of function, claims of supremacy and poor coordination among the component of criminal justice system.

Recommendations

In regards to this study, the paper recommend this remedies as pathways to address the problem of awaiting trial inmates syndrome across correctional facilities as posed by the federal structure arrangement.

1. There should be creation of state police in order to avoid transfer of prosecutor or officer in

charge of investigation of an ongoing case; this will help curb the problem of delay in investigation process and handling of case more easily

2. There should be recruitment into the judicial system in order to beef up speedy judicial and investigation process and also the adoption of a computerized system that could help judges know specific cases to be handling by them, in regards to the time and date of sittings.

3. The constitution should be amended in other to provide clear jurisdiction of authority especially among courts in other to determine courts which has competence over a specific case and who can trial some cases or were to appeal.

4. The citizens need to be sensitizing about free Bono service by paralegals in other to avoid illegal detentions and extortions by individual in the criminal justice system.

5. The correctional service should also keep proper records of inmates on awaiting trial and sensitizing them on the actual and proper steps to take for fast and ease judgment

The Artificial Intelligence application used in this work was for English grammar and word checking.

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Interrogating the Basic Elements of Public Policy Using the Nigerian Examples

Timothy Onimisi ¹✉

¹ Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria, © Author

Abstract

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This paper is designed to provide a succinct understanding of the basic elements of public policy analysis. It also provided for explanation basic concepts in public policy, and it exposes the readers to actors in public analysis policy using Nigerian examples. Based on the belief that public policy is a multifaceted discipline and activity regarding the policy can be better understood when they are considered in the environment in which it occurs, where the players are involved, and why such a public policy is being undertaken. Relying on secondary sources of data, the paper found that in most cases the public policy in Nigeria is anchored on demand and the immediate needs of the environment or citizens. It also found that the crisis of priority of demands exists, the ability of the groups where such policy demand is coming from goes a long way in determining when it gets to the agenda stage and subsequent stage of the policy cycle in the country. The paper concludes that a strong public policy system in Nigeria depends on the understanding of the basic elements of public policy

Introduction

Public policy analysis is one of the subdivisions of politics. The attention of scholars on Public policy analysis became prominent after the Second World War and continues to spread in the 1960s and 1970s. The attention gained by public policy analysis led to a paradigm shift from the focus on institutions of government, their types, powers, functions, structures, and processes. The shift in attention of scholars was forward attributed to increasing awareness and concern for the welfare of the government towards the citizens, the effective implementation and poor performance of governmental programs and policies, as well as the advancement of political scientists in their quest for relevance in the modern government. An amplified understanding of public policy

can be done when considered within the environment and context where such activities take place. This is based on the belief that public policy is a multifaceted discipline and activity regarding policy and the players involved, and why such public policy is being undertaken can be better appreciated when scholar draws their understanding from the environment of such policy.

Again the demands for policy actions are generated in the environment and transmitted to society and at the same time, the environment places limits and constraints in some cases upon what can be done by policymakers (Onkware, 2015). In Nigeria for example, where we have diverse ethnic and religious inclinations some policy decisions of the government should reflect the diverse nature of the country for equity and fairness.

Also Included in the environment are the geographical characteristics, natural resources, climate, and topography; demographical variables like population size, age distribution, and spatial location; political culture; social structure; and the economic system. In addition to these factors, the reasons behind such policy demands equally play paramount in Nigeria's public policy discourse. Regional or community-based civil society movements with a strong desire to protect their own interests have grown since Nigeria's democratic transition. The Bayelsa Youth Federation of Nigeria (BYFN), Afenifere, Ohaneze Ndigbo, Arewa Consultative Forum, Middle Belt Forum, Egbe Afenifere, Odua People's Congress (OPC), Igbo People Council, and Ndigbo Liberation Movement are a few of these regionally based CSOs (Abari, 2013, p.13). The two most prominent CSOs that also arose after 1999 are the Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN) and Youths Earnestly Ask for Ababa (YEAA). They played a key role in quelling popular opposition to authoritarian rule. Pro-democracy NGOs such as the Transition Monitoring Group, Constitutional Rights Project, and Civil Liberties Organization, all of whom received questionable sums of money from foreign aid, were perceived as weaker than these groups (Chukwudi and Samuel, 2023).

This paper provides an understanding of the study of public policy analysis, it also provides a simplified explanation of the basic concepts in public policy, and it exposes the readers to actors in the public analysis policy.

Conceptual clarification

For a clear understanding of the concept of public policy analysis, for students, especially foundation students of public policy / public administration, political scientists, policymakers, practitioners, administrators, and of course the general public. The absence of consensus among scholars of political science and public

affairs analysts on the concept of public policy analysis makes it germane for us to subdivide the subject for broader understanding.

a) Public: According to Barret and Fudge (1981), the term public means a policy that is conceived and emanates from the public sector. The public sector here includes the institutions of the federal, state, and local governments. Examples of such public policy that emanate from the government's concern over the supply of potable water in the Niger-Delta geopolitical zone of Nigeria because of ravaging pollution as a result of oil spillage, the concern of provision of basic health services to the citizens, and the provision of security. According to Anderson (1975), the public is simply the act or action taken in the interest of the general public, governmental bodies, and officials.

b) Policy: The term policy was captured as a proposal on an ongoing project by Sharkansky (1978:23), thus "a proposal, an ongoing program, and other goals of a program, major decisions or the refusal to make certain decisions." According to Olaniyi, (1998), a policy is a set of decisions carried out by a political actor in an attempt to select suitable goals and methods of solving a specified situation. The attempt by the government of Nigeria for example to make the basic needs of the people of Niger Delta through the provision of suitable means of providing portal water for the people of Niger Delta can be regarded as policy. According to Oni (2019), views the concern of policy is in the making of decisions regarding attempts taken by the government in dealing with a current problem or matter of concern at a particular time. The policy is that decisions and programs are aimed at meeting a particular demand at a given period. A policy is a statement by the government or its agencies expressing what it plans to do or not to do, these include law, ruling, regulation, decision, or a combination (Birkland, 2001). According to Dahida & Maidoki

(2013), characteristics of a policy include choice or a critical or major decision taken from multiple choices by individuals, groups, and organizations; policies are proposed courses of action or statements of future actions; policy is goal-oriented; policies are designed to solve particular problems through the provision of direction and guide attaining set goals.

c) Public policy: From the perspective of Jerjins (1978) public policy is a set of interrelated decisions championed by the political actors or group of political actors who concern themselves with the selection of specific goals for attaining some measure of political solutions within their jurisdiction. Jerkins, the definition of public stresses the importance of political actors in the public policy process and in attaining policy goals, especially in finding solutions to societal problems. While Roberts and Clark (1982) opined that public policy is a series of attempts or steps taken by agencies of government to provide a solution to perceived problems, through policy decisions, allocation of resources or values, and the implementation of policies for the interest of constituencies. The attempt made by the Nigerian government through the provision of social intervention programs such as the N-power to reduce the high unemployment amongst the youth can be regarded as public policy. According to Roberts and Clark, public policy ordinarily is an attempt to provide solutions to the problem in society through the allocation of available resources at their disposal. Public policy is governmental decisions, indecision, action, and inactions to matters that concern the generality of the citizens and residents within its jurisdiction. It is important to note that the efforts made by the Nigerian government towards meeting the infrastructural and social needs of the citizen through various policy actions such as the national health scheme and Sure-P program are but only a few of the public policies in Nigeria. According to

Thomas Dye (1972), the public policy emphasizes that the indecision of the government in itself can be considered a policy. Dye sees public policy as what the governments choose to do or not to do. Thus, inaction is also a policy in itself. And the failure to make decisions or take steps is itself public policy since the resultant effect of the government's inaction could have a significant impact on the public. The government's actions and inactions, or whatever, the government chooses to do or not to do, are a reflection of the objectives and goals of such government (Oni, 2016). Public policies are an instructive instrument that guides governmental actions.

d) Policy analysis: Policy analysis, according to Oni (2016) simply means generating detailed knowledge of a proposed action plan or policy. Policy analysis is the systematic review of proposed and existing policies to ascertain their probable effectiveness, impact, and implication. For example, the Nigerian government's attempt to provide portal drinking water for the Niger Delta may require some level of project analysis to determine the implication of such policy to the government and the people of the area. Similarly, Shafritz (1986), sees policy analysis as a set of techniques aimed at answering the question as such what is the probable effect of a policy before it occurs. Policy analysis is a multidisciplinary inquiry designed specifically to formulate, systemically assess, and communicate useful information needed for the improvement and greater understanding of policies (Dunn, 2004).

Brief explanation on other important concepts in public policy analysis

a) Policy recommendation: According to Ponge (2013) policy recommendation entails "will need to be based on a systematic enumeration and weighing of all potential benefits and costs of an intervention if it is to be credible". Hence, policy recommendation requires an evaluation of the

potential gains, challenges, and impact of a governmental action plan regarding already defined societal problems. In Nigeria, for example, the recurrent farmer-herder conflict especially in the Northcentral geopolitical zone of the country requires an effective policy recommendation aimed at ending this menace and making the aspiration of both parties

b) Policy studies: This is the analysis of policy processes that could be normative. Here the focus is placed on a clear understanding of policy formulation up to implementation, as well as how to improve on them. In Nigeria for instance the government may adopt analytical procedures or develop models are developed for such purposes.

c) Policy science: This is the scientific method of studying policy processes with the view to making the study of the decision-making process scientific. This involves an interdisciplinary approach to solving a societal problem. This involves systematic methods of engaging the issues of boarding society.

d) Policy environment: This is referred to as the prevailing (external) factors or situations that influence, shape, and reshape the policy cycle, beginning from the formation up to the implementation stage. In Nigeria, for instance, the recently enacted Northeast Development Commission was influenced by the destruction caused by the activities of the insurgency group in the region, thus, we can say that the environment influence the enactment of the commission.

e) Policy demands: These are often the request made by the citizens make on the policy-makers and the concerned stakeholders on demanding necessary actions or inaction to solve an existing societal problem. Policy demands are made to draw the attention of policymakers to an issue during policy formulation processes. For instance, the enactment of the Anti-open Grazing Bill by some state governments was a response to

the outcry over the continuous farmer-herder conflict.

f) Policy decisions: This is the authoritative direction given to policy actions. Authoritative approval is the legal backing given to policy demand. Policy decisions are the actual statutes or an enactment given to societal demand. In this case, the enactment of the Anti-open Grazing Bill is the actual legal backing given to solving a perceived cause of the farmer-herder conflict in some states of the country.

g) Policy statements: These are a formal expression of opinion on public policy by institutions of government and the modality to achieving the said policy. These often come in form of decrees, presidential orders, regulations, and administrative rules. In Nigeria for example under the military regime policy statement can eventually stand as a policy decision, while a democratic government statement may not translate into actual policy until some procedure measures are taken.

h) Policy outputs: These are the reflections of the government's actual action and inaction to a policy decision or policy statement. Policy outputs show what the government has done regarding a societal problem.

i) Policy outcomes: According to Oni (2016, p.333) policy outcomes is the "overall manifestation of public policies in terms of the goals set for attainment. This manifestation could be intended or unintended consequences of policy for the society where the policy is implemented and this could be as a result of the action or inaction of government". Policy outcomes allow the assessment of public policy goals set at beginning of every policy.

j) Policy advocacy: According to Oni (2016, p.333), policy advocacy is "concerned with the activities of government designed to draw support and promote a particular policy through several means, including discussion, persuasion, and

political activism. It is also a means of creating awareness and sensitizing the public on the orientation and contents of a policy". The Nigerian government adopts this measure whenever they attempt to remove petroleum subsidies.

Significant of public policy analysis

a) Public policy analysis assists policymakers through the provision of relevant policy information for the efficient definition of the problem in society, as well as the identification of potential policy alternatives that can provide the solution to a defined problem and recommend the best policy alternative (Weldeslassie, 2021).

b) Linder and Peters (1988), also stressed the significant role of policy analysis in ensuring an efficient and effective policy-making process by providing an understanding of how policy alternatives are generated and analyzed and the fundamental goals attached to producing better policies.

c) Policy analysis, is significant because it helps policymakers to make informed policy decisions, and assist interest groups, policy actors, as well as researchers, using relevant policy data/information to elaborate and strengthen their policy ideas, arguments, and plans with reliable facts.

d) Public policy analysis helps to awaken citizens' participation and consciousness, as well as stimulate critical minds to take up the challenge of evaluating the impact of government policy decisions or planned activities. It provides a vital opportunity for various socio-cultural and interest groups and the general public in particular about the government's action plan and responses to the demands made by the public.

e) Policy analysis does not just stop at the identification of problems but it also saves the nation of Nigeria from various economic and political challenges through a systematic policy analysis of the country's policies (Dunn, 2015).

Hajer (2003, p.12) empathically captures the problem-solving nature of policy analysis through knowledge-driving actions thus "the commitment (of policy analysis) to a problem-orientation implies that knowledge is not to be pursued as a goal in itself, but to help resolve particular societal problems". Through policy, analysis knowledge is effectively utilized to solve a societal problem.

Types of public policy

a) Distributive policy: The distributive type of public policy just as the name implies is formulated by the government to create an avenue for the allocation of resources to the generality of the public. The policy emphasizes the need for equal access to resources. It also promotes the need for everyone to be carried along, to ensure that individuals benefit from it regardless of their status. Examples of distributive policies found in Nigeria include the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) Act 1989, enacted to train young on skills needed for everyday activities, the National Programme on Immunization (NPI), enacted to aid the immunization of all children in the country irrespective of the geo-political zone and state, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), enacted to cater for health needs of the civil servant and their family and to ensure free education for all children in the country the government enacted the Universal Basic Education (UBE) Policy, and other similar policies.

b) Re-distributive policy: Re-distributive policies are enacted for purpose of re-allocation of resources from geo-political zones to others, this is to ensure equilibrium. Re-distributive policy according to Olaniyi (1998), can be tagged as the "social inter-transfer of material resources", because it includes the allocation of resources through the transfer of available resources from one geo-political zone to another. This type of policy aims to ensure equilibrium, in the distribution of

the available resources including public amenities/facilities (Oni, 2016). This type of policy is a kind of zero-sum game nature because the gain of one geo-political zona is the loss of another (Oni, 2016). Examples of this re-distribute policy in Nigeria include the Petroleum Trust Fund Decree No. 25 of 1994 promulgated under the military regime for purpose of redistribution of excess funds generated from crude oil sales gotten from the Niger Delta to every sector of the country's economy, the Subsidy Reinvestment Programme (SURE-P) of 2013 of the Goodluck Jonathan administration which dedicates the subsidy fund to amenities especially the construction and maintenance of roads.

c) Regulatory policy: The regulatory policy is essentially formulated to create a control mechanism in the conduct of human and societal affairs. This kind of policy involves setting rules and standards aimed at restricting certain behavioral threats or activities backed with commensurable sanctions. The regulatory policy makes rules and regulations based on certain terms and conditions and is backed by enforcement and adjudication mechanism in cases of any breach, hence its "low clientele supports" (cooperative behavior) (Olaniyi, 1998; Oni, 2016). The type of policy could be competitive or protective. The competitive aspect of the policy shows its restrictiveness in the number of citizens that can provide or are eligible to provide certain public goods/services or utilities, while the protective aspect of the policy focuses on the sets of conditions made to protect the general public against harmful activities of service providers (Oni, 2016). Regulatory policies enacted and current practice in Nigeria includes the Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON) established to ensure quality control in manufacturing products that are consumed or utilized in the country, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), which focuses on the regulations of the movement and use of hard drugs the

country, while the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) which regulates the quality of foods, water, and drugs processed and consumed in the country.

d) Constituent policy: The constituent policy focuses on national orientation and cohesion. This type of policy draws attention to issues of national interest. Individuals, organizations or sectional interest does not have a place in the constituent policy. The constituent policy "serves the nation as a whole by protecting and promoting certain activities that are vital to national security and survival" (Oni, 2016:331). This type of policy includes the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme established after the civil war to enhance peace and reconciliatory move of the federal government, the siting of the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja with the aim of promoting national unity and cohesion.

Methods and approaches to policy analysis

a) Descriptive approach: The descriptive approach uses explanation and descriptions mechanism to understand public policy and governmental activities. The approach focuses on the history of policy, its development, causes of the phenomena that lead to policy formulation, and implementation, as well as consequences such as public policies. The descriptive approach possesses certain features such as her ability to seek an understanding of policy processes, it seeks to investigate policy contents, its implementation, and impact as well as the evaluation of a particular policy (Ikelegbe, 1996). This approach is concerned with the investigation and reporting of the behavioral pattern of policy-makers.

b) Prescriptive approach: The prescriptive approach focuses on the fundamental problems of society. And promotion/achievement of human dignity. The approach advocates that public policy analysts should center on the fundamental problems

of man in the society they live in as well to help in the achievement of human dignity (Lasswell and Deiner 1951). Lasswell and Deiner's arguments are the premise on the limit of analysis which indicates that policy analysis should not stop at the level of description both in practice and theory. The prescriptive approach stresses the improvement of the human condition, and to avoid human catastrophe. Intellectual capital and social interaction are what are needed by policy-makers to ameliorate the social problem. Thus, the prescriptive approach involves and employs social science analytical techniques; is problem-goal

c) Qualitative approach: Qualitative approach in public policy analysis involves the use of a narrative approach in analyzing societal issues. Thus, the approach adopts logical reasoning in its analysis. The use of statistical techniques, quantification information, and inferential analysis of statistical data does not apply to the qualitative approach. The descriptions and narrations of social issues and policy thrusts of the government are the main analytical tools in the qualitative approach. This approach describes the processes involved in public policy and narrates and analyzes the impact and issues relating to the implementation of the policy quantitatively. It is important to point out that descriptive and prescriptive approaches to policy analysis can adopt qualitative analytical techniques.

e) Quantitative approach: Quantitative approach unlike the qualitative approach uses relies greatly on quantitative data techniques in analyzing public policy. The techniques used can be inferential analysis of statistical data, a simple calculation of means or percentages, analysis of variances, linear regression, and other complex quantitative tools for public policy analysis. This approach is informed by the result of statistical analysis.

f) Micro analytic approach: The micro or case study approach in public policy analysis concentrates on specific case policy for analysis. A case-by-case study of public policy analysis is the focus of this approach. The implication of the case-by-case approach is that creates room for depth and thorough investigation of a public policy. This approach most often uses descriptive or prescribed techniques in analyzing policy depending on the type of policy at hand. This approach provides a detailed examination and information on public policy, but, the approach is often criticized for being too narrow in focus.

g) Macro analytic approach: Macro-analytic approach unlike the microanalysis approach concerns the general aspects of public policy analysis. This approach takes a holistic view of policymaking and analysis and draws a broad knowledge as well as an understanding of various public policies. This approach provides insight into public policies and analysts. The central focus of this approach is to provide broader insight into public policy analysis. And a broader description, analysis, actions, and interactions involved between concerned stakeholders.

The Public policy-making process (the policy cycle)

a) Agenda-setting: Problem recognition is the starting point in the policy-making process. Problem recognition includes the identification of the social problem, and the definition of such problem that requires state intervention in form of policy formulation, which subsequently makes way for the problem to be put on the agenda list for prompt consideration and necessary public action (Werner and Kai, 2007). The agenda-setting stage of the policy cycle is nothing more than "the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside the government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given

time" (Kingdon, 1995, p.3). Through the agenda-setting process diverse problems and issues are considered, including the potential strategies and instruments needed to shape and structure the formulation of a policy that would be acceptable to all, hence, this process presents the reason why some existing problems could receive similar of the level of attention, while some are recognized.

b) Policy Formulation and adoption stage: This is a critical pre-decision stage in the cycle of the policy process. The policy formulation stage aims at identifying the best possible solution to a defined societal problem. And this stage involves assessing the provided possible solutions to problems or, as well as exploring the series of options available for addressing an identified problem (Howlett and Ramsesh, 2003). According to Werner and Kai (2007:48), policy formulation is that which takes place "during this stage of the policy cycle, expressed problems, proposals, and demands are transformed into government programs". This stage involves the process of defining an issue, identifying solutions, and accepting and rejecting policy options for a defined problem (Howlett and Ramsesh, 2003). Policy formulation comes in various types such as routine formulation, which is a repetitive and changeless process that involves reformulating similar proposals; analogous formulation involves proffering a solution to a new problem by relying on what was done previously; while creative formulation involves attending to any problem with an essentially new proposal, in the form of a breakthrough from the past practice (Jones, 1977). Policy adoption involves the process of giving authorization to a proposal. The authorization of a proposal makes a planned course of action of the government legality. The authoritative ratification of a proposal which is referred to as policy adoption provides room for public accountability. This stage requires lobbying the legislature (members of the National Assembly) to legitimize the proposal, thereafter the executive signs it into law.

c) Policy implementation: This is a policy execution stage. According to the broad explanation of O'Toole (2000: 266), this entails "what happens between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of the government to do something or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action". Policy implementation involves the gathering of human and material resources, and the utilization of such resources to achieve policy objectives. Policy implementation is all-encompassing aside from the civil service or the executive whose responsibility is to implement policy, the legislature conducts oversight on the policy implementation while the courts come to their dispute to interpret statutes as well as to provide clarity on the policy.

d) Policy evaluation: The evaluation stage of the policy cycle focuses on the intended and actual outcomes of the policies. Policy evaluation examines the intended target and impact of a policy. According to Werner and Kai (2007:54), Policy evaluations can "lead to diverse patterns of policy-learning, with different implications in terms of feedback mechanisms and a potential restart of the policy process...Evaluations could also lead to the termination of a policy". Policy evaluation is an assessment of the impact of a policy. Policy evaluation helps assess the performance of a policy through scientific interrogation of the workings of policies to determine whether to continue the policy or discontinue it, change a certain aspect of the policy, or overhaul them. Policy evaluation faces several constraints such as funding, certain restrictions attached to some policies, ethical considerations, ideological differences, and clarity of purpose (Onkware, 2015). Public policy evaluation involves assessing public program through the use of the goals and objectives the program was set to achieve, and eventually measuring the degree to which the said policy goal has been achieved, and of suggesting a way forward (Peters, 2018).

Actors in the policy process

The actors involved in public policy are both government and non-governmental institutions or bodies. Ikelegbe (1996) description sums up government and non-governmental actors who participate in public policy follow, The Role of Governmental Actors in the Public Policy Process:

a) The executive: Another important governmental actor in the public policy process is the executive arm of government, which comprises the president, governors, ministers, commissioners, cabinet, and political officeholders. The core responsibility of the executive arm of government in the public policy process is the implementation, coordination, and supervision of policy decisions (Dahida & Maidoki, 2013). The executive also has the role of initiating, enacting, implementing, and working on the feeding of policies for possible modification.

b) The legislative arm of government: The legislator has a great influence on public policy. The role of the legislature in the policy process begins with policy initiation, policy formulation, deliberation of policies, and oversight especially, during the implementation stage. The legislative arm expresses its influence over policy during lawmaking, oversight of the executive, monitoring of governmental expenditure, and expression of the opinion of the people they represent, through aggregate and articulated citizen demand and interests via quality legislation. According to Dahida & Maidoki (2013), the legislature is at the center of the policymaking process because through them demands are made by various groups and individuals, and they (the legislature) lead the discussion, mediation, and compromise paving way for policies.

c) The judiciary: The interpretation of policy passed or enacted by both the legislature and the executive arms of government are the core responsibility of the judiciary. The judiciary plays a crucial role in the public policy process especially

the adjudication of issues when conflicts and crises arise amongst interest groups and individuals, as well as judicial review policy actions. And as an actor in the policy process the judiciary moderate, mediate, interpret, adjudicate, review, and legalize public policy.

d) The bureaucracy: The bureaucracy plays a role in the policy process because policy formulation, implementation, and eventual evaluation take place within their context. According to Dahida & Maidoki (2013:59), "bureaucracy's role in public policy is that of bringing to bear policy-making and implementation, expertise, skill, and competence. The bureaucracy then is only conceived instrumentality in terms of enabling goal attainment". Bureaucracy in the present day seems to be socio-politically neutral in the process of policymaking.

Non-governmental actors include:

e) Political parties: Political parties play an influential role in the public policy process which arises from their role in the political process that brought about the government. The programs political parties most often set during their campaign in their attempt to win control of governmental machinery become policies at the end of the day. This means that an electoral victory represents victory over policy options and policy performance presented to the electorate to choose which ones they consider to be the best alternative for them over a series of policies

f) The role interest groups: Various interest groups would often project and pursue their members' interests through policy initial, formulation, and the quest for implementation. The interest groups pursue them through "interact with governmental and non-governmental actors in the policy process because a lot of their interests are affected and dictated by governmental interventions and regulations" (Dahida & Maidoki,

2013, p.59). The place of interest groups in the policy process is a continuous one beginning with policy initiation, generation, formulation up to the implementation stage through steady influence.

g) The role of citizenry: The citizenry plays an important role in public policy in the country. They are important actors in the policy process of any nation they belong to. The citizenry prompts human demand emanating from the environment of policies, and the demands of the citizen are transformed into public policy to meet the yielding of the people. It is important to note that the citizenry contributes resources to policy implementation through their support or reject unfavorable policies (Ikelegbe, 1996).

h) Professional bodies and Civil Society: Professional bodies and civil society are critical non-governmental actors in public policy analysis. Professional bodies such as the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), and other bodies such as the Academic Staff Union of University (ASUU), provides policy advice to the government. Civil society also assists the government in providing policy advice and protesting against unfavorable policy decisions.

Theoretical approaches to the study of public policy

The theoretical approaches to the study of public policy that would be discussed briefly in this section include group theory, elite theory, institutionalism, political systems theory, policy output analysis, rational-choice theory, and incremental theory.

a) Elite theory: The theoretical approach of elitism views public policy from the values and preferences of ruling elites in the society at any given time. The central belief of the elite theory is that public policy is a product of the elite class not essentially a product of the majority of the people. The elite class is divided into the governing

elites and the non-governing elites. The governing elites are apparently in possession of qualities such as material resources, skills, and intellectual know-how, and the leadership needed to overshadow and influence public policy, while the masses which make up the majority of the population are destined to be ruled by the elite (Anyebi, 2018). According to Dye and Zeigler (1990), the elite theory views society as divided into sections the few powerful persons who allocate values and decide on which policies to adopt and the masses who do not have power and do not decide public policy. The scholars further state that the few who govern are drawn disproportionately from the upper socio-economic strata of society and the movement of members of the masses to the elite class of the society must be slow and continuous to ensure stability and to avoid revolution. The basic value of the society and the preservations of the system, incremental (minimum of alteration or dislocation) rather than revolutionary change are consensus shared among the elites. The influence of the masses is one of the attributes of the elite class, and for the masses to change the thread all stakeholders must be involved to subdue the elite from its constant influence.

b) Group theory: The proponent of the group theory of politics conceive public policy as a product of group struggle. The theory opined that public policies are a reflection of the activities of groups, who attempts or tries to influence public policy to their advantage (Anderson, 1997). The theory tries to analyze the influence various groups in society exert or exercise during public policy formulation, especially to their advantage. The group theory of public policy stresses the interaction among groups in society as an important element of politics, which is about searching for a compromise between competing interest groups. According to Enemuo (1999), the type of competition exhibited by the groups here

would determine the pattern of allocation of value and societal resources. The power of policy direction here is determined by the combination of these groups or groups that exert influence at a particular point in time. One of the central points of the group theory of policy analysis is that policy itself is a compromised equilibrium reached by groups after a genuine inter-group struggle (Latham, 1965). The role of the legislature here has been accurately captured by Latham (1965) when the scholar describes them as a "referee to the inter-group struggle and it ratifies the victories of the successful coalitions, as well as record the terms of the surrender, compromises, and conquest in the form of statutes or Bills" (Cited in Anyebe, 2018: 5). The theory presents a dynamic situation of the current reality of politics which is in itself a product of the struggle between interests represented in form of a group.

c) Systems theory: Another important theory of public policy is the systems theory. The system theory can be traced to David Easton in his famous work, 'political system' published in 1953. Easton's perception of politics and political phenomena was a clear departure from the traditional model to a scientific mode signaling the arrival of a behaviorist revolution in the field of political science. The central features of the behavioral schools of thought are the promulgation of regularities, verification, techniques, quantification, values, systemization, pure science, and integration. The system theory sees public policy as a system of interaction in an organized society where the authoritative allocation of values is made and implemented in a form of policy decisions; arising in the form of response to a demand made from the environment (Anyebbe, 2018). To Easton (1965), the environment is made of all the issues which are external to the political system. The system theory generates inputs from the political system derived from the environment in form of demands and supports. The demands

are usually made to satisfy the needs, interests, and values of individuals and groups, while support is rendered when the citizens, residents, groups, and individuals abide by their constitutional duties such as to vote and be voted for, pay taxes, obey laws, and abide by the verdict of the constitutional court (Anyebbe, 2018). The support is imperative here because it determines the extent to which the legitimacy of the political system is accepted by the citizens, to guarantee effective outputs of the political system which comes in form of policies, laws, rules, and judicial pronouncement, which may further produce a recurrent output in of public policy changes and amendments. The demands made by groups or individuals are considered as input from the environment and the output from the political system comes in form of the allocation of resources with a provision for future inputs often emanating from the feedback received.

d) Institutional theory: The institutional theory concretized the concerns of political science in the early era which focuses on the institutions of government such as executives, legislatures, judiciary, and political parties, whose responsibility is to formulate and execute public policy on behalf of the government and the citizenry. This theory uses the descriptive approach to explain the formal and legal institutions of government. The central focus of the institutional theory is the structural relationships among the arms of government, legal powers, procedural rules, and functions of the government. Institutionalism focuses on the legal and structural aspects of policy analysis. The theory stresses the institution's arrangements and their significance on public policy. Investigating the nature of the relationships that exist between institutional and the content of public policy is one of the core concerns of institutional theory.

e) Incremental theory: Incremental approach is concerned with a small number of changes to

existing policies, such as a small percentage increase in the statutory provision or budget of certain ministries or parastatals. The incremental approach emphasizes a review of a limited number of policy alternatives and the implementation of changes in a series of small steps by the policymaker. A limited or small change in the status quo is the major focus of this approach. This approach is constrained by some factors such as financial constraints, time, and complexity associated with understanding policies. These limitations make policy-makers often accept past policies that easily satisfy their needs. The weakness of this approach to some scholars is its conservative nature, discouragement of innovation, lack of guidelines through theory or directive for dealing with issues of policies, further, discouraging available policy alternatives and radical amendments of an existing policy (Anderson, 1997; Anyebe, 2018).

Conclusions

It is pertinent to conclude at this point with the words of Weldeslassie (2021:12) that "policy analysis knowledge is not a result, but utilizing knowledge to solve a problem is the objective". The process of enacting a policy that is of public concern often has some element of dynamic characterized targeted at a specific objective or solving a particular societal issue. Public policy is a dynamic process that is characterized by a course or pattern of activities carried out to achieve predetermined objectives. The public policy process varies from one country to the other, for example in Nigeria, most often than not only the government institution and agencies play a great part in policy formulation and implementation excluding the critical role the non-governmental organization can play. Finally, the role of human and material resources in the public policy process cannot be overemphasized, and for any policies to succeed, all stakeholders must pledge their

commitments. A strong connection must be established continuously between the policymaker and the citizenry that is the direct beneficiary of the policies.

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The Nexus in Intra-Party Conflict and Civil War in Ethiopia: An Appraisal

Kefale Beyazen Gella^{1*}✉, Asnake Kefale Adgeh¹✉

¹ Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia

* Corresponding Author, © Authors

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Abstract

This research paper examines intra-party conflicts and their impact on violent internal conflicts in Ethiopia. It investigates the institutional frameworks used to resolve these conflicts within political parties. The study reveals a threat to intra-party democracy, leading to destructive civil wars since 2018. Data from five Ethiopian political parties was gathered from October 2022 to August 2024. The research reveals a lack of procedures for resolving intra-party conflicts, which often result in violent civil wars. This can lead to party fractures and loss of support, affecting the entire national political system.

Introduction:

Ethiopia, once ruled by monarchs, had a unique political system with a one-party system established through the 1987 constitution. The Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was the sole authorized party to operate in the nation. Unlike many African countries, opposition political parties were not established until the 1991 multi-party democracy at least in principle (Ayele, 2021, p.169; Oloruntoba and Falola, 2018, p.485).

However, the Ethiopian People's Council, founded by three supporters of the 1960 coup d'état, was the first Ethiopian political party in its traditional sense. The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) emerged after the coup and dominated political activity until 1974. In 1968, Ethiopian students in Europe founded the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) in Hamburg. In 1972, former ESM leaders founded the Ethiopian Peoples Liberation Organization (later Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party) (Zewde, 2014, p.249; Gebru, 2009, pp.13–63; Kiflu, 1993; Andargachew, 2000, p.9; Melaku, 2019, p.172).

In post-1991 party politics, the power imbalance between opposition and ruling parties is evident due to the ruling's mandate to use state resources to outperform rivals. This results in opposition parties being trapped by a dominant party that doesn't allow them freedom (Berhanu, 2009, p.1). Intra-party conflict led to inadequate institutionalization and fragmentation of political parties before and after multi-party politics in 1991 and the fall of the military dictatorship, resulting in a lack of institutional procedures to address these issues (Berhanu, 2003, p.115).

Ethiopia's democratic quagmire is attributed to ethnic politics and a lack of clear demarcation between ruling parties and state institutions. Power sharing is seen as a solution, but party mergers and structural defects hinder democratic transition which all lead to internal violent conflicts. This study aims to provide a comparative analysis of intra-party conflict and their immediate consequence as a civil war in Ethiopia, examining the nature, causes, and repercussions of these conflicts in various political parties. This will

shed light on how these conflicts affect the country's democratic dynamics (Kassahun, 2020, p.91; Gemechu, 2023, p.33; Bayu, 2019, p.20593).

The study aims to analyze internal conflicts within political parties and their impact on intra-party democracy and civil war in a country. It examines how these conflicts are managed and how they lead to violence. The study also examines the institutional frameworks used to resolve conflicts, as well as the country's legal frameworks.

The main research questions that the study attempted to address are on the differences in intra-party conflict resolution across political parties in Ethiopia, its implications for democratic governance, its role in shaping political dynamics, and its contribution to recurrent civil war and political economic consequences.

The core argument of this study is that intra-party conflict has a considerable impact on the quality and stability of democracy in Ethiopia by leading to violent civil wars. As a result, political parties that violate democratic principles to resolve intra-party conflicts are less devoted to societal democracy while promoting violent political culture, which leads to violent civil wars.

Methodology

The study employs a qualitative methodology to explore intra-party conflict resolution, civil war, and its implications for Ethiopia's democratic society. Data is sourced from both secondary and primary sources, with primary sources supplementing secondary sources. The review includes party literature, documents, manifestos, and programs, mostly in local languages, to understand the dynamics of intra-party conflict resolution in Ethiopia (Hancock, 2001, p.4).

The study interviewed 16 key informants from various backgrounds, including party presidents, deputy chairman/chairwoman, executive committee members, rank-and-file members, a

party researcher, high court judge, and NENE officer, in Addis Ababa, Hawassa, and Bahir Dar, in two rounds from October 2022 to April 2023. This research employs a comparative case study design to examine party conflicts' similarities and differences, drawing conclusions representative of non-included parties, and employs thematic data analysis for easy identification of themes (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.93).

In 2021, Ethiopia's National Electoral Board registered 53 political parties, with 20 national and 33 regional. The sample parties reflect the nation's changing socio-political landscape. Ethnic based opposition parties include the National Movement of Amhara and Oromo Federalist Congress, while multi-ethnic parties Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice and the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party, along with the ruling coalition Prosperity Party.

The 2019 Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) merger case provides a valuable case study for investigating internal conflicts leading to the country's rebranding as PP and civil war. The 2019 EZEMA election was criticized for intra-party power struggles, and the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) has faced disagreements. The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party (ESDP) are also examined for their internal governance.

Conceptual and theoretical perspectives

The choice of theoretical perspectives for this research is dependent on how their suppositions lead to realize internal party democracy because good theories are assessed based on their predictive abilities on the issue. In light of this, it is important to keep in mind what Downs (1957, p.21) stated: "Theoretical models should be tested primarily by the accuracy of their predictions rather than by the reality of their assumptions."

The study utilizes deliberative democratic theory, specifically the Intra-Party Democracy model, to promote internal discussions and debates within a political party, aiming to involve constituents in resolving intra-party conflicts before escalating to national level (Wolkenstein, 2016, p.9). Deliberation is crucial for democratic political decisions to be legitimate, as it provides a public forum for debate, enhancing the likelihood of reaching a consensus (Bevir, 2007, p.204).

Resource-based conflict theory explains the relationship between party conflict and financial and non-financial resources. In Ethiopian political parties, conflicts stem from disagreements over resources like funding, influential networks, power positions, and expertise. Marginalized factions can lead to internal strife, power struggles, and disputes (Das and Teng, 2000, p.32).

Given their function in a democratic government, political parties must operate democratically, at least legally. But whether parties are committed to intra-party democracy or not depends on how they handle internal conflict (Salgado, 2020, p.116).

Mair (2002) argue that empowering party members weakens the position of activists and militant critics, benefiting the party's leaders. Intra-party politics involve conflictual interactions among party subgroups, similar to politics, where internal actors compete for influence over party strategy, program, and apparatus (Maor, 2005, p.140). Party conferences typically serve as an expression of the party as a single, cohesive body, which is at least partially why most parties hold them, even when their actual power is rather small (Pettitt, 2014).

Results and discussion

The nexus of intra-party conflict and internal party democracy

The bylaws of most Ethiopian political parties reveal various sources for establishing dispute resolution entities, indicating a desire to make the party internally democratic. The EPRDF's internal conflict following PM Meles Zenawi's death led to the resignation of the party's chairman and PM. Tensions over power imbalance between TPLF and ANDM-OPDO escalated, leading to competition between ANDM and OPDO for chairmanship. TPLF leaders were removed from various positions, forcing them to resign from the proposed coalition (Kefale, 2019, p.1).¹ The PP, formed on December 25, 2019, was criticized by the TPLF due to procedural and legal issues, leading to political contention and a civil war that devastated the economy (Geremew and Alamineh, 2021, p.12).

The TPLF's opposition to the postponement of the national election and the establishment of a regional election led to tensions, resulting in the federal government printing a new national currency and military preparations, resulting in the war that began on November 4, 2020.² As a result of this intra-party conflict, the civil war broke out between November 2020 and December 2021, a conflict in northern Ethiopia that caused \$22.7 billion in infrastructure damage and an additional \$6 billion in productivity losses, accounting for 26% of GDP.³

The Prosperity Party's by-laws state that its inspection and ethics commission oversees constitution and resolves conflicts, but it's often used for leaders' interests at the expense of rank-and-file members.

¹ Interview with an executive committee member of the PP, March 2023, Hawassa, Ethiopia

² Interview with a researcher at the federal government office, March 2024, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

³ Available at <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2023/08/01/boom-bust-fallout-war-and-drought-leaves-ethiopians-mired-poverty#:~:text=The%20conflict%20in%20northern%20Ethiopia,to%20an%20Ethiopian%20government%20assessment>.

Intra-party conflict-resolution committees often face challenges in safeguarding individuals who oppose leadership. "Prosperity Party officials were removed from their posts due to criticism of lack of transparency in candidate selection during the party's organizational congress, which took place from March 11 to 13, 2022, causing fear of retaliation among rank-and-file members."⁴

Ethiopian political parties face intra-party conflict due to lack of transparency and publicity, with members only informed of dismissals and the party's inspection and ethics committee never opposing decisions favoring party members.⁵

Members who are facing disciplinary action should be given enough time to submit their defense. Since actions made against leaders or members of the rank-and-file are essentially orders from presidents, it is doubtful that the accused will have the chance to offer evidence refuting the accusations. The outcome will be against them if it is carried out. When the ruling party and government figures were ousted from the EPRDF in 2001, this was the case (Gebru, 1999).

Because of the lack of transparency and impartiality in Ethiopian parties and because of the fear of reprisals, neither the defendant nor other members are informed of rulings in writing. The PP has an ethics and audit commission, which must serve as the party's court when disputes arise within the party. When there is injustice, party leaders and members typically petition the commission. The majority of the appeals' content concerned dismissals from

appointment. One regional PP office's 2022 annual report states that the commission has dismissed 75% of the claims proving unfitness.⁶

Ethiopian political parties faced external challenges but internal conflicts led to their collapse. The ruling party EPRDF's internal crisis and split caused a loss of influence over the larger political system, despite the concentration of power and the absence of significant opposition. "Despite facing pressure from various groups, the EPRDF's 27-year rule remained unimpeded. However, internal conflicts eroded its influence, leading to a loss of political control in 2018. The party relied on undemocratic tactics to suppress dissent."⁷

As one interviewee from EZEMA said, "party presidents always need to give their approval and instruction for final approval when it comes to implementation. Because the laws are naturally copies of those in other democratic countries, they cannot be flawed in general". The party's inspection committee appears to support top leaders, believing their authority is unchallengeable. They make decisions based on bylaws, and certain leaders, like the former AAPO, financially support the party during economic deficits.⁸

Party procedural laws often copy foreign laws, requiring leadership approval. Faults are acknowledged, and incorrect actions tolerated. Independent conflict adjudicating organs ensure standards. Members should file appeals against convictions, but inspection committees are unlikely due to potential manipulation.⁹

⁴ Interview with PP official, May 2023, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia

⁵ Interview with a former PP Central Committee Member, November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

⁶ Interview with PP official, May 2023, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia

⁷ Interview with a former PP Central Committee Member, November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

⁸ Interview with a former executive member of EZEMA, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

⁹ Interview with an official at the OFC, October 2022, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

One OFC respondent gave the assurance that NEBE or the court would rule in favor of party presidents if such matters were brought before them. There is no way to bring such intra-party conflicts to such institutions given this culture.¹⁰ Additionally, when intra-party conflict emerges and is brought before the state institutions that are supposed to strengthen democratization, they favor the devoted party leaders who pledge to work with the government, as one EZEMA respondent remarked. One instance worth bringing up is the situation of CUD, which was handed over to Mr. Ayele Chamiso at the expense of those leaders who were imprisoned following the 2005 election.¹¹

The committee investigating disciplinary infractions in Ethiopian political parties is often an ad hoc group, becoming distracted when major offenses occur. "Presidents activate inspection committees to take action against undesirable groups or individuals in the party."¹²

In a nutshell, the process of democratizing the internal functioning of political parties is significantly impacted by intra-party conflict resolution processes. It follows that a party cannot be expected to be responsive, open, and capable of addressing societal disputes once it reaches public power if it is unable to overcome its internal conflicts with its rank-and-file and leaders.

Post-conflict Ethiopian political parties are fragmented, with dispute resolution processes benefiting party officials. Former PP leaders often fled abroad or supported armed organizations, leading to their detention for sparking civil war. Institutional processes benefit party officials.¹³

¹⁰ Interview with an official at the OFC, October 2022, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

¹¹ Interview with a former executive member of EZEMA, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

¹² Interview with an Executive Member of the ESDP, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

¹³ Interview with a former PP Central Committee Member, November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

¹⁴ Available at <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/why-ethiopias-2021-elections-matter>

¹⁵ Interview with an executive committee member of the PP, March 2023, Hawassa, Ethiopia

¹⁶ Available at <https://www.theeastfrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/cost-of-ethiopia-war-in-tigray-fuels-search-for-a-lasting-peace-3716668>

¹⁷ Available at <https://www.ft.com/content/2f385e95-0899-403a-9e3b-ed8c24adf4e7>

According to Shomer and Gedalya (2016:510), internal conflicts within political parties have a significant impact on the nation's democratic transition in terms of how voters view parties and how they vote. Once their confidence in the internal party's functioning is damaged, this encourages voters who are disengaged to take part in a national election. Such public images have contributed to the low turnout in the national elections. For instance, out of more than 110 million individuals, 37,408,600 votes were expected to be cast in the national election of 2021, of which almost 60 million people are major voters.

Causes of intra-party conflict

Intra-party conflict in Ethiopian political organizations often stems from the desire to exclusively exercise power within the party. In 2018, the EPRDF was divided into two groups, with the TPLF on one side and the OPDO/ODP and ANDM/ADP on the other. The top leadership of SEPDM was split between the TPLF and ADP/ODP. A new organizational structure was formed in December 2019, in which all 45 TPLF CC members and 13 ANDM CC members opposed the reform agenda.¹⁵

This intra-party conflict is exceptional in the history of the nation because it initially arose in opposition to one party's domination (unilateral exercise of power) over the state apparatus and subsequently resulted in a protracted civil war between political parties that had previously been united that cost the country more than \$28 billion¹⁶ in less than two years since November 4, 2020, killing more than 600 million people.¹⁷

The Amhara Democratic Party and Oromo Democratic Party, two of the founding members of the PP, have experienced various levels of conflict; for example, both were considered to be at odds shortly following the Bahir Dar assassination of ANRS leaders in June 2019.

*"Widespread evictions and killings of the Amhara ethnic group in the Oromia and Benishangul regions, violent clashes in the Attaye region of the North Shoa of Amhara, disputes over the reclaiming of Wolqait-Raya-Metekel, the Pretoria agreement to end hostilities on October 24, 2022, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church's internal pope appointment concerns and the restrictions on free entry to the Capital City, and the distribution of political positions across Addis Ababa offices all feed simmering tensions and intra-party conflict inside the Amhara-Oromo PP. There have been irrational justifications for not resolving the aforementioned problems and other problems that weaken intra-party cohesion."*¹⁸

Differences in coalition building make it difficult for Ethiopian political parties to preserve continuity and democracy. EZEMA, as it claims to be a modern party, has implemented new structures to control internal operations, such as decentralized structures, a leader and chairmanship, local unit authority for finance and recruitment, and a line ministry within the party. The party has since suffered a significant loss of its founding leaders and the bulk of its previous executive committee members, who have formed new parties or joined others.¹⁹

The internal conflict in EZEMA stems from a significant portion of the leadership supporting Abiy Ahmed's government, while others opposed it, fearing it would betray their party. On July 2-3, 2022, crucial positions were open for internal competition, leading to intra-party contests for

leader and chairman. The country's political culture of a "winners-take-all game" deteriorated the relationship between these groups, leading to the loser withdrawing and forming another party. Accusations and defamation continued, leading to tagging each other as a betrayal of their initial promise.²⁰

NaMA has also had to resolve an internal conflict that sprang from a coalition choice. The party's stance on whether to form collaboration with the government by accepting offers for some government positions after the election in June 2021 became a topic that significantly divided the leadership circle. The practice of two distinct parties based on government policy actions persisted as well; while some appointees continued to oppose decisions made by the government, others continued to support them.²¹

Internal party conflict in Ethiopian political parties can be attributed to a variety of pretexts. A response from OFC revealed that the ruling party has infiltrated parties in the past to foment discord. He emphasized the procedural situation the Oromo National Congress encountered during the 2005 election.²² Most of the time, the reasons why party mergers fail to last for very long are akin to the reasons why there is intra-party conflict. For instance, when the Ethiopian Democratic Forces Union (EDFU) was founded in North America in 2003 by 15 political parties, the majority of the parties expressed their displeasure with the EDFU leaders as soon as it became clear that financing and member recruitment would be centralized through EDFU. Therefore, internal party strife inside the EDFU had two main causes: political funding and the scrambling of party members by each party (Lidetu, 2006; Kiflu, 2006).

¹⁸ Interview with PP official, May 2023, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia

¹⁹ Interview with EZEMA's executive member, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

²⁰ Interview with a former executive member of EZEMA, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

²¹ Interview with NAMA's executive member, November 2022, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

²² Interview with an executive member of the OFC in November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

In ESDP, internal conflict among leaders arose because of coalition choice, where some leaders are sympathetic to staying allied with the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (ye'tiyop'iya fēdēralawī dēmokirasīyawī ānidineti medireki), while others advocate departing owing to OFC's admission of renowned activist Jawar Mohammed as vice chairman of the party. The ESDP's incumbent leaders stand against OFC's decision, arguing that it would deteriorate Medirek's relations with the ruling party.²³ Owing to these disagreements with the OFC, the ESDP is now in a position to dissolve the MEDREK²⁴ and claims no affiliation with it.

MEDREK was founded in 2008 by the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, the Somali Democratic Alliance Forces, and Arena Tigray (the Union of Tigrians for Democracy and Sovereignty). Currently, MEDREK's members are the Oromo Federalist Congress, the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party, the Union of Tigrayans for Democracy and Sovereignty (Arena), and the Sidama Liberation Movement.

Intra-party conflict and the nature of party coherence

Ethiopian political parties, despite their democratic commitment to resolving internal disputes, have a disintegrated organizational structure. Organizational coherence, the degree of congruity in party members' attitudes and actions, is crucial for settling conflicts through dialogue and consensus. Parties' coherence will disintegrate if they cannot resolve internal conflicts over ideological matters, coalition building, financial management, and candidate nomination.²⁵

²³ Interview with the top leader of the ESDP, April 2024, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

²⁴ MEDREK was founded in 2008 by the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, the Somali Democratic Alliance Forces, and Arena Tigray (the Union of Tigrians for Democracy and Sovereignty). Currently, MEDREK's members are the Oromo Federalist Congress, the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party, the Union of Tigrayans for Democracy and Sovereignty (Arena), and the Sidama Liberation Movement.

²⁵ Interview with an executive member of the OFC in November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

²⁶ Interview with a political researcher, February 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

²⁷ Interview with an executive committee member of the PP, March 2023, Hawassa, Ethiopia

²⁸ Interview with a former executive member of EZEMA, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Conflict inside the EPRDF's party has been a result of loose or nonexistent party cohesion. The then-ANDM and OPDO, which were influenced by the popular uprising against the regime from 2015 to 2018, were profoundly influenced by the mass uprisings of Fanno and Qerro, respectively. These then started to cause disagreements among the EPRDF ally parties in the upcoming leadership election to install Abiy Ahmed, when 13 ANDM members voted against him working with the TPLF.^{26, 27}

Accepting appointments from the ruling party in October 2022 was not based on the party's leadership selection rules, as one EZEMA respondent discovered, with the exception of the case of the party's principal leader, whose case was decided by Congress. Others who held regional and local administrative positions were chosen based on their permission and the generosity of the ruling party, which could jeopardize the party's cohesion.²⁸

Some observers question if the appointment procedure is legitimate. In this light, some think that the PP took this action during the non-competitive election in the Oromia region in order to resolve its legitimacy crisis with the international world. In addition to these allegations, the nomination process was rife with anomalies to restore the lost legitimacy. As a result, some people saw that the selection process was not as transparent as it had appeared to be. The process was manipulated by state officials to produce the desired result (Yusuf, 2022, p.12).

In the experience of the Ethiopian parties, factionalism results in significant party division and the formation of a new party. For instance, after being finally ousted from the party in June 1996 because they were dissatisfied with the leadership, a youthful group of AAPO members established their own party, the EDP, in October 2000 (Tamirat, 2007; Lidetu, 2006).

According to Ostrogorski (1902, p.79), parties that have legislative representatives who are subject to the direction of a membership organization are more cohesive than parties that are predominately made up of parliamentarians. Since the 2005 elections, there have been no parties in Ethiopia with a significant number of MPs, and the affiliation of MPs with membership organizations is uncertain. One ethnic-based political party (NAMA) and one multi-ethnic (EZEMA) have five and four MP²⁹ respectively in the presently sitting federal parliament. However, it might be claimed that the coherence of the parties is reliant on the will of their leaders because the party presidents are not MPs.

For instance, once chosen as the winner of an internal leadership election, the leader will have the authority to choose his cabinet members as members of the party executive, according to a high-ranking EZEMA official.³⁰ In this situation, it is possible that the party leader will decide who to keep in his inner circle and who to reject in order to maintain party cohesion. It is also argued that organizational weakness typically equates with low party cohesion in the legislature, whereas parties with substantial mass membership organizations tend to have cohesive parliamentary groups (Maor, 2005, p.140).

Intra-party conflict and party factionalism

Political parties are groups of people that have a common objective, but disagreements about how to achieve these goals lead to conflicts that have an impact on party behavior. Additionally, individual actions and the political culture of the nation fuel internal party strife in Ethiopia. As a result, some people have a stronger loyalty to their ethnic group than to all other ethnicities combined. While some behave in the opposite manner to show greater loyalty to their nation than specific ethnic needs. When it comes to how the party operates within, friction breaks out.³¹

A typology of factions is developed by Sartori (1976, p.1) based on the interests (power or spoils) and guiding principles (ideas and ideologies) of each group. According to Sartori's dichotomy, Ethiopian political groups frequently split into factions because each leader has a natural tendency toward power-seeking. One may categorize the internal grouping inside the ruling party (EPRDF) that has been strengthening ANDM and OPDO youth leaders against TPLF dominance since September 2016 as a drive-by-power clique.

A lack of internal democracy within parties has a significant impact on factionalism, or the effectiveness of parties in winning elections. This was evident in the EPRDF following the change in leadership in 2018, when the three ethnically anchored coalitions (ANDM/ADP, OPDO/OPD, and SEPDM) joined forces with five former allied parties to establish one national party (PP) in opposition to the TPLF.

Ethnic representation is a significant consideration in Ministerial and Addis Ababa city administrations, particularly among former

²⁹ Available at <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/LEOME%20Report%20of%20the%20June%202021%20Elections.pdf>

³⁰ Interview with EZEMA's executive member, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

³¹ Interview with a former PP Central Committee Member, November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

EPRDF members. Ethnic parties often mobilize ethnicity for political power representation, even outside their local boundaries. For example, NAMA claims to represent the Amhara ethnic community but maintains offices in various regions.³²

This paper examines the collaboration between EZEMA, NAMA, and ESDP after the June 2021 national election. The ruling party appointed appointees, but conflicts arose due to deviations from rules. Some nominees showed greater loyalty to the governing party, and some appointees were reluctant to respond, potentially leaving the party if resignation was requested.³³

There is no real distinction between ethnic parties and multi-ethnic parties in Ethiopian party politics, with the exception of nomenclature. One of the sample parties, ESDP, which is a coalition of numerous ethnically organized parties with names like Hadiya People, Dawaro People, etc., may serve as an empirical example of this since the majority of multi-ethnic parties are a merging of ethnically formed organizations. Additionally, ethnicity is taken into account when allocating positions of leadership among claimants under the term 'ethnic composition' (ye biher tewatsio). One of the sample parties, PP, is a good example of this.³⁴

According to Zariski (1960, p.33), a faction is any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members are structured to operate jointly (as a distinct bloc within the party) in order to accomplish their objectives. In Ethiopian parties, faction formation is ingrained because it is a requirement for establishing another party. A notable case in point was the 2001 TPLF schism, during which 12 central committee members

with considerable support were dismissed. A few of these former prominent party figures joined other political organizations, such as AEUP. OFC was formed after a splitter group was granted the name of the old party ONC in a court order following the 2005 national election.³⁵

When we use Sartori's second typology as the foundation for faction, we find that Ethiopian parties place less importance on ideological beliefs. This is due to the fact that political parties are typically not founded on the basis of ideas or ideology, but rather out of animosity for a certain group. The NaMA is against the TPLF's persecution of Amharas; the TPLF was established against the allegation of Amhara supremacy in the state; the OLF stood against the alleged Abyssinian domination; the ESDP is against the regime's repression of its founding members' social base; and the OFC calls for a true representation of the Oromo people based on its size.³⁶

Implication of party conferences as a unifying tool

Important hints about the degree of IPD can be found in the type of membership participation in the party congress. Participation in the party congress may not meet the inclusivity condition in some parties. Local groups and membership applications are entirely under the central party's supervision. As a result, the local party congress's makeup is easily under the control of the central party.

Party conferences are regarded as the only venues where members of all party hierarchies will congregate in one physical location. Ethiopian parties also hold party conferences or congresses if they believe it is necessary to do so or if the NEBE

³² Interview with members of NAMA, November 2022, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

³³ Interview with a former executive member of EZEMA, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

³⁴ Interview with an Executive Member of the ESDP, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

³⁵ Interview with an executive member of the OFC in November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

³⁶ Interview with an executive member of the OFC in November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

³⁷ Interview with a former PP Central Committee Member, November 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

orders them to do so. Due to tight NEBE membership requirements, the number of Ethiopian political parties was reduced from 130³⁸ to 53. The NEBE followed up with these parties to have congresses and conferences with their members.^{39, 40} Disgruntled members approach the NEBE rather than relying on internal appeal mechanisms after disciplinary actions to seek redress. The weak internal demand for responsibility and the ineffectiveness of external regulating authorities in guaranteeing adherence to party constitutions contribute for the lack of internal accountability in some opposition parties.⁴¹

The NAMA, a sample party required by the NEBE to hold its congress, convened 580 members from local units. The main agenda included hearing the executive's report, amending the party's bylaws, reorganizing leadership, and implementing party reform. However, internal discord among members demanded genuine opposition to the ruling party, with the main justification being the need for reconfiguration.⁴²

Ethiopian political parties lack consistent institutional frameworks to address intra-party conflicts, despite the fact that conflict is unavoidable. Others even prefer using prominent people and arbitrators to arbitrate disputes between parties than employing the parties' institutional systems. This is somewhat related to the political culture of the nation, which promotes compromise following a conflict.⁴³ ESDP also included this traditional conflict resolution instrument in its by-laws.

As it was observed in the 2000 election, where the ruling could only win 42% of the total votes cast in Addis Abeba while the remaining 68% was divided among opposition parties, the founders of the influential party in the 2005 national election known as CUD initially tried to resolve the disagreement among party leaders of AAPO and EDP who refused and pushed the arbitrators to come up with a new party-EDP. The well-known maxim 'let you cooperate or disintegrate' (translated as 'tebaberu woyim tesebaberu' in Amharic) was then used to urge parties to cooperate, merge, form an alliance, or unite in order to successfully oppose the ruling party, which unilaterally presents itself as stronger by relying on state institutions and resources (Kefale, 2011, p.693).⁴⁴

Above all, parties may become weak and even split if they don't have internal dispute resolution processes based on democratic values of bargaining and compromise. Most political parties in Ethiopia are associated with this culture.

Political parties in Ethiopia should first attempt to resolve conflicts within their own party through democratic processes outlined in their internal by-laws, rather than immediately resorting to legal action. By doing so, they can demonstrate their ability to handle internal disputes and work together to find resolutions. A federal high court judge who has experience hearing intra-party conflicts taken to court shared her observation as follows:

³⁸ Available at <https://nebe.org.et/en/political-parties>

³⁹ List of Registered Political Parties Amharic and English Final. <https://nebe.org.et/sites/default/files/List%20of%20Registered%20Political%20Parties%20Amharic%20%26%20English%20Final.pdf> last accessed on 28/09/2022.

⁴⁰ FDRE Federal Negarit Gazeta (2019). *The Ethiopian Electoral, Political Parties Registration and Election's Code of Conduct Proclamation No.1162/2019*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

⁴¹ Interview with an expert in NEBE, November 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

⁴² Interview with NAMA's executive member, November 2022, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

⁴³ Interview with the top leader of the ESDP, April 2024, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

⁴⁴ Interview with a former executive member of EZEMA, October 2022 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

*"If political parties cannot effectively resolve their own internal conflicts, it raises doubts about their capability to address the complex issues facing the Ethiopian society. When they cannot handle disagreements and conflicts within their own ranks, it indicates their lack of unity, leadership, or problem-solving skills that are necessary for governing a country effectively. Therefore, they should possess the necessary skills and mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts, as this would reflect their ability to manage and address broader societal challenges if they were elected into power. The society's trust in political parties is contingent upon their demonstrated capacity to handle complex issues both within their party and in the broader context of governance."*⁴⁵

Findings and study suggestions

The study found that the most destructive civil war of the 21st century that took the lives of more than 600,000 people and cost more than \$28.7 billion was caused by intra-party conflict within Ethiopia's ruling party, the EPRDF, that later split into the PP and TPLF, which fought for nearly 24 months.

Intra-party conflict within the sample political parties was attributed to various factors. The first one is a power struggle within the party leadership, where different factions within EPRDF in March 2018, EZEMA in March 2022, NaMA in February 2020, OFC in 2007, and ESDP in 2019 were seen to compete for control over decision-making processes, resources, and party direction, leading to conflicts. Secondly, disagreements over ideological stances and policy directions fueled intra-party conflict where party members have divergent views on fundamental issues such as party governance in the PP since its formation, coalition formation in EZEMA, NaMA, OFC, and ESDP, financial transparency, or social issues that

were leading to internal strife. Thirdly, ethnic and regional cleavages in this diverse country with various ethnic groups and regional identities have been leading to intra-party conflicts arising due to tensions related to ethnic or regional representation in NaMA since its establishment within the party structure, where competing interests based on ethnicity in the PP or provincial affiliations in OFC escalated conflicts within a party. Fourthly, conflicts over resource allocation, including funding, positions, and access to networks, were seen as significant factors in intra-party disputes. When party members feel that resources were unfairly distributed or that certain factions receive preferential treatment, it leads to internal strife in all sample parties to varying degrees. Fifthly, the leadership style of key party figures contributed to intra-party conflict. Authoritarian leadership, lack of transparency, or failure to consult with party members on important decisions breed resentment and opposition within the party ranks, as seen in the PP, EZEMA, and NaMA. Sixthly, past grievances or unresolved conflicts within the party's history resurface and contribute to ongoing intra-party tensions, as seen in the PP. Issues such as past leadership struggles as seen in EZEMA, betrayals in OFC where a faction aligned with the ruling party, or ideological rifts can continue to impact party dynamics and lead to conflicts. Lastly, external influences such as pressure from interest groups, as is seen in the ESDP, from other parties against the incumbent leader, foreign entities like the diaspora intervention in NaMA, or government interference in OFC to split the former ONC, played a role in fueling intra-party conflict. External actors may seek to manipulate internal party dynamics for their own agendas, exacerbating existing tensions.

⁴⁵ Interview with a federal high court judge, November 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

According to the study, Ethiopian political parties have significant internal governance issues that can be attributed to a dearth of intra-party democracy. One significant issue revealed by the research is that when disputes arise within the parties, people often split the party apart into factions or cliques rather than staying inside and realizing that politics is a fight of competing interests. The five political parties used as examples, in this case, have engaged in a variety of intra-party conflicts, some of which have led to the expulsion of groups that helped to create their parties.

Another result is that in order to prevent political parties from having a strong institutional foundation to oppose its rule, the ruling party has been adopting either cooptation or repression. Some respondents said that infiltrating the opposition has finally caused the party to break apart and that some organizations favorable to the ruling party would continue to use the name and resources of the original party. One example in this direction was CUD, whose key leaders were jailed after the 2005 election, leaving the party without a leader until, following a legal battle, the NEBE recognized a faction claiming the party. The kind of cooptation has persisted to this day, as the ruling party was able to appoint some party officials to the cabinet without having them stand for election in the national election of June 2021.

The study also discovered that the appointment of opposition political party leaders by the ruling party caused a major split among party leadership and membership structures in the wake of the 2021 national election. This occurs in part as a result of the appointed officials' growing loyalty to the government or ruling party rather than to their background. This gets worse because the appointment by the party congress was not approved by their respective parties. Worst of all, if these appointees choose to stand against the party, there are no rules that would hold them

accountable for the party (or the nation as a whole). The paper concluded that institutional procedures are necessary for all of these processes to resolve.

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