

S&P or (Reading Suriyan Panlay's Young Adult Criticism on Intertextuality) สป หรือ (อ่านบทวิจารณ์ความเป็นสหบทที่ยังเยาว์ของสุริยันต์ ปานเลห์)

Korphong Witchayapakorn¹

ก่อกองศ์ วิชญ์ปากรณ์²

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to read Suriyan Panlay's "I am Precious/I Am Girl/I Am Black: Intertextuality in African American Children's and Young Adult Literature" (2015), criticizing his politicalization and mythologization of reading and textuality. Even though Panlay's study focuses on African American young adult literature, the readers and intertextuality, the reading of Panlay emphasizes the concept of reading and intertextuality. On the contrary to Panlay's argument about intertextuality, intertextuality is where it is not. It de-nominates itself. The binary opposition between motivated and unmotivated Signifyin(g), as seen in Panlay's work, is problematic because the praising, rewriting, parody of a text is not intertextuality (but it is there as a punctum) – the intent of the author turns a text in to work in a strict Barthesian sense of the word. Also, reading as such does not split the readers into two groups as Panlay argued. Because misreading is the "only right way" to read, there is no such thing as mature readers and inexperienced readers. Reading is a space where a void is created: one does not have to focus on the text at all as long as one is in the instant of reading.

Keywords: Reading, Intertextuality, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Textuality

บทคัดย่อ

บทความนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่ออ่านบทความ "I am Precious/I Am Girl/I Am Black: Intertextuality in African American Children's and Young Adult Literature" (2015) ของสุริยันต์ ปานเลห์ แม้ว่าบทความของสุริยันต์จะให้ความสำคัญกับเรื่องของผู้อ่านวรรณกรรมเด็กและเยาวชน ความเป็น 'สหบท' ที่พบได้ในวรรณกรรมอเมริกัน และหน้าที่ของผู้เขียนเป็นหลัก แต่ทว่ากระบวนการอ่านที่เกิดขึ้นในบทความของสุริยันต์ ทำให้เห็นว่าการอ่านและความเป็นสหบทไม่จำเป็นต้องเป็นอย่างที่สุริยันต์นำเสนอ ข้อเสนอของสุริยันต์ยังเต็มไปด้วย ความย้อนแย้ง และความลึกลับในมโนทัศน์ที่นำเสนออยู่ สหบทไม่ได้เป็นสิ่งที่มองเห็นหรือจับต้องได้อย่างที่สุริยันต์นำเสนอ เพราะสหบทนั้นจะมีอยู่ได้ต่อเมื่อไม่มีอยู่ สหบทมีความเป็นอิสระจากการตั้งชื่อและเรียกขานที่กำหนดโดยผู้เขียน สหบทลบล้างตัวเองออกเสมอ เหลือไว้เพียงแค่ร่องรอยของการมีอยู่ เพราะนี่คือข้อจำกัดของการมีอยู่ของสหบท ความตั้งใจของผู้เขียน (ไม่ว่าจะเป็นเพื่อเขียนล้อหรือยกย่อง) จึงเป็นการทำให้สหบทไม่เป็นสหบท แต่เป็นสหบทในเวลาเดียวกัน เนื่องจากสหบทเกิดขึ้นระหว่างการอ้างอิงเสมอ นอกจากนั้นการแบ่งผู้อ่านออกเป็น 2 กลุ่มระหว่างผู้ใหญ่และเยาวชนของสุริยันต์ยังมีปัญหาในตัว เนื่องจากสิ่งที่สุริยันต์พูดถึงไม่ใช่การอ่าน การอ่านไม่จำเป็นกระดืบขึ้น ความไม่เข้าใจในการอ่าน คือส่วนหนึ่งของการอ่าน ไม่ใช่สิ่งที่ทำให้การอ่านของผู้คนอื่น "มีประสิทธิภาพ" กว่าอีกคน การอ่านผิด

¹ Lecturer Department of Philosophy, History and English Literature, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Thammasat University

² อาจารย์ ภาควิชาประวัติศาสตร์ ปรัชญา ภาษาและวรรณคดีอังกฤษ คณะศิลปศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตร์



คือการอ่านที่ถูกต้อง ไม่มีการอ่านอื่น นอกจากการอ่านผิดที่เป็นอื่นไปจากเดิม แม้ว่าข้อเสนอของสุริยันต์ว่าด้วย ผู้เขียนควรจะสร้างความสมดุลยากง่ายให้เหมาะสมสำหรับผู้อ่านเยาวชนและผู้ใหญ่เพื่อสร้างพื้นที่การอ่านให้กับ เยาวชน แต่ทว่าข้อเสนอดังกล่าวนั้นกลับย่ำความคิดเรื่องอาวุโสที่ไม่มีในการอ่านและไม่ควรจะมีอยู่ในพื้นที่ของการเขียน

คำสำคัญ: การอ่าน สหบท บาร์ตส์ แดรวีดา ตัวบท

Introduction

Be-Heading/ing. One of the unofficial tricks to start any work of writing,³ to make something academic serious, to veil fiction with the surface of deepness, to realize the law and myth of writing (as it is only in writing that a quotation is visible), is to mark the heading, making it an end in itself, with a couple of quoted lines in which authors embody the-Name-of-the-Father. It does not matter whether the author is of the margin or center; black, brown, green, or red; genderless or meta-gender. It is the-Name-of-the-Father as long as it functions as the *point de capiton* for the whole subjectivity of the text. As a result, the text, with the Father's phallic on its head, ceases to function as a text. With the Name of the Author, who is not other, but Other, a work of non-art, it is to become. The author cannot be dead if his name is present, despite the general law of signification: sign presents the absence of the object, giving birth to the dead. The name is more than just a sign. It presents more than itself, more than a reference. A name is not a substitute for the author, but is the author *par excellence*, as the Name of the Symbolic Father who is Other. In the case of Suriyan Panlay's "I am Precious/I Am Girl/I Am Black: Intertextuality in African American Children's and Young Adult Literature" (2015)⁴, which will be referred to as S&P from this point forward, to make the ~~original~~ name absent by the presence of the ~~new~~ sign, the birth of a dead name that does not function wholly as the author, but the other author, the strategic stance of quotation and reference, referred to as the act, not phenomenon, of intertextuality, to sustain a sense of irony.

Even though the quotations are about the namelessness of a text, of the possibility of non-symbolized order, the authorial names are signed by the new author, not only to authorize the writing of S&P as a whole, but also to *other* the meaning, erasing the original with the *copie conforme* of the new.⁵ There is no original, only the certified copy with the out-of-place signature. The authority of the text, as mentioned above, starts with the quotations from the other authors.⁶

³ The heading of this part had to be changed from "Be-Head/ing" to "Introduction," a beheading in a literal sense, because "Introduction" was more proper according to rule of TCI (Thai-Journal Citation Index Centre).

⁴ As suggested by the name, the work is about intertextuality and African American children's and young adult literature.

⁵ From the movie of the same name Certified Copy (Kiarostami, 2015).

⁶ Panlay quoted Umberto Eco and A.S. Byatt at the beginning of his article.

They are the centralized supplement function of S&P. Without them, the S and the P will cease to function as an article about intertextuality in African American children's and young adult literature. Supplemented by them, a text gain the excess of the authorization, as authorization is always an excess of text. Nevertheless, in this case, the authorization is not here, but there: the other place, out of place and out of time. The one who signs is S&P. The name, the date, and the title are put (t)here⁷ through the signification of S&P: sign and play. The meaning is disseminated. While A.S. Byatt argues that "[a] text is all the words that are in it ... the other words that precede it, haunt it, and are echoed in it" (as cited by Panlay, 2015, p. 19), what haunts her words are not words, but name, her name as the product of S&P. Her words are fossilized, made static through the confirmation of the copy. This does not mean that there is the original in the first place, but that there is an attempt to authorize the copy as the original. *Where is the original, then? There, not here, if there is approachable here.* Similarly, despite the fact that one of the character in Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose* (1980) says that "each book spoke of things ... that lie outside of books" (as cited by Panlay, p. 19), books, assuming are texts, do speak of thing in themselves. Books can speak only of things in themselves where the word "inside" is put under erasure by the concept of "outside." "There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; *il n'y a pas de hors-texte*]" (Derrida, 1976, p. 158). This neither certifies the copied quotes nor negates them. There is no outside-text, no inside-text, no in-sided-text, and no out-sided-text. A text, in this context, has to be put aside. There is only a marking of the territory. The spacing that locates and defines the quality of a text. In other words, because there is no original, only its mark that sign the territory of the original, the de-signature of the two quotations at the beginning of S&P are its own product.

The author of S&P signs and re-structures the text, forcing meaning (not meanings) onto the words and the reader, a kind of framing device that is not too far-fetched for the authoritarian. The meaning is (t)here, under the names, between these names: S&P and Umberto and A.S. Byatt. These are someone, implied S&P, that the readers *should* know. This does not mean that the readers should know them as they desire (for whose desire is it? It can never be uttered clearly: the reader's, the name's, or S&P's?). But to know them as they are imposed. As Umberto says "it is as if [the books] speak among themselves" (as cited by Panlay, p. 19), S&P talks by himself and with herself, the one sided dialogue between s and p. The starting point of a writing about intertextuality is, ironically, about the biased translation, of mutating the meaning, finding the polysemy of work-meanings, not a dissemination of signifier-texts. Even though polysemy is related to the idea of intertextuality, it betrays the very concept, betrays which is on the contrary to deconstruction. It holds the idea of multiple meanings that will eventually lead to One:

⁷ "Elsewhere here. [sic] If it were elsewhere, it wouldn't be an elsewhere" (Derrida, D'ailleurs Derrida, 1999)



the presence of meaning as the arranged multiplicity.⁸ This seems to be implied by the gesture of name dropping at the beginning of S&P. That is to say, S&P translates the meaning of the previous authors by way of cutting and castrating through the application of the writing tool: quotation. The work forces the meaning onto the newly signed signatures, Umberto Eco and A.S. Byatt, signed by S&P. What the original meaning is, one could never know. This is not to say that the reader lacks any kind of facility as S&P argued⁹, but that the coexisting meaning is already the *copie conforme*. The original is cut by itself. The readers see only the cut and paste with the confirmation of the name, a name that is also cut and copied. The multiple meanings, which is mostly lost in translation-cutting, is made One, the head, the anchorage of S&P: there is always something outside of the words and books. The problem with this argument is not about territory, but the tautological aspect of it. There is always something outside of the words and books because here is always something inside of the words and books. Books do not talk among each other (intertextuality is not a dialogue). It is the readers that lend them the act of utterance, not even the author, but the writer. Words lack echo. It is the readers who echo themselves. They see only what they want to see, the gesture of translation. This, as stated, could be seen from the S&P's strategy of quoting and cutting the reference at the beginning which functions as a rear in terms of theory.

The irony of S&P is not the concept of intertextuality itself, but how the concept is utilized to prompt the finding(s) that undermines the argument. Intertextuality, though the core of the whole argument, is missing. It is not that intertextuality is not uttered. It is there, covering page after page. But it is what it is: a cover, a surface to disguise. It surfaces as a surface, creating a face of theoretical paper, where theory is as complex as the complexion of a face. This is not to say that S&P as a text lacks intertextuality. Because intertextuality is not a function but a state of being of the text. Without "it" S&P would cease to be a functional being. However, this is to say that the "word" found all over article does not function as it is intended by S&P. As said, it has only a face

⁸ Evink argued in "Polysemy and Dissemination" (2012) that even though Derrida believes that polysemy is about controlling the meaning, of putting many into one, this is but a simplified perspective. Polysemy, by itself, cannot reduce the meaning to one. The idea of horizon of meaning and creativity of language are too problematic to function as stable as Derrida implies.

⁹ As S&P implied in the fifth section of the article, quoting this and that, "the lack of intersubjectivity knowledge" in children causes the "overreferential" problem, unlike the adults who are "equipped with enough [knowledge]" (Panlay, p. 27). However, those who cry out the problem are neither the readers nor the children, but S&P and the critics. Even though there are cries of the readers, and indeed there are, those cries are dubbed and subtitled by S&P. Does this mean that the overreferential is not the problem of a child but the adult with the surplus knowledge? If the children do not know that this is the problem, at least in S&P as it does not say anything about the children's saying, does it mean that the problem does not exist for them? In other words, does this mean that "sophisticated or 'adult' readers" impose the problem on the children?

value – a value of a face that loses its very position. Still, intertextuality as a condition of the text is there. This is the aporia of intertextuality, at least made visible by the event from reading S&P, not intentionally by S&P, a game of hide and seek whose goal is to be found after the game is done.

The Haunting of W.H.

A reference is different from intertextuality. It is an intertext, as a text can only exist if it is intertexting and intertexted, but it is not intertextuality *per se* in the sense of S&P. Since the beginning of the article, even before the “content”¹⁰, quotation and reference are the core of S&P. It is not the criticism, if there is one. Everywhere is quotation without being a quotation¹¹: who says this and that.¹² Nowhere a “motivated” quote can be found. An “unintentional” quotation without a citation would be another story, but that is what S&P lacks: another story. A nowhere that is supposed to be everywhere, this would make S&P another story. Here lies the awkward work on the idea of intertextuality. Everything and everywhere of intertextuality in S&P is to be “reinterpreted and reiterated by another” (Panlay, p. 19). But there is only this one pseudo-formula: “‘I am Precious/I am girl/I am black’” (as quoted by Panlay, p.19). The utterance is signed by the formula, everywhere and everything. It has to be quoted, to be a point of reference for the whole work to work wholly. There, the echo – the myth of “Echo and Narcissus” – is echoed by this hollowed echo. Echo, an intertextuality embodied, even though speaks the other’s words, distorted the other’s words into hers, but not wholly. Left only traces of words that trace indefinitely to its genesis. “[Narcissus] said; ‘I will die before I give you power over me.’ All [Echo] could say was ... ‘I give you power over me’” (Hamilton, 2011, p. 115). It is as Kristeva said, which S&P faithfully quotes – if it is even possible to quote faithfully in the first place due to the violence in repression of the unquoted – “intertextuality is defined as ‘a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another’” (as quoted by Panlay, p. 21). However, here, which is there, S&P bars Echo from her utterance. She could not speak, could not absorb and transform. Words may be altered, but they are altered to fit the altar of the Other. Echo is echo(ed) *as such*, that which only repeats without change. Her body exists as a hollowed body which is holy to S&P. Lack that is, the utterance, the voice of the other which is partially other to her and him. It is the “thematic” reading of S&P that bars her body *as such*. That is, to S&P even though the words are changed, the form is different, and the author is none other than the other one, they only echo each other. A scene of repetition between this and that. The orgasmic gaze of Narcissus.

¹⁰ Despite the fact that it is impossible to limit the content of the text by a simple format – a heading, a paragraph, a footnote, and so on – since textual content is the limit of “limit” itself, it cannot be avoided here. A classification is needed in order to butcher the text. And yet, this is not an unfortunate circumstance. This is the condition of existence of the text. It dissects itself to be.

¹¹ “[The text] is ... quotation without quotation marks” (Barthes, 1975, pp. 30 - 31)

¹² “I am this, I am that” (Woolf, 1992, p. 39).



Despite S&P's criticism that "[i]t is the act of writing, of re-authoring their own reality, *in their own tongue*, as these young female characters push themselves towards literacy and visibility, that their sense of self and liberation and empowerment is gained" (Panlay, p. 24), what changes is only the image-word, not the form of the utterance. Houston's verbal-focused text, even though is turned into a writing-focused text by Walker (Panlay, p. 23), is not a "speakerly text" in the first place. How could a text be speakerly? The dialect, the rhetoric, and/or the discourse are *written*. In one sense, it is written in a sense that it is structured and lawed – that is, it is a remembrance of any political identity. Here, the written is the "speakerly" of an African American; it is a part of the law of being African American as S&P implied. On the other sense, it is neither a matter of writing nor speaking, but of representation, which is problematic in itself. The representation here refers to the function of a text – that is, can a text be written truly? Every text, referred to in S&P, are "speakerly". They can be spoken, simple as that. This is simply because they are not written. The written here is also visible in S&P, such as signifyin(g). How to pronounce such a word with the parenthesis mark? This could be seen more clearly from Derrida's essay "Différance" (1982) that writing is not just written *as such*. Writing plays with speaking, it flees from being spoken into one: is it possible to utter signifyin(g) or *différance* without any supplementary signification? At the same time, it desires to be spoken, to be able to complete with one utterance, to be visible as said by S&P. This means that Walker's *The Color Purple* (2004) is a speakerly text in a sense that it desires to be one, as uttered by the critics. The "epistolary format" (Panlay, p. 23), despite the fact that is writing, falls under the spoken law in the first sense. However, this is not to say that everything is speakerly *par excellence*. "There is no purely and rigorously phonetic writing. So-called phonetic writing, by all rights and in principle, and not only due to an empirical or technical insufficiency, can function only by admitting into its system nonphonetic "signs" (punctuation, spacing, etc.)." (Derrida, 1982, p. 5). Everything is "speakerly" only because everything is written as such. They are translated. There is such a thing as a speakerly text. When the text is uttered, the accent, the dialect, the pronunciation and so on, are different from one person to the other. It is the astructural sediment of writing that this "free" agency in speaking exists, as the negative of the said structure. Nevertheless, this agency is neither of the speaker nor the word, but the written law (culture) which speaks the speaking subject. The identity of a text, speakerly and writerly, does not exist as something wholly different as S&P implied.

Hence, its work, the work of a text, does not change as said in S&P. It is not intertextuality, structurally *per se*, to talk about signifyin(g), especially under the idiocy of political identity. Intertextuality, as an apolitical concept, is politicalized here, unfortunately, into a "politically correct"

one at that. S&P yearns for the call of political identity. The protagonist of each novel, as cut by S&P, is uttered by their desire for identity; and here desire is written strictly in a Lacanian desire. If politics, in the general and over used sense of the word, falls under the image of a struggle between powers, whether it is between a subject and social or between subject for the ideal agency, here there is no struggle in that sense. There is only: the power-image of “I am precious/I am Girl/I am Black.” There is only a chant, an echo without change, for that one identity, for that oneness. This leaves only that one Narcissus whose gaze is locked on his own reflection, cursed by the god. Even though the myth is about the obsession with one’s own image, what Narcissus sees is the gaze itself. He see the unchanging of the image. It is not his own reflection that he sees, but the state of seeing the unchanging. This is the beauty that locks his gaze: the beauty of the being unaffected, which could be read as the unloved also. “He pinned away, leaning perpetually over the pool, fixed in one long gaze” (Hamilton, 2011, p. 115). Narcissus, the young adult black girl.

What intertextuality is, is not what it is. It is where it is not. The “wh”, that presupposes the who, where, when, and why, falls under the banner of nomination. This is the case of S&P in a nutshell. The name and noun of *nom* and *non*.¹³ It refers to One and makes one for itself. Intertextuality does not need name. It abolishes the name. “[T]he text undoes nomination” (Barthes, 1975, p. 45). This is not to say that a text is nameless, for this would inevitably implies that a text could not be signified and signify. In a sense, it is an erasure, a Derridean *sous rapture*. ~~Name~~, it is put under erasure as, at least in two senses. On one hand, that it is crossed out, not being of use, while on the other hand, it cannot be crossed out, completely erased, because it is under, as in an ongoing process of under construction. ~~The nomination of intertextuality~~ is what it is not, a supplementary name, a name that *sh/could* not be named, namely the no-of-the-name as a noun. In the case of a text, there is a third hand, and that is the attempt to cancel out the erasure: the insistence of a name. The name of the text always returns, and because of this return, it cease to function as a text, turning itself into a work.¹⁴ Whether it is temporary or permanently, this depends on case by case, name by name. This return of the name either connotes that the name is repressed and returns or that the name has never been erased – it has never been there – as the fictionality of the name posits the name there, on the imaginary hole, trapping a gap with another gap, making a hole (w)hole: the haunting of “wh”.

¹³ Name in this context refers to the name of the text, the origin, its author – anything that could fix the text momentary to that one place, that one meaning that could give the meaning to the polysemy of the text.

¹⁴ See Barthes’s “From Work to Text” (1977) for more theory regarding the difference between work and text.



In S&P, the process of haunting is more apparent. This can be seen from the process of signifyin(g) between authors. S&P said that the ending in *Push* is a parody of *The Color Purple*'s whereas *The Skin I'm In*'s celebrates the ending of the other (Panlay, pp. 24-25). Here, S&P argued that "the authors, whether consciously and unconsciously, resort to intertextuality or Signifyin(g), essentially letting their texts interact with other (black) texts, thus adding both range and depth to their works" (Panlay, p. 20). There is no intertextuality here, not there in the text, but (t)here on S&P. Emphasizing the intent of the author, S&P unavoidably meets with the aporia of intertextuality. Ironically, Barthes' "The Death of Author" (1977) is mentioned also by S&P, and it seems that the author does not want to be dead after all. As the intent still haunts (with) "wh": who is the author, where is the ending, when is where S&P starts evoking the ghost, and why is the given argument above (?). How could the author be dead if his intent still haunts the work with "wh"? This is not to say that he is between life and dead, for that would put this argument in the realm of mysticism. The dead author here is dead as in the sense of not being able to control the meaning-intent of his work, and at the same time the death of the author refers to the lack of origin and identity of the work. Despite Barthes' argument that "it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author" (1977, p. 148), in S&P, it could be seen that the Author as position can never be dead.¹⁵ The "re-authoring", to use S&P's words, is to ensue. After all, a text is a gap that is to be completed by the readers, not by itself, as argued by Wolfgang Iser in "The Reading Process: a phenomenological approach" (1980). Iser argues that any textual object is without meaning, but with holes and lack. It is the reader who produces the meaning by "filling" those holes. This implies that a text always assumes the author; a text desires to be a work. The author has never been dead. The author is a function as it is the text itself that authors the readers, authorizing the authored other: the author is always the other presupposed by the Other. Therefore, the intent of the author in S&P is neither the author nor the reader. It is the unconscious, in Lacanian sense, of the text – strictly symbolic agency. However, what S&P assumes is otherwise.

On one hand, S&P's intent can only be conscious, even though s/he said in the beginning that it can be either conscious or unconscious. It is grounded in the intent of a thesis. One author here is to refer to the other there through the characters. Even though alphabetical characters and fictional characters are not identical, they intersect on the imaginary and symbolic strata

¹⁵ In "Myth Today," (2013) Barthes argued that the only way to demythologize a myth is "to mythify it in its turn, and to produce an artificial myth: and this reconstituted myth will in fact be a mythology" (p. 247). This could be seen clearly from how the idea of the death-of-the-author has become the mythology itself. The concept of text and reader are mythified. A new myth has become the new Author of the myth. Subjectivity of the reader and the free play of the text are now on the throne. They are the new King-author, with the ex-caliber of the has-never-been-dead author.

(with a touch of the Real). The authors and the characters are characterized in and by S&P. They desire what S&P desires. “Man’s desire is the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1981, p. 235). S&P functions as the Other, the supposed Symbolic order of the text, whereas the meaning, situated in imaginary registry, is the other meaning of intertextuality – that is to say, it is imaginary whether it is on S&P’s part or of its own structure as a meaning as such. S&P becomes language, not a text, to say, a grammar that rules the movement of the characters according to its “pleasure of ... image-repertoire” (Barthes, 1978, p. 6). It could be that the authors do want to refer to the other’s work. Nevertheless, how could S&P or even the author know that it is the pure intention of the subject? Is this but an interpellation of the Symbolic that creates the imaginary function for author? What is the author, but a haunting of “wh” (this has been stated above)? To take pleasure in the image, S&P and the author, as a position, can only be “conscious” of this intertextuality, being the Lacanian ‘subject supposed to know’ for the reader and the assumed authors. The ideal subject who knows more than the other because he is the ideal ego of the presumed Knowledge. It is a pleasure to know accordingly to the grammar of such knowledge, both in terms of form and content (this does not mean that one or the other can be distinguished). There is no bliss or *jouissance*, but pleasure. This is not to say that pleasure is unwanted in anyway. Even of this text, in this very work, the pleasure takes the helm. It writes itself according to the figure of gaze which stares back at itself: the doubling of name S&P¹⁶. The discussion of bliss of *jouissance* will not take place here, but bliss itself is everywhere but (t)here.

On the other hand, it can be said that the intent of the author is conscious under the gaze of S&P while it is unconscious at the same time, as a function of the Symbolic. As stated, it is conscious because it is known and made known by the author who is the *Autre* of the author. The known is of S&P’s alone. In other words, it is a meta-discourse of the Zizekian “unknown-known” (Zizek and Writght, 2004).¹⁷ It is something that is not known to be known. The authors are not aware of what this very *Nom-du-Pere* desires here. Hence, this meta discourse is structured as the unconscious. (It should be noted at this point that the said meta-discourse is conscious in terms of its content but works similar to unconscious in term of form). Only here, S&P assumes the role of the narrator who knows what the authors do not.

¹⁶ A footnote is necessary for those whom the irony misses, or for those who miss the irony. The title of this article is a doubling of Panlay’s original article, translated here as S&P.

¹⁷ This is not to be confused with Johari window. Even though the terms used by Zizek is identical to Johari’s, Zizek does not talk about the ego of the subject as Johari does (Zizek, as a one of the strictest Lacanian in the world, do not take a strong stance against the ego psychology, as any Freudian and Lacanian reader would). Johari window emphasize on the individual of the ego, how s/he perceive the other and how s/he image how the other perceive him/her. On the contrary, Zizek’s terms are about the discourse and knowledge of the subject regarding the discourse.



At the same time, on the surface it could be said that the intent mentioned by S&P does not exist as such. It is his/hers alone, being the author of his work. Despite the fact that there are others that think alike, like an echo, the relation between the other and S&P is that of Echo and Narcissus. It is not theirs *per se*. S&P sees only what s/he wants to see. This is a structure of academic writing where reference is more and less than itself. It means more than it supposed to figuratively; it is less than what it is literally: as partial whole, and a whole rendered partial. However, at the structure level, the intent does exist. It is what it is not. Its materialistic is as written above: an imaginary. There can never be an intent *as such* – the real intent that is created wholly for the sake of the subject – because a subject is created from the other. Hence, this could explain one of the reasons why S&P's argument seems like, according to Wilkie-stibbs (as cited by Panlay, p. 22), "texts of quotation, texts of imitation, and genre texts". There is only this and that, a tit for tat. Where the original argument is, if there is any, but the 'certified copy'. This does not mean that a text lacks any kind of free gesture. There is a kind of free gesture, a kind of accidental gesture. It can only occurs under the guise of reading, as an event in reading with an accidental meaning in the crevice: a misreading. The problem is how long can that free gesture prolongs itself as a free agent before the interpellation of a name, of that one head. The work of Hercules against the textual nature of Hydra. In this case of S&P, how could there be intertextuality if a text itself is missing from the very wor(l)d?

Misreading and Re-Citation

The first thesis of S&P is about intertextuality in young adult literature, emphasizing the conscious intent of the authors that could be seen in their works. However, as shown above, the theoretical aspect of the argument is still too problematic to even say that this is intertextuality. It is rather a problematic subject which refuses the nomination of the One. It is where and when it is not. Also, it seems as if the desire of S&P, as the Other author of work, is the one that regulates the flow of intertextuality into a circulated cog belt. The second thesis focuses on the reader and intertextuality. S&P believes that there is a limitation of difference between the adult reader and child reader. Wilkie-Stibbs said that the child readers are "delimited by their temporal immaturity and inexperience" (as cited by Panlay, p. 27). On the contrary, the adult readers could enjoy a more complex text because of their knowledge and background. One of the resolution for this problem, as proposed by S&P, is that "books, particularly for younger readers ... [have] to be *overreferential* in order not to lose their readers" (Panlay, p. 27). Nevertheless, a new (old?) problem arises: how to effectively balance the referential content, which could hinder the challenging aspect of the text? (Panlay, p. 28). That is to say, how to not "linguistically, historically, and ... 'intertextually' [marginalize] the reader" (Panlay, p. 27)?

It is ironic to talk about intertextuality without textuality. In this case, it is questionable to talk about an “intertextually marginalized” reader when textuality does not take side. A text is out-side; it is out of sight. There can never be side when talking about, especially the one sided “power imbalance” as mentioned one-sidedly in S&P (Panlay, p. 27). It stands on the side but never out there for “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (Derrida, 1976, p. 158). The old translation of the phrase is ‘there is nothing outside of the text’ which, most of time, is interpreted as there is nothing outside language, everything is but a discourse or rhetoric, or everything is languaged, and so on in this line of thought. The newer translation of the phrase, which is not the actual new, in the 40th anniversary of *Of Grammatology* is “there is no outside-text”. Michael Wood (2016) mentioned that

[i]t did not hold, as many of its detractors thought it did, that there was no reality apart from language, and it’s wrong to translate Derrida’s famous ‘Il n’y a pas de hors-texte’ as ‘there is nothing outside the text.’ A hors-texte is an unnumbered page in a printed book. Derrida is saying that even the unnumbered pages count, just as an outlaw, in French an hors-la-loi, has everything to do with the law, since it makes him what he is

While it could be seen that Wood uses the old English translation, Wood refers to the historical context of the word “*hors-texte*” – hence, the new translation. *Hors-texte* is a French word not only for the blank page in the book, but also pages or illustration that prints separately from the book and “tipped in after the binding” (The Press, 2010). There is neither inside nor outside; there only is a Derridean supplement (For example, between verb and noun, what would be the other since the other is the other? The cat does cats. It cats, and so does the tree trees). The new translation *could* be closer to Derrida’s intention, to the origin (but as discussed above, the subject of intent is a dangerous topic; and also this would be ironic because of Derrida’s). Everything is not *languaged* because that would be an obvious logocentric statement with a touch of mysticism. A text is not language; nevertheless, it is inevitably related to it. (Barthes, 1975, pp. 30 – 31). (This does not mean that Derrida agrees with Barthes’ concept of text as this could be seen from how Derrida’ philosophical antagonist, Jacques Lacan, plays an important role in Barthes’ philosophy about text).

¹⁸Coming back to point via the Derridean gesture of supplementing, the old and the new translation is neither new nor old: it is not present, but a trace of each other, a supplement that subs the other pre-made meaning, a sub-premade supplement. The old interpretation from the old translation

¹⁸ The paragraph is an intentional mistake as the mark of a new paragraph is elsewhere (at the end of the above paragraph). The paragraph is a non-paragraph (the prefix indicates that it is a paragraph when it is not). Supposed-to-be-a-conclusion of the paragraph, it is, but at the same time it is its own idea. Also, footnote 16 signifies the spacing itself, not the word-matter. A Derridean supplement in practice.



is the ~~new~~ interpretation of the ~~new~~ meaning, and vice versa. The value of wrong or right is left with nothing. Language, on one hand, is everything, from its imaginary-symbolic aspect of object to the ideological aspect and discursive aspect of things, as a product language-image and discourse. At the same time, in that structure, language is no-thing. A text, though residing in language, is not language because it is the utterance, the crevice in the system, an *hors-texte*. Anything textual is the event that slips away, thought temporary, from the limitation of language, presuming that the limitation is the moment before that instant. Structurally speaking, there are other aspects of language that *should*¹⁹ not be mentioned here. From the case of Derridean translation, it could be seen that there is no such thing as an “intertextually marginalized” reader, as said by S&P. Even though, on the face value, S&P addresses a problem which he wants resolution, S&P is a part of the problem addressed, becoming a dress that dresses him and dressed by him. By addressing the difference between two groups of readers, S&P emphasizes the idea that there is such a thing as a bad reading and good reading, a good writing and bad writing, or even a right way of reading and bad way of reading. If, with whatever reason, the problem is solved, it only can be at the level of imaginary-practice, not at the level of ideology. The only marginalized reader here is the one who reads that marginalized the other there. S&P's body is composed of the myth of children, adult, wrong and right, that is to say, the mythology of seniority, grounded in the logocentric of the old.

With a Barthesian gesture, to undermine a myth, there needs to be the other myth, myth can only be demythified with another myth (Barthes, 2013, pp. 246 -247). But myth requires time and specific condition to morph itself from discourse to myth, from societal to natural. It needs a beginning. The beginning of beginning would be otherwise. A beginning also needs a beginning; however, the beginning of a beginning can only occur retroactively (Bianchi, 2017, p. 3). This does not mean that it is of the past in a sense that the past determines the present or the future. Retroactively, psychoanalytically speaking, is an afterwardness or *après-coup* (Bianchi, p. 34). Here, the *après-coup* beginning of a ~~new~~ myth, to laying bare the device as the Shklovsky would say, is, the only way of reading is misreading: this could be read as, the correct way of reading is a mistake, the right way of reading is the wrong one, or even the only way of reading is not to read at all, and so on. There is no need for more explanation. The above pedantry and logomachy should suffice.²⁰ It marks the point here which is there, looking with afterward gaze.

¹⁹ It should because it could not. The *hors-texte* refers to those that are (t)here – hence, the structure defers the different dialogue that should come up inevitably.

²⁰ In case words are not enough, the play between the two interpretations of Derrida's ‘il n'y a pas de hors-texte’ should show that reading is not structured by right or wrong.

This myth, if I dare say, is the out-of-joint one, could be made anew in this context (but theoretically, this myth is not new), from the structure of reading S&P. The adult readers cannot read as the child readers do (there is a possibility, but this possibility is removed from the discourse of S&P), and vice versa. They misread each other. This is not to say that the adult readers could read as the author wants them to while the child could not (this is what S&P said, and is discussed of its problem above), but that they read with *différance*, which is the gesture. Reading is not a formula where there is a right or wrong, where who would be the chosen one, or where who would be closer to the King-Author at his table, on his right hand, not the wrong left hand. Reading is related to textuality where there is only a flow and crevice of the utterance. It is a *punctum*, a scar, at the moment. It is abrupt instant. “[I]t is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of It like an arrow, and pierces me” (Barthes, 1981, p. 26). S/he would not read to remember, for that would be a remembrance of an icon, not reading. Studying a work is not the same as reading a text. Nevertheless, similar to intertextuality, there always is a sediment of reading in studying, remembering, deciphering, translation, and so on. It is where it is not. Each sees and reads according to their immediate subjectivity. It is true that one reads according to one subject-position as implied in S&P – that is, the children readers read as they do, and so do the adult readers (this is rather problematic in itself as to what degree a child is mature at his position or an adult immature). However, because of the relational nature of a subject-position, the subjectivity of the reader is always re-written. The readers are interpellated by the text, and consequently, the text is read. “[T]he reader is without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted” (Barthes, 1977, p. 148). Strangely enough, even though S&P seems to almost touch this very topic (and yet too far from what is being discussed here is), talking about the “act of writing” that could alter the subject-position of the character (Panlay, pp. 23-24), his proposal to the problem, his findings, is contrary to what he said about the characters, as if he draws a line, between fiction and non-fiction: for him, the author still holds power over the text. (It has to be stated that while this may fall under the pretense of mystical negative theology, defined with a closure, reading would only be practice where there is right and wrong. *Then, how could it not be right or wrong if the concept of reading from S&P is argued here to be at the wrong?* The resolution to such argument is in its statement, the assumption that S&P is about reading. The readers of S&P do not read, they re-cite²¹ the fetishized work. The value is that of being able to re-cite with and as the Author²², which is deeply rooted in the Christian hermeneutic. The audience, both of the Old Testament and the New Testament, can only attain something when

²¹ Re-citation is where citation is committed repeatedly, in terms of the same citation and the numbers of citation.

²² Other-author

the text, that the text is void, as an unmentioned fissure in their Symbolic order. One can read a text even if one has ever read one, only a trace of it in the discourse is sufficient for reading (but it will never be enough for re-citing). A marginalized reader, simply put, is not a reader of that particular text. There is no marginalized reader because s/he is not the reader; there is always a reader because everyone read in a particular sense of the word; and there is always a marginalized reader because it is impossible to read everything: that would turn everything into no-thing.

There is only spacing in reading, not a distance imbued with marginality and centrality of authorial meaning. Reading itself does not marginalize individuals (that would be the matter of the work that marginalizes with the power-knowledge). It does not create a distance between readers, only a space. On one hand, “[t]he reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination” (Barthes, 1977, p. 148). Misreading the quoted phrase, reading produces a position for the reader-space. The reader is the destination²³ of the text. Whatever arrives at the destination is the textuality of the text, not the text itself. The matter of the text cannot arrive because it has never existed in the first place, the materiality is of the work.²⁴ What is (mis)read, is its textuality. This whatever follows the logic of supplementary, the aporia of the haunting of W.H. Even though it is quotation without marks, it is marked at the moment of its arrival at its destination. The marked is hardly the same among the readers. One reader may (mis)read a phrase, a word, or even the spacing between letters, as the quotation without marks. This is not to say that s/he recognizes its image from other work of the other name since this would not be misreading, but that at that very instance, at that present, the disposition of the reader affects the text, and in return (to the origin-destination), the reader’s disposition is dis-positioned by the text. The result could be a slight alteration of affect, such as boredom, annoyance, angst, *jouissance* or that even that distilled posture of contemplation. Reading always misread because it alters the reader-space, using his/her own history to de-historize and culture to de-culturalized – hence, the dis-position of disposition.

The echo of Lacan’s “[a] letter always arrives at its destination” (2006, p. 30) can be heard but sung in an estranged tune. While Lacan’s letter positions the subject-meaning, as it is purloined from one to the other through the *signifiance*, Barthes’ reader is not an empty signifier, waiting for its turn in the post-Oedipal triangular structure, but a space-that-matter. Lacan’s destination could be anywhere even the non-destination (its origin); Barthes’ destination could

²³ The idea of destination is structured on the concept of time and space as it is deferred and differed from its origin by both time and space.

²⁴ “[T]he work is seen...the text is demonstrated...; the work is held in hand, the text is held in language” (Barthes, 1977, p. 157)



the otherness is interpreted by the Author, such as the Daniel and the writing on the wall, Joseph's interpretation of dream, the suffering of Job, or even the parables of Jesus. There is a right and wrong way to re-cite God's signified: those who can "read" and those who cannot, or adult and the children readers in the context of S&P. Even so the fetishization of meaning alienates the subjects from the work (which creates an instant of textual implosion). The subject, as the subject of God, alienates God from his intent and vice versa. His words, his "interpretation," are one with God. He knows what God desires, and so does God's desire becomes his. Hence, he can "speak" the truth, the future which he and God can only foresee. Nevertheless, this is not God's desire as such. "Who are you to question my wisdom with your ignorant, empty words" (Job. 38:2 Today's English Version). It is the word itself that presupposes the outcome (the faith of the individual in the Bible) – that is to say, it is the interpretation itself that conditions the originality of meaning, not the original meaning. This is the *sjuzet* of the narrative, of how it is told. Despite the fact that the *fabula* of the narrative is about what happens as interpreted and foreseen by these God-chosen individuals, the *sjuzet* implies that what happens is structured by how it is told. In other words, the cupbearer would not survive and the baker would not be dead if Joseph did not interpret their dream. Fate-as-God does not exist; it is to exist when it is uttered in the name of the interpreter's Faith. Here, God is alienated from his work-meaning as it is his subject that subjugates his will. However, at the same time, the subject, as the subject-that-matters, alienates himself with this very same fetishized meaning. He is not himself anymore, but the Author. He is God. The interpretation, even though is his, is made under/in the name of God. He does not own those words. Both God and his subject are alienated from their work because of the one and the other. The one and the other both are structured under the right-wrong recital. They re-cite each other – God needs to recite the faith of his subjects, and the believers are to re-cite the fate destined by God, and this is the song sung behind the word "reading" in S&P. Recycle-re-citing.)

Reading in Space

There is no marginalized reader *as such*. Marginalization is a concept that, broadly speaking, structures around the idea of center and other, such as the idea of modernity and colonialism. What implies in this very concept is the distancing between the center and margin. Furthermore, the problem of marginalized reader of S&P is more problematic, considering the idea of singular and general. *Is marginalization considered as general for the readers of a particular group toward a general group of text, or only a particular reader toward a particular text? Is the reader marginalized from the text, the author, or other reader?* For me, if a marginalized reader is to exist, because of the insistence in marginalization itself, s/he is to be the individual who has never come into contact with a particular text. That is to say, s/he has never heard of



not be anywhere but the reader-position. The text needs to interact with the reader, so the reader can be in his or her position. A slight utterance of the name is enough for the reading space. Unlike the Lacan's destination, the Lacanian reader can be in his position even though the text is not a part of his subjectivity. Simply put, Barthes emphasizes the interaction between the text and the reader while Lacan the relation-distance between the twos.

Misreading always alter because it is not looking. It is true that these two gesture cannot be separated. There is always a sediment of looking in misreading, and misreading can only be through looking (it does not matter whether one looks by hands, ears, eyes, or lips, as long as the object, either exterior or interior, is "perceived"). Because the predominant feature of looking is the imaginary²⁵, looking often traps and lures the looking subject as Lacan said. It is the immobile aspect of the imaginary that makes one look. One falls for the other one: the misrecognition between the looking subject and the subject-who-is-looking (noted that the two have the same meaning, but differ in their image) – hence the name "Mirror Stage" as called by Lacan. One looks because one is pleased with the gaze, with what looks (back). It affirms his or her subjectivity. It does not alter him, only change him according to his ideal ego and ego-ideal: something that confirms his or her existence as One. There is a sense in alteration in confirmation; however, the alterity in confirmation only repeats for the sake of similarity, not for difference. The object of the gaze is not affected. It only looks back at the one who looks, creating a vicious circle of identification. Thus, looking paralyzes the "individual," putting him/her in a coma, trapped in a deep slumber where one dreams about looking at one's self" perpetually. This does not mean that reading cannot exist with looking. Reading can erupt during the moment of looking or non-looking, as a parasite. It is a moment of sleep paralysis where one becomes afraid of being one, of being there sleeping. That is, one becomes aware of the nature of sleeping: stasis. It alters the position of sleeping. The coma becomes a comma in-between the word and words. At the same time, sleep paralysis cannot occur without the presupposition of sleeping; and one can always falls back to sleep the after the paralysis because the body²⁶ is out of joint. What can a body do but being caught between the subjects?

On the other hand, the spacing as reading is spoken in the Derrida's sense of spacing: *espacement*. Spacing cannot be dissociated with alterity. It indicates nil from the distance, acting as the irreducibility of the movement, barring the *dénouement* of identity. Spacing can never be itself because its origin is without one, only a spacing from the other (Derrida, 1981, pp. 81 and 94).

²⁵ This is a simplified way of looking at looking because since Lacan first seminar, he showed that imaginary order is intertwined with symbolic order.

²⁶ "Apparently Arab scholars, when speaking of the text, use this admirable expression: the certain body" (Barthes, 1975, p. 16).

Reading creates the originality of work-without-origin. It alters the identity, and at the same time it does not change because the trace of identity is left in the blank space, a movement. *Is it necessitous to read a criticism about intertextuality in young adult literature as one, too, as a blank space?* This is not because the text itself is lacking in its subject matter, but because, at the instant of reading, a void is created. The text ceases to be one. It does not multiply, which would be a polysemy of meaning. Even though multiplicity can be considered as one of the aspects of reading, the multiple meanings “is” grounded by the context, by the content germinated from the work. Reading breaks. It is itself a *contradictio in terminis*. The semantic limit, presumed by the authorial Master signifier of the text, is broken. The context of the work is missing because there is no context in the first place. A context is a con-text: it deceives *as such*, that there is a context, and misleads the text to be contextualized. It is an auto-antonym. As Derrida (1988, p. 9) said about writing that it “carries with it a force that breaks with its context,” it is the same with reading. A context of reading is not a context, but a con-text, because it is simultaneously asocial and socially conducted. A context cons a text to be socialized at the moment of reading. There is no original context, only a con-text at the moment of utterance, at the moment of writing.

When one reads, one could read-look at the stain of ink on the text, at the wrong page number at the bottom of the page, at that one footnote which stands out, at the misspelling or the misplaced comma, at the transmutation of scanning where I (i) turns to I (L), or 1 turns to I from the intervention of technology (PDF scanning), or not even read-look at the text at all, but at the blind man, reading his text with his own hands. In other cases, one “actually” might reach the dissemination of the text itself, such as reading William Carlos Williams’s “This is Just to Say” (1934) without all of its enjambment, or the infamous

“bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonnerronntuonnthun-
ntrovarrhounawnskawntoohohoordenenthur –nuk!”

from the beginning of James Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* (1939). Surely the new context is created in the guise of con-text. *Last but not least, could I read Suriyan Panlay’s Panlay’s “I am Precious/I Am Girl/I Am Black: Intertextuality in African American Children’s and Young Adult Literature” as a conversation between itself and the other, between S&P and S&P, about the myth of Narcissus and Echo, about be-heading, haunting, re-citing, (mis)reading, spacing, and so on, without any background knowledge about African American literature, young adult fiction, or even intertextuality? Can I read S&P without reading S&P?*

A Misplaced P.S. for S&P

...is the “so-called intertextual gap fillings ... help the younger reader” (Panlay, p. 28)? Is it in the author’s authority to do so? S&P seems to believe so. However, how could the author know where



the gap is? Is this not a very militant gesture, as that of the Thai junta, in assuming the desire-lack of the other, forcing one desire-lack onto the other? The One-Who-Knows-All. The echo of “Return Happiness to Thai People” is vibrant. This is not to say that S&P is in support or against the Thai junta. It does not matter. This is only to say that the gesture of assuming the desire-lack of the reader is that of the Thai junta. There is such a thing as the assumed readers. Are they not the fantasy of the author? After all, if the letter always arrive at its destination, the assumed readers have already arrived at its destination: its origin.

.....

S&P: How could the reading of a “misunderstood” child readers be considered less effective than the adult readers? When was reading about efficient?

S&P: Can reading be about affective trivial matter? Can reading be about indifferent contemplation?

S and P: Are there such concepts as ‘motivated Signifyin(g)’ and ‘unmotivated Signifyin(g)’ since textual signification, in terms of criticism, both (dis)respect and revise-revive the text. Is it not a form of respect to disrespect? Is it not a kind of parody, revision, or even intertextuality, to cite a text, and plays with its original meaning?

สอและปอ: กาลครั้งหนึ่งเมื่อสิบกว่าหน้ากระดาษที่อ่านมา ข้าพเจ้าหวนกลับมาที่จุดจบ ณ ตอนก่อนแรกเริ่ม เมื่อปลายทางสำหรับที่นี่คือการรวบหัวและหางเพื่อสร้างข้อต่อที่พับสิบกว่าหน้าเป็นหนึ่งย่อหน้า ข้าพเจ้าจึงกระทำได้และพึง/เพิงปฏิบัติเมื่อไม่นานมาก ไม่ไกลนัก ตัดหัวออกจากหางเปลี่ยนปลายทางให้เป็นหนทางของการมีอยู่ เพียงเพื่อรอการมาถึงของการเดินทางอีกครั้ง

p to s: ฉันไม่อ่าน ฉันไม่เขียน ฉันแค่เล่น ฉันเพียงแต่ต้องการเล่นเท่านั้น แล้วเธอล่ะ จะมัวจดและจ้องตัวหนังสืออยู่ไย ฉีก กัด ดึง ทั้ง มาเล่นกับฉัน ขยำก้อนกระดาษ แล้วมาเล่นกัน²⁷

nu
deltit
valpottnawtnodlon
ylfottnawl

enalprepapym
[sic]

²⁷ What is the need for the literal-letter translation if what written is but an image of the letters?

References

- Barthes, R. (1975). *The Pleasure of the Text* (1st American ed.). New York: Hill and Wang.
- Barthes, R. (1977). The Death of the Author (S. Heath, Trans.). In S. Heath (Ed.), *Image, Music, Text* (pp. 142-148). London: Fontana.
- Barthes, R. (1977). From Work to Text (S. Heath, Trans.). In S. Heath (Ed.), *Image, Music, Text* (pp. 155-164). London: Fontana.
- Barthes, R. (1978). *A lover's discourse : fragments* (Paperback edition. ed.). New York: Hill and Wang.
- Barthes, R. (1981). *Camera Lucida: reflection on photography* (R. Howard, Trans.). London: Vintage.
- Barthes, R. (2013). *Mythologies: the complete edition, in new translation*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Bianchi, P. (2017). *Jacques Lacan and Cinema: Imaginary, Gaze, Formalisation*. London: Karnac.
- Derrida, J. (1976). *Of grammatology* (1st American ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Derrida, J. (1982). Différance. In A. Bass (Ed.), *Margins of philosophy* (pp. 1-27). Brighton: Harvester Press.
- Derrida, J. (1988). *Limited Inc*. Evanston, IL (n.p.): Northwestern University Press.
- Derrida, J. (Writer) & S. Fathy (Director). (1999). *D'aileurs Derrida* (n.p.): Gloria Films.
- Derrida, J., Bass, A., & Ronse, H. (1981). *Positions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Evink, E. (2012). Polysemy and Dissemination. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 43(3), 264-284.
- Hamilton, E. (2011). *Mythology : timeless tales of gods and heroes* (Oversized ed.). New York, NY: Grand Central Pub.
- Iser, W. (1980). The Reading Process: a phenomenological approach. In J. P. Tompkins (Ed.), *Reader-Response Criticism : from formalism to post-structuralism* (pp. 50 - 69). Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kiarostami, A. (Writer). (2010). *Copie Conforme* (n.p.): MK2 Diffusion.
- Lacan, J. (1981). *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, book XI* (A. Sheridan, Trans. J.-A. Miller Ed.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Lacan, J., & Fink, B. (2006). *Ecrits : The first complete edition in English*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Panlay, S. (2015). I am Precious/I am Girl/I am Black: Intertextuality in African American Children's and Young Adult Literature. *Journal of Liberal Arts*, 15(January - June 2015), pp. 18 - 30.
- Press, T. (2010, January 1). HORS-TEXTE. Retrieved July 5, 2017, from <http://parasiticventure-spress.com/books/?p=339>



- Wood, M. (2016). We do it all the time. *London Review of Books*, 38(3), 7-9. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from London Review of Books website: <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n03/michael-wood/we-do-it-all-the-time>
- Woolf, V., Woolf, V. M. D., Woolf, V. T. t. I., Woolf, V. W., & McNichol, S. (1992). *Collected novels of Virginia Woolf (Mrs. Dalloway, To the lighthouse, The waves)*. London: MacMillan.
- Zizek, S. (Writer) & B. Wright (Director). (2004). *The Reality of the Virtual* (n.p.).